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ABSTRACT 
 
The current thesis investigated the emotions of workers at a hospital in the United 
Kingdom.  Historically, the topic of emotion has received scant attention from academics 
in organisation research. It has been placed antithetical to reason and since the Second 
World War, for the most part, it has remained off the research agenda. It was in the early 
1990’s that emotion started to attract attention and since then, research on the topic has 
gained momentum. Extending this movement further, the current thesis specifically asks 
the question: How is emotion experienced by workers involved in organizational 
change?  
As a research theme, organisational change has attracted attention by scholars 
interested in worker emotion. A change context involves emotion because workers stand 
to gain or lose prospects in such environments. Emotion is a form of adaptive behavior 
and from a research viewpoint, there is space to further develop our knowledge of how 
emotional experiences of workers emerge in organizational change. Focusing on this 
space, the current thesis specifically looks at the mental components of emotion. Case 
study based investigation and qualitative analysis was conducted with participants 
employed at a hospital enduring change.  
Findings show that emotion as an experience involves intentionality, feelings, and 
beliefs. To understand how these are formed, further empirical analysis also showed that 
congruence, immediacy and certainty were related components of emotional 
experiences that emerged in change. Contributing to knowledge of emotion and 
implications for change management, the current thesis found that change was met with 
two types of participant reactions. Firstly, in anger and fear there was a perception that 
change was doomed to fail. Secondly, there was uncertainty about how change was 
important for participant prospects. These represent barriers to change which were not 
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managed at the hospital. The contribution is the recommendation that practical policy 
aimed at setting up programs designed to manage employee adjustment to change 
should be established.   
Contributing to knowledge of emotional experiences of workers involved in change 
research, findings propose the presence of intentionality. Related to this core 
component, the participants experienced feelings of frustration. Intentionality functioned 
to turn feelings to emotion by providing direction towards persons and change programs. 
Intentionality was present in both beliefs and feelings, wherein the latter component was 
found to be directly about things rather than through mediation of some logical belief 
system with clear rationale. Additionally, findings suggest that beliefs and to a lesser 
extent feelings, explicated congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The latter three 
concepts represent new territory in the field of organizational change. Integrating the 
above findings, the current thesis proposes the tripartite model of emotion. The model 
represents how mental components co-operate and represent a dynamic understanding 
of emotion in change. In the field of organizational change, such a model has not been 
proposed in terms of the components that it integrates. The model provides a fresh way 
of thinking about emotion and how workers endure such experiences during change. 
Future research can extend the model and review its applicability to other organisational 
arenas.    
The methodology employed in the current thesis is designed to elicit the interpretations 
that participants harbored in thinking about emotion during change initiatives. The 
collection and analysis of data involved techniques that reduce, compare, and 
synthesize data. The technique is designed for this study and presents a possible set of 
tools available for use in other research projects.        
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 WHY RESEARCH EMOTION  
 
In organizations and in everyday life emotion is important because it influences 
how we see things. Emotion is a personal experience that shapes the workers thinking. 
Consider the worker in fear who is plagued with negative thoughts. Amidst rumors of 
redundancies he believes that tomorrow he might lose his job. His emotion may involve 
related beliefs about the fearfulness of the situation and the inferred consequences of 
job loss. Later in the day he might think about how his wife will react when she hears 
about his job loss and again a shudder runs down his spine. Appreciating this view of 
emotion Goldie (2004) argues that emotion is not just a brute feeling and it involves 
believing the world to be a certain way. For organization research, it took a long time to 
recognize this idea. The reason is that historically and in the wider scheme of things, 
research has neglected emotion. In the decades following World War II, emotion largely 
remained off the research agenda (Ashkanasy and Humphreys, 2011; Hartel et al, 
2005). The prevalent argument against emotion has been that emotion is bad because it 
harms the worker’s ability to act rationally (Ashforth and Humphreys, 1995; Fineman, 
1993.         
 Organization research has focused on the idea that rational behavior is more 
important. That is, the worker, whether acting in his own interest or in the interests of the 
team, can best benefit the organization through rational responses. A rational response 
is seen to be one that minimizes economic costs and maximizes benefits. This 
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preference for rationality is rooted in early 20th century ideas by thinkers like Gulick 
(1937), Weber (1946), and Taylor (1912). Over the past 60 years, rationality has reigned 
over research agendas and consequently emotion has remained on the periphery of 
research. 
“Prior to 1992, the study of emotions was, with a few notable exceptions, essentially next 
to nonexistent in the management literature. Textbooks in the field, for example, 
provided no coverage of the role of emotions in work settings except with respect to job 
satisfaction -” 
     Hartel et al (2005.p2.) 
 In the early 1990’s, a new idea emerged. The idea was that knowledge of 
emotion is important because worker emotion is a way in which the worker experiences 
and knows his environment. During emotion the person forms beliefs about the 
environment and recognizes its importance for survival and progress (Goldie, 2004, 
2002a, 2002b; Lazarus, 1991). Emotion is a basic human experience pervasive in 
organisations. Whether research acknowledges it or not, emotion will shape worker 
beliefs. Consequently, knowledge of emotion on the job improves understanding of 
worker experiences (Fineman, 2003,1993). Broadly speaking, the current thesis adopts 
this position; knowledge of emotion is better than ignorance of it.  
Specifically, the current thesis is situated within a branch of organisation 
research concerned with organisational change. Studies in this area look at how change 
is managed within an organisation. The current thesis focuses on the individual and how 
emotion unfolds through inner workings of the mind. There are several reasons why 
organisational change provides an opportunity to research emotion. One reason is that 
change is typically met with emotional reactions by workers. Two common emotions are 
anger and fear (Elving, 2005). Change provides a good environment for researching 
emotion because it emerges during change as an adaptive response (Klarner et al, 
2011) and so it should be researched as part of understanding organisational change. 
How the individual has an emotional experience during change remains fertile territory 
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for research. The second reason is that organisational change provides an opportunity to 
define emotion. Most studies of emotion in organisations fail on this front. They do not 
explicitly provide definitions of emotion (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). As a concept 
emotion is not explicit. This is a gap in research. Researching emotion within 
organisational change provides a fresh understanding of emotion, which is currently not 
present in the field. Emotion is an emerging topic and one that could do with a definition.  
The third reason is that knowledge developed will foster more research in the 
area. This has practical implications. Knowledge of emotion can enable better 
implementation of change in organisations through increased awareness of worker 
experiences and reactions (Carr, 2001; Klarner et al, 2011). Knowledge of emotion as 
adaptive behavior can help management in formulating methods to manage this aspect 
of change. 
  
1.2 THE RESEARCH GAP   
 
Reviewing emotion research Jonker and Botma (2012.p.15) note that “Not much 
attention has been paid to what really happens on the job”. This is surprising because 
worker responses on the job are often based on emotion (Fineman, 2003, 1997, 1993). 
In the decade’s post 1990, some studies have focused on emotion and how it links with 
topics like Group dynamics, Leadership, Justice, and Culture (Fineman, 2000). There 
has also been an emphasis on how emotion can be managed on the job – referred to as 
emotion work. Studies have examined how emotion impacts attitudes (Staw and 
Barsade, 1993), the area of emotional labour emerged (Morris and Feldman, 1996; 
Kruml and Geddes, 2000; Grandey, 2003) which was based on earlier work by 
Hochschild (1983). Links between emotion and identity have been explored (Ashforth, 
1998; Ibarra and Petriglieri, (2010). Emotion and influence on justice has been 
researched (Harlos and Pinder, 2000). Contributing to this burgeoning body of literature, 
15 
 
the current thesis asks: How is emotion experienced by workers involved in 
organisational change? Central to this question are two ideas that justify its importance 
in research. One idea is that emotion has not been explicitly defined in organisation 
research. The question addresses this concern. The second idea is that in defining 
emotion, research should focus on beliefs and related components like feelings that 
constitute the experience. Past research has avoided this research focus and instead 
has concentrated on causes or antecedents alone. Organisational change literature 
does not define or illustrate emotional experiences on these accounts (Klarner et al, 
2011).     
 
 
1.2.1 IMPLICATIONS OF WORKER EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES FOR CHANGE 
MANAGEMENT: PREVIEW OF OBJECTIVE ONE 
   
The latter part of section 1.1 provided reasons why emotion may be researched 
in a change context. To this end one primary idea is that emotion is often present during 
change and it has implications for change management. If emotion is present during 
change then one may think about the implications this poses. In other words, emotion 
means something for implementing change successfully. The central idea here is to 
reflect on why emotion may be important for change management. In particular, one 
may think about the types of perceptions formed by workers involved in change (Elving, 
2005). An emotional worker under the influence of anger may see the world as gloomy 
or grim (Forgas, 1991; Goldie, 2004; Cummins, 2006). His response to change depends 
on such perceptions. It follows that in order to manage change some understanding on 
this front is important. Studies covered in chapter two such as Klarner et al (2011), 
Elving (2005) and Carr (2001) demonstrate that the presence of emotion forms 
perceptions of change that can hinder the successful administration of change. Adopting 
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this concern the first research objective is the following: To explore the implications of 
workers emotional experiences for change management.     
 
1.2.2 DEFINING EMOTION THROUGH INTENTIONALITY: PREVIEW OBJECTIVE 
TWO 
 
  This section previews the argument supporting research objective two. The 
argument is that most management studies do not explicitly define emotion (Gooty et al, 
2009; Ashman, 2008). However, it is important to define emotion so that what is being 
researched is somewhat understood. In particular, the current thesis provides a 
definition based on ideas by Solomon (2007), Goldie (2002a, 2002b, 2004) and Lazarus 
(1991, 1994, and 2006). This contributes a novel definition elaborated in subsequent 
chapters where examples are provided. The above scholars are interested in the mental 
experience of emotion; they argue that as subjective experience, emotion transforms the 
way the worker sees situations. Therefore emotion should be defined in how it 
transforms the way a worker sees situations. The idea is that worker emotion is directed 
at the world and it is always about things in the world. For instance, I might be angry at 
my colleague for his actions, or I might feel happy at my achievements at work this 
month. In Philosophy, this is called the property of Intentionality, proposed by Goldie 
(2004) and Solomon (2007). If intentionality is an essential character of emotion, then 
the worker’s emotion is always about things. The counter-argument is that emotion is not 
always about something. For instance, one may feel fear without knowing what one is 
afraid of. I explore this in chapter Two. Intentionality presents a concern in defining 
emotion in so far as its presence and role are not clear (Ashman, 2008). Therefore the 
second research objective is: To explore the presence of intentionality within emotional 
experiences of workers involved in change.     
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1.2.3 INTENTIONALITY, BELIEFS AND FEELINGS: PREVIEW RESEARCH 
OBJECTIVE THREE 
 
This section presents arguments supporting research objective three. When 
examining intentionality, there are two related components. The first component is 
the belief held by a person. A belief is about things one experiences. Therefore it is 
inherently intentional. Not focusing on this inherent intentionality, past research has 
focused on three ideas, which have kept emotion and beliefs apart. One idea is that 
emotion and reason (i.e. inferentially linked beliefs) are two separate states of the 
worker. This separation has meant that emotion is categorized as unrelated to 
reason. Research has focused on reason linking it with organisational benefit and 
greater management control. This is visible in movements like Taylorism and systems 
thinking. Philosophers also argue that emotion and reason are independent states and 
both rely on different underlying biological developments (Goldie, 2002b). In pursuit of 
knowledge, this idea has kept emotion in the closet. The second idea is that emotion 
precedes reason. The latter is often tainted by the former. This idea also kept emotion 
off the research agenda for decades because emotion was seen as contaminating 
reason. Emotion of the worker should be kept away from beliefs. The third idea research 
has focused on is that reason precedes emotion. That is, reason is the antecedent. The 
term reason refers to beliefs that a person has for doing something. A person may 
reason by believing that change brings about job loss (the antecedent). This antecedent 
may cause fear (the emotion) (Kiefer, 2005).  
Focused on the above areas research may continue to flourish by relying on the 
central assumption – that emotion and reason are categorized as separate states. They 
are causally related. Emotion can cause emotion or be caused by it. This reveals a gap 
in knowledge. If emotion and reason can co-exist in the same experience, then the 
subjective experience of being emotional may involve some reasoning (i.e. beliefs). 
Goldie (2002a, 2004) and Lazarus (1991, 1994) argue that emotion forms beliefs that are 
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a part of that experience. This reveals relatively new research territory. Frijda and 
Mesquita (2000.p.46) note that 
   
“Although an influence of emotions upon beliefs is 
widely accepted in ancient wisdom, there is little 
research proving this”.   
 
As yet we do not completely understand how emotion as a subjective experience 
involves beliefs. It follows that in so far as workers amidst organisational change become 
emotional, the way in which they see change is sometimes influenced by emotion. 
Knowledge on this front can facilitate successful change. In the organisational change 
literature, Klarner et al (2011) argue that one approach is to explore the terrain utilizing 
the Lazarus theory. I turn to this in chapter two.  
The second component is feelings. This is normally related to bodily states that 
one feels. (Oakley, 1991) notes it is possible to feel no bodily sensation whilst being 
emotional, an idea I review in chapter Two. The main point being that feelings are about 
things such as when one feels something is no right in a situation, or one feels irritated 
when angry. Whether feelings configure as more than just brute states (i.e. Goldie’ 
(2002) thesis) is a concern faced in looking at intentionality. Given the lack of focus on 
intentionality in relation to the component beliefs and feelings, the current thesis looking 
at emotion proposes objective three. To investigate relationships between intentionality, 
beliefs, and feelings in workers involved in change.  
 
1.2.4 CONGRUENCE, IMMEDIACY AND CERTAINTY: PREVIEW RESEARCH 
OBJECTIVE FOUR 
 
19 
 
This section reviews arguments for research objective four. The two components 
that are beliefs and feelings exhibit relations to three other components: congruence, 
immediacy, certainty. These components are found in cross-disciplinary literature of 
philosophy and psychology. But little is known about them in organization literature.  
The component of congruence appears when an emotional worker generates 
beliefs that are congruent with the emotion they are experiencing. An angry person will 
generate beliefs that confirm ‘the blame he attributes’ to somebody, and this in turn 
makes that person angrier. Whether feelings have a role to play here is less clear. The 
second component is immediacy. Elster (2012) explains that we know little about 
immediacy. This appears when an emotional person sees things as closer than they 
might otherwise seem to an unemotional observer. Things look magnified, or closer. A 
fearful worker may believe in the threat of redundancy looming around the corner 
compared to a worker who is not emotional. That is, a fearful worker may feel afraid to 
an unjustifiable extent. This feature configures in the experience of emotion. The third 
and last component is certainty. Mesquita and Frijda (2000) note, that a belief held by a 
deeply angry person is often unshakeable. Emotion has an impact on the certainty of 
beliefs held in that experience. The person may also feel certain without being able to 
say why. In this case there is a feeling of certainty, which is apart from the kind of feeling 
where one feels their heartbeat racing. This is not a visceral feeling; instead, one knows 
something by feeling that this is the matter (Goldie, 2004). Within the workers emotional 
experience the three components appear; covered in chapters two, four and five. To this 
end research objective four is proposed as the following: To determine the relationship 
of beliefs and feelings with the components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty.      
 
 
1.2.5 HOW TO REPRESENT RESEARCH FINDINGS: PREVIEW RESEARCH 
OBJECTIVE FIVE 
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Given the pursuit of a qualitative sense of the workers emotional experiences, this 
section is about how my research output (emotional experiences of participants) can be 
represented. The current thesis in chapter six proposes a model. This model represents 
the components of emotion induced from data analysis. A model can be categorized as 
normative or descriptive (Simon, 1986). A normative model is represents how behavior 
should ideally occur. By comparison, a descriptive model is about representing how 
behavior actually occurred. Emotion research has proposed both types of models (Lopes 
et al, 2006; Smith and Kirby, 2001; Forgas, 1995).  A normative model provides a causal 
ordering of events to represent emotion. This representation treats emotion as inert 
physical stimuli and it is an impoverished approach because mind stuff is left out (Sartre, 
2006; Goldie, 2002b, 2004). Emotion broken down into biological units does not 
constitute a walking talking worker who has opinions and feelings. A descriptive model, 
induced from data consisting of opinions and emotional stories, provides a way of 
representing what emotion may have been experienced like (Huy, 2002).  Between 
organisational corridors workers share stories and bits and pieces of emotional 
experiences. Lazarus (1991) uses a model that represents the themes of such 
experiences. The Lazarus model underpins arguments throughout this thesis and it is 
covered in depth in subsequent chapters. Similarly, a descriptive model is presented in 
chapter six. This model, a central contribution, adds to our understanding of emotion as 
a mental process in change. To this end, the following research objective is established 
in following chapters: based on empirical data analysis, to develop a model that depicts 
the components and dynamics of workers emotional experiences in a change context.    
We have seen that in asking the question “How is emotion experienced during 
organisational change?” five research objectives have emerged. I will revisit and 
integrate these and provide related arguments throughout the current thesis. 
 
1.3 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
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There are two ways of understanding emotion. One way is to look at the 
environment and the factors in the environment. Here, one aims to determine the 
behaviour of environmental factors that determine emotion. The other way is to look at 
the mind of the worker. The focus here is on the emotional experience and how one 
knows the environment through inner workings that make up a state of mind. The current 
thesis falls in the latter category (Lazarus, 1991; Goldie, 2002a, 2002b, 2004; Solomon, 
2007, 1973). Specifically, research defined emotional experience with the formation of 
beliefs alongside feelings. 
 
1.4 ONTOLOGY OF EMOTION 
 
There are a variety of ontological interpretations of emotion. At the fundamental 
level, one interprets two substances; the mental and the material. The relation between 
the two remains an unsolved philosophical conundrum (Goldie, 2002a; Oakley, 1992; 
James, 1957; Descartes, 1988). If one thinks in this way, then one may try to reduce 
emotion to a simpler state such as beliefs. There are studies that define emotion as a set 
of beliefs (Kenny, 1963; Solomon, 1977; Taylor, 1984). Alternatively, one may interpret 
emotion as reducible to bodily developments. Such are biological explanations 
(Damasio, 1996; LeDoux, 1993). These are not useful in the current thesis because this 
is not a biological study of emotion. In the current thesis aligning with Goldie (2002a) and 
Lazarus, (1991) emotion is interpreted as an experience of the worker. Arguments in the 
next chapter and in the philosophy section of Chapter Three demonstrate this 
interpretation in greater depth. Ontologically, emotion is first and foremost interpreted as 
an experience. It is transient. It is lived as an ongoing experience rather than taken to 
signify some static state. As experience it involves believing the world to be a certain 
way and feeling it in that particular way intrinsic to that experience. Secondary to this, 
22 
 
the current thesis concedes the possibility of a material reality, supported by the 
methodological rationale in Chapter Three, and maintains that material explanations 
such as biological theories fall outside the scope of the current thesis. Ontologically 
causal explanations of what emotion is cannot provide the emotional experience. The 
latter is a different reality and it must be studied as such (Goldie, 2002, 2002b, 2004, 
2009). 
 
1.5 THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT – CHANGE WITHIN THE NHS 
 
The research for this thesis was conducted at the National Health Service (NHS). 
The NHS is a nationwide government funded organisation which provides health service 
across the United Kingdom. It has been undergoing organisational change for a number 
of years.     
In response to the Calman Hine Report published in 1996, Cancer Care 
Networks had been established throughout the United Kingdom. The aim was to provide 
what the report described as ‘seamless cancer care to patients’. The workers who had 
volunteered to participate in my research were administrators and clinical personnel 
(nurses) situated at one of the cancer wards in the hospital in Nottingham. The hospital 
was part of a group of three hospitals, which together made up the Cancer Care Network 
in the North region of the United Kingdom. On a broad scale, this Network was a part of 
the National Health Service (NHS) of the country which is a government run health 
provider in the United Kingdom.      
These workers presented an opportunity to do research for two reasons. Firstly, 
in terms of the empirical context, the hospital was undergoing organizational change. 
The reason for the change was the provision of better services for cancer patients. Each 
patient has a journey based on their diagnosis – their pathway and accompanying end of 
life care. The aim of the organisational change was to distribute resources so that 
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patients get the best care. This included the distribution of expertise, knowledge, and 
good practice by General practitioners, nurses, and administrative staff. The change was 
top down. This meant that information was funneled down to different sections of the 
hospital and the network as a whole. As I will elaborate in subsequent chapters (4 and 
5), due to lack of information sharing, overall the organisational change had brought 
about uncertainty, fear, and anger amongst the participants that took part in my 
research. The climate was one of uncertainty about the change. For instance, one of the 
participants had remarked “Nobody knew why or what was happening”. There was 
insufficient sharing of the right information with the right workers.   
Secondly, past research shows that a hospital is an arena filled with emotional 
encounters between patients and workers. Locke (1996) explains that the decision of a 
Doctor to give his patient treatment, even though sometimes he is aware of the low 
chances of success and has fears about this; is driven by a belief about providing 
comfort to the patient and his family. In one sense, the doctor’s belief about providing 
comfort to patients and their families buries his fears about the low chances of success. 
Were he to think entirely rationally, the doctor may reason that the low chances of 
success outweigh the costs incurred in terms of resources spent on treatment. Thus, 
emotional experiences of hospital workers involve beliefs. Bolton (2008) argues that 
hospital settings involve work tasks that give rise to emotions due to the nature of the 
tasks which involve interactions with disease, pain, and morbid conditions. It seems that 
a hospital is fertile ground for the cultivation of emotions. If we better understand how to 
manage emotion then we may better deliver healthcare services. I will return to this in 
chapter three, which looks at research methodology and provides a detailed exploration 
of empirical issues and philosophical arguments.    
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1.7 CONTRIBUTION OF THESIS  
 
The current thesis provides a new way of thinking about emotion of the worker. A 
model is presented in chapter six which brings together the various components of 
emotion. These components were derived from inductive data analysis, and from the 
interpretations presented in chapters four and five. In initial chapters, the literature 
review chapter helped sharpen the focus on relevant components. 
The conclusion chapter expounds the contributions of the current thesis. It draws on 
research findings presented in the discussion and data chapters. Form a practical 
viewpoint it was found that management at the hospital failed in gaining the support of 
research participants. Support is a necessary factor behind successful change. 
Participants in anger and fear saw change as something they did not understand and 
they resented management. The contribution is the recommendation that a policy aimed 
at developing programs for emotional adjustment to change needs to be implemented. 
This includes regular doses of information for workers involved in change. The outcome 
is likely to be better management of emotions in change, and smoother transitions based 
around co-operation; so that workers do not feel left out of the process.   
The main theoretical contribution is a model of emotion presented in chapter six. The 
model relates components that are derived through inductive data analysis. The model 
shows how during emotional experience appraisals of change aspects are formed. The 
model provides a picture that has not been proposed in change literature. Klarner et al 
(2011) call for research that provides such understanding of emotion. The model 
contributes to this call for research. A criticism is that this approach leaves out the 
external factors of change that can bring about emotion. Future research may wish to 
link the proposed model with external factors deemed worthy by studies that reflect on 
the findings of the current thesis or consider relevant environmental factors.  
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In addition to a theoretical contribution the current thesis also proposes a 
particular methodology in chapter three. Drawing on personal construct psychology and 
constructive alternativism (a set of ideas by Kelly, 2003, 1963) and located within the 
broader school of interpretivism a set of procedures are provided in order to conduct 
research. From philosophical ideas through to data collection, analysis, and 
interpretation this provides a particular toolkit for doing research. In terms of practical 
implications it seems that better knowledge of how emotion is experienced by workers 
can enable better management in delivering healthcare. Both workers and managers in 
a change context can anticipate to some extent the emotional reactions that are possible 
and how to interpret such reactions. Chapter six discusses the findings. Building on this 
chapter eight provides detail on the practical, theoretical and methodological 
contributions of the current thesis.     
        
1.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
The current chapter introduced my research focus. The research question and 
related research objectives, presented below, are revisited throughout this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How is emotion experienced by workers involved in Organisational 
Change?  
 
 
 
 
Research objectives 
1 To explore the implications of workers emotional experiences for 
change management  
2 To explore the presence of intentionality within emotional 
experience of workers involved in change 
3 To investigate relationships between intentionality, beliefs, and 
feelings in workers involved in change 
4 To determine the relationship of beliefs and feelings with the 
components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty 
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5 Based on empirical data analysis, to develop a model that depicts 
the components and dynamics of workers emotional experiences in 
a change context. 
 
The rest of the thesis will expound and critically appraise arguments related to 
the research focus laid out in the current chapter. The thesis is organized as follows. The 
second chapter provides a literature review that presents and challenges arguments 
about change, emotion, and constituent mental components. These form the theoretical 
base that my research will build further and contribute towards. Next, chapter three 
presents the research methodology. This includes the philosophical stance of the thesis 
and details about how data was collected, analysed, as well as related concerns about 
research methods. Chapter’s four and five present the research data. This addresses 
the concerns around research objectives. Next chapter six is a discussion of the 
findings. Chapter seven presents reflexivity. This chapter shared the lessons learnt on 
my research journey. It considers the involvement of the ‘I” around other actors in the 
research process. The conclusion chapter presents the contributions of the thesis. This 
carves out the difference that research has made.    
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In a general sense, organisations are continuously changing. With the passage of time 
aspects of the organisation mature and develop. On the other hand, in a fast paced and 
technically advanced environment, organisations often undergo deliberate changes 
implemented by management. In this latter scenario, the worker will not always adapt to 
change on his own. At times he might experience emotion that seeks to preserve his 
personal interests and he might perceive the change as a threat. If the worker is a 
creature of habit than he finds comfort in routine. The saying goes ‘if it ain’t broke than 
don’t fix it’. For many workers their routine is comfortable and acceptable, and they are 
not interested in changes. Things don’t appear broken and they feel secure. But in a 
dynamically changing environment the management does not always share this view. 
Technological advancements and competition are viewed as the key to successful 
change and the worker is left to one side. He is expected to adapt to whatever the 
management throws his way. When change is implemented from the top down, workers, 
as active agents, participate in programs and initiatives, and sometimes this presents 
barriers. What is known is that change often faces the barrier of emotion (Klarner et al, 
2011). However, we know little about how worker emotion contributes in this arena. In 
particular, we know little about how the individual workers emotional experience and 
constituent mental components of intentionality, feelings and beliefs are formed. The 
current chapter takes stock of a growing body of literature concerned with emotion and 
change, and points to the prospect of further research on the mental capacities of 
workers.    
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The previous chapter briefly presented the issue and posed the question - How is 
emotion experienced by workers involved in organisational change? In this regard 
chapter one presented the idea that emotion has been ignored in most of organization 
research. Generally emotion has been thought of as the enemy of reason. Contrary to 
this view, my research question rests on the premise that instead of ignoring emotion, 
researchers should attempt to understand how it is experienced. Emotion consists of 
believing the world to be a certain way and this needs more research attention. The 
current chapter builds a novel view on emotion by reviewing philosophical accounts and 
cognitive theories of emotion. These arguments support the proposed research question 
and the research objectives outlined in the previous chapter.  
I begin with a review of organizational change literature and arrive at a specific gap in 
the change literature addressed by the current thesis. This is followed by a brief history 
of research which provides a wider historical context justifying why emotion is important 
across management and not just within change. The remaining bulk of the chapter 
reviews arguments about intentionality, feelings, and beliefs. These demonstrate the 
importance of the concepts and the presence of related under researched concepts 
picked up again in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.  
 
2.2 IMPLICATIONS OF WORKER EMOTION FOR CHANGE MANAGEMENT: A 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ONE 
 
The current section reviews literature about the importance of emotion and change 
management. In other words, ideas relevant for research objective one are reviewed. To 
restate, the objective is: to explore the implications of workers emotional experience for 
change management. Specifically the central argument by Klarner et al (2011) is also 
presented which points to the gap in our knowledge of the workers emotional experience 
during change.  
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Reviewing literature about change is important because the empirical context of the 
current thesis presents an environment where change was being implemented. The 
Cancer Care network is one amongst a few prominent networks in the country. It is 
located at a hospital which is part of the National Health Service. The NHS is a public 
sector based provider of healthcare across the United Kingdom. At the time the data was 
collected there was organisational change taking place in the network. In general there 
were change initiatives taking place throughout the NHS system of hospitals.  
Successful change requires adaptive responses from workers (Liu and Perrewe, 2005b). 
Emotion is an adaptive response (Scherer, 2005; Zeelenberg et al, 2008). Therefore, the 
presence of emotion in change is important because it indicates the degree to which 
workers have adapted. That is, change may be been accepted or rejected, and this may 
depend on emotion. This can determine the extent to which change is successful. Based 
on this, studies argue that organisational change presents an opportunity to explore 
emotions in the workplace (Klarner et al, 2011; Maitilis and Sonensheim, 2010; Kiefer, 
2005; Elving, 2005). Generally, organisational change is defined as a set of planned 
actions commonly carried out by senior ranking workers in the hierarchy (Weick and 
Quinn, 1999). The purpose is to improve performance in organisations. Often, such 
change occurs due to environmental demands, which may include government 
regulation, technological advance, and changing economic conditions of a country 
(Amiot et al, 2006).  
On the one hand, organisational change involves modifying non-human conditions (for 
instance this includes modifying technology, structures, putting in place formalized rules, 
workplace furniture). On the other hand, it involves managing worker behaviour (this 
includes modifying job tasks, job roles, beliefs, emotions, and personal goals) (Ibarra 
and Pertiglieri, 2010, Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, 2001, and Armenakis and Bedeian, 
1999). The focus of the current thesis is emotion. This is a type of worker behavior. 
Therefore, the current thesis falls into the latter category concerned with worker 
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behavior. In the latter category, studies of emotion tend to look at observable employee 
actions that occur within change situations, or they focus on the inner psychological 
workings of employees (Ashkanasy and Humphreys, 2011; Klarner et al, 2011; 
Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, 2001). In this respect, the current thesis is specifically 
concerned with psychological workings of the workers emotional experience. Therefore, 
it is situated on the human side, or what may be recognized as the soft aspect of 
change.    
Change management literature in general highlights two paths open to workers. In an 
organization a worker can either hinder change or he can facilitate change.  Looking at 
how employees hinder change, some studies show that workers often react to change 
by resisting it (Ford et al, 2008; Huy, 2002; Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999). Worker 
reactions often take the form of negative emotions. A primary reason is the lack of clear 
communication by management, which expects workers to adapt to change. This can 
leave workers uncertain and confused (Maitilis and Sonenshein, 2010; Kiefer, 2005). 
According to Lindblom, (2004) a worker will react with anger or fear because he does not 
understand the impact of change on job prospects. Furthermore, he may not understand 
the impact on his career prospects in the long run. In such cases, concerns about job 
security and one’s place in the organization can arise (Amiot et al, 2006). Jones et al 
(2008) argue that workers may also reflect on consequences in personal life. The belief 
that change may lead to job loss is common and can induce negative thoughts and 
emotions in both the workplace and in personal life scenarios. These thoughts are 
antecedents and consequences of becoming emotional during change. Elving (2005, p. 
133) provides the example of an uncertain employee who is plagued with negative 
thoughts.  
  
31 
 
 “Will I still have a job after this change”, “Will I still have the same 
co-workers after the change”, and “Can I still perform my tasks in 
the same way I used to do then.” 
 
In the worker’s mind there is doubt about what will happen to her job tasks. There is 
uncertainty. Fear and uncertainty are reactions that arise during change due to lack of 
sufficient communication across the organizational hierarchy (Sutton and Kahn, 1987). 
Restructuring announcements can be met with a sense of job insecurity. One’s job tasks 
can be perceived as redundant in the context of change. Chapters four and five will 
explain that such uncertainty also appeared in the minds of my research participants 
who worked at the cancer care network where research data was collected. These 
workers were emotional and experienced similar negative thoughts about the adverse 
impact of change on their lives.  
Examining implications of emotion some studies argue that emotional workers perceive 
change as a threat and this can lead to costly delays in administering change (Del Val 
and Fuentes, 2003). Sometimes this can lead to the failure of change initiatives and 
projects because workers have not been involved in change. Successful change 
requires that workers in the organization participate in organization wide initiatives 
(Bovey and Hede, 2001). This includes managing emotion, which is a force that 
influences how workers may perceive change as something that should be resisted or 
something positive that should be supported (Forgas, 1991; Lazarus, 1994; Kunda, 
1999). To enable the worker to cope with emotions and wider developments across the 
hierarchy, the management should actively manage workers. An example is the study by 
Huy (2002), which proposes that management should be ready for resistance to change. 
A manager should plan meetings designed to enable workers to talk about any emotions 
or uncertainty building up in their minds. Unplanned and poorly communicated changes 
can reduce employee desire to work (Leana and Barry, 2000). At the same time, to the 
extent that the employee is presented with change, the employee creates interpretations 
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and consequences based on what is already in his or her mind (Maitilis and Soneheim, 
2010). For successful change, there must be a dialogue between management and 
employees about emotional reactions arising during change. As Fineman (2003 p.130) 
notes “The ability to manage change in others is typically considered a key skill for 
effective management.” What he is arguing about is the managerial act of recognizing a 
distressed employee, and providing consolation and clarity. Additionally, it is not just 
about others, one must also manage emotion in the self in times of change.        
The studies reviewed above focus on negative emotions such as anger or fear. A 
negative emotion is a mental state that anticipates undesirable consequences for the 
self and others (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). Overall, negative emotions have attracted 
more attention than positive emotions (Maitlis and Sonensheim, 2010). Perhaps this is 
because negative emotions are pervasive during change. Typically, workers often 
perceive or feel that change is not beneficial. This evokes negative emotion such as 
anger or fear. Consequently, due to the pervasive presence of negative emotion 
documented in the literature, workers involved in change, either believe that change is a 
bad thing, or they resort to negative feelings because change is not communicated, and 
as a result it is not very well understood by workers (Bovey and Hede, 2001; Armenakis 
and Bedeian, 1999).  
Negative emotions are barriers to successful change and whilst they are prevalent in a 
change context, studies have also looked at positive emotions. A Study by Howard 
(2006) examined positive emotion. The study presented the idea that positive emotions 
can benefit the implementation of change, and this occurs when the worker experiences 
positive emotions such as happiness or joy, and latches on to hopes and possibilities for 
his development in the organization. Howard (2006) draws on biological and 
psychological studies such as Schulkin et al (2003), Trugade and Fredrickson (2004) 
and Tobias (1996). To some extent this serves to show that most work on positive 
emotion, as indeed noted by Howard (2006), has been conducted in other fields such as 
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neuroscience and psychology. The limit in this case is that biological explanations are 
not directly informative when studying social situations in organizational change. 
Alternatively, the impetus must come from organization studies. Biological variations 
such as heartbeats per second, or the release of a chemical compounds in the blood 
stream, are not indicators that easily translate into consequences for organizational 
development. Studies suggest that positive emotions are important because they 
increase employee resilience to negative thoughts (Avey, et al, 2008). Overall the above 
studies show that both positive and negative emotions represent important factors 
behind the success or failure of change.  
In studies researching emotional experience during change, one common theme is the 
notion of unfair treatment (Smollan, 2012; Kiefer, 2005; Biess and Tripp, 2002). Smollan 
(2012) recognizes that workers can experience anger, frustration, and anxiety when they 
perceive unfairness in organisations. A worker may blame the actions of managers 
tasked with implementing change. Generally, negative emotions such as anger will be 
experienced by workers who believe that wrongdoing and unfair practice has taken 
place (Kiefer, 2005). The content in chapters four and five provide accounts of emotional 
experience where unfairness was perceived in the actions of others in a hospital. With 
regard to the theme of unfairness, Smollan (2012 p.176) note, that, “..much of the 
separate and related literatures on organizational change and organizational justice 
have neglected the important role of emotion.” It seems that a study such as the current 
one looking at emotional experience can expect to find beliefs that are about unfair 
treatment during change. Additionally emotions are experienced more strongly when a 
worker continues to believe that he or she has been treated unfairly rather than fairly 
(Bies and Tripp, 2002). This suggests negative emotions are likely to be encountered 
during change, particularly where unfairness is perceived. Emotion covered in chapters 
four and five that present findings are therefore negative emotions as speculated in the 
literature.  
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The case for studying emotion during change is made by Klarner et al (2011). They 
argue that emotional experiences of workers enduring change, remains poorly 
understood. The mental workings of the emotional worker prevalent during 
organizational change require examination. Klarner at al (2011) propose that the 
Lazarus theory provides a fresh perspective hitherto not sufficiently employed by 
research looking at emotion during change. The theory was proposed by Lazarus (1991) 
and it explains that emotions are experienced when we recognise some problem in the 
environment. We form beliefs to evaluate the harm or benefit of the problem, and about 
how to cope with the problem, and how to act in that situation. The theory provides a 
fresh focus for further research because it introduces three key components – 
Intentionality, Feelings, and Beliefs.  
These components have not so far been integrated to examine emotion in change. 
Whilst Lazarus (1991, 1994, 2006) provides a sharp focus through these components, 
his ideas are developed further and in more depth by arguments of Goldie (2002, 2004, 
2009), Frijda and Mesquita (2000), Solomon (1973, 2007). Latter sections where 
Lazarus’s work is revisited theoretically demonstrate that the components in Lazarus 
(1991) are developed by these latter writers to varying degrees.  
Overall, the arguments presented in the current section demonstrate that emotion has 
implications for change management. Emotional workers sometimes due to lack of 
involvement can perceive change as a bad thing. The management is to some extent, 
responsible, particularly where change requires both employee support, and support for 
employees. Without this, notions of unfairness can also arise. From a practical 
viewpoint, Klarner et al (2011 p.339) propose that “A better understanding of how 
emotions unfold during and across changes can lead to more focused managerial 
interventions intended to effectively manage the change process”. Developing a focus 
on this and to aid analysis in chapters four and five the following objective is proposed:  
35 
 
Objective One: To explore the implications of workers emotional experiences for 
change management. 
Addressing this, the chapters at the rear of this thesis, elaborate on the importance of 
management involvement, and the shortcomings that arose at the National Health 
Service Hospital, where data was collected, and participants were did not support 
change.   
Astonishingly, it took almost half a century for the above focus on emotion to emerge in 
organisation research. One might reason that only after a call for research during the 
early 1990’s by those like Fineman (1993) and Ashforth and Humphrey (1995), research 
momentum stated gaining some momentum. In this context, the relatively poor 
knowledge of emotional experience may not seem too surprising. However, to 
understand the reasons, a wider historical perspective needs to be reviewed. This is 
covered in the next section and it shows that in the history of organisation research, the 
emergence of some arguments prevented the type of understanding that my thesis 
builds. Now we turn to consider some of these arguments placed primarily in the first 
three quarters of the 20th century.  
 
 
  2.3 THE ANTI-THESIS- A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 Historically, emotion has not been a great concern in organisation research. In fact, 
emotion has largely been a taboo subject. Organisation research traditionally looked 
towards emotion as a dis-advantage for the worker and a threat to reason (FIneman, 
1993; Ashforth and Humphreys, 1995). The position amongst researchers was: If reason 
involves a set of beliefs that lead to beneficial reactions, then reason is desirable. 
Emotion prevents reason and beneficial decisions. Therefore, it is undesirable. In order 
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to eliminate emotion and attain reason and make beneficial decisions, researchers 
should focus on reason. Ashforth and Humphreys (1995 p.3) sum this up by explaining 
that research did “foster a belief that emotion is the antithesis of rationality”. 
Consequently, emotion has been largely ignored. 
During early and mid-20th century, this attitude was adopted by researchers. Rationality 
was prized by researchers because it led to beneficial decisions while emotion was the 
enemy. Research was devoted to developing a rational account of worker behaviour and 
decisions (see Weber, 1946; March and Simon, 1993). The mechanical engineer turned 
organisation theorist Taylor (1912) described the dominant assumption held by 
researchers who he called scientific managers 
“The duty of gathering in of all this great mass of traditional knowledge and then 
recording it, tabulating it, and in many cases, finally reducing it to laws, rules, and even 
to mathematical formulae, is voluntarily assumed by the scientific managers”    
Taylor, (1912, p.29). 
 
Armed with this assumption, researchers saw the organization as a physical system 
governed by hidden laws. Like a physical system, the organisation was made of parts, 
including workers, tasks, and technology. Using laws, one could integrate these parts in 
various ways to build an optimal whole (see the systems approach in Hatch, 1997). Of 
this view were the Public administration theorists like Gulick (1937) Weber (1946) and 
Secklor-Hudson (1955). For most of the 20th century, their overall aim was to assign 
tasks according to mathematical precision so that when followed by workers the result 
would be rational decisions. This meant reaching the set goals with maximum possible 
benefit at the lowest cost in terms of resource use. Theorists believed that under 
management control, workers were rational agents. Workers would follow the assigned 
tasks. The pinnacle of development was reason with no room for the workers’ emotions. 
However, in the context of this historically prevalent attitude, some studies have 
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considered the inadequacy of traditional Taylorist thinking and highlighted the need to 
research emotion. In the 1920’s, Roethlisberger and Dickson (2003) at the Hawthorne 
plant in Chicago researched how working conditions impacted worker productivity. Their 
study found that aside from working conditions, the workers at the plant were productive 
whenever they managed their emotions at work. Raz (2002) explains that workers who 
were emotionally stable performed better and encouraged others despite the same 
working conditions. This result was unexpected because Roethlisberger and Dickson 
(2003) were not exclusively researching worker emotions. They were interested in 
productivity and they unexpectedly found that rationality alone seemed insufficient in 
accounting for worker reactions. Similarly, drawing on psychoanalysis Selznick (1948) 
presented the worker as an emotional being rather than calculating automaton. He 
argued that workers did not reflect the mathematical rationale found in Taylorist thinking. 
Dror (1967) explains that Taylorist thinking employed quantitative formulas to workout 
job routines. This emphasis on quantification has meant that historically the qualitative 
aspects reflecting how workers actually think, feel, and experience emotion in workplace 
situations has largely been ignored. In the current thesis the focus is on the experience 
of workers. That is, an interest is developed in the opinions of workers who undergo 
emotional experiences during change. There is not the desire to quantify opinions but to 
explore them in their richness and depth. Historically, this approach has remained 
relatively scarce.  
In the 1970’s, Janis and Mann (1977) proposed that the subjective sense in the worker’s 
emotion represents a peculiar way of reasoning and using beliefs. The study saw 
emotion as an experience that forms beliefs leading to an emotionally laden way of 
thinking. In this sense, Janis and Mann (1977) are close to the current thesis in so far as 
emotion is seen to provide a peculiar experience and view of the world that occurs 
during anger or fear. In the 1980’s and early 1990’s there was a greater emphasis on 
worker satisfaction in the workplace. Studies such as (Laffalando et al, 1992 and Locke, 
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1985) positioned emotion as a sub-topic covered under the general category of 
satisfaction and well-being. This provided a degree of focus. However, emotion was not 
seen as a topic in its own right until the call to arms by Fineman (1993). He argued that 
the workplace is an emotional arena. As such worker behaviour needs to be understood 
with a focus on emotion as a research topic in its own right.     
In the current section, we saw that historically studies touched on sentiment or feelings 
of the worker. Studies protest that emotion and the kind of thinking formed through it 
requires attention. For this task the traditional faith in quantitative explanations found in 
earlier studies seems insufficient (Fineman, 2007). We find traces of concern about 
emotional experience of the individual with no specific research focus or agenda with 
regard to emotion. In the wider scheme of things, for a good part of the 20th century, the 
focus of my thesis remained unexplored. Some of the studies reviewed in this section 
refer to emotion but they do not talk about how emotional experience organizes beliefs 
of a certain sort alongside related components of intentionality and feelings. Goldie 
(2002.p.24) has argued that emotional experience forms the sort of beliefs not formed 
otherwise. The components of intentionality and feelings have a role to play here. A role 
explored in the following section.  
 
2.4 EMOTION AND INTENTIONALITY: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
TWO 
 
Chapter one introduced the second research objective. That is, to explore the presence 
of intentionality within emotional experience of workers involved in change. Accordingly 
this section reviews arguments about emotion and its relation with intentionality. Most 
accounts of emotion, many of which reside within the disciplinary spheres of philosophy 
and cognitive psychology, suggest intentionality as a central part of emotion (Lacewing, 
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2004; Fineman, 2003, 1993; Goldie, 2004, 2002a, 2002c; Nussbaum, 1994; Lazarus, 
1991; Ortony et al, 1988).   
However, in organisation studies of emotion intentionality is extremely scarce and is not 
explicitly present (Ashman, 2008). The absence of this concept may be accounted for by 
the idea that most philosophical and cognitive accounts use intentionality in defining 
emotion and given that most organisation studies do not define emotion (Gooty et al, 
2009) one can logically expect a lack of attention provided to intentionality. This 
expectation would stand to the extent that emotion involves intentionality as a central 
component, something addressed in the sections below and within data chapters four, 
five, and six.   
Ashman (2008) suggests that there is an implicit unspoken assumption which states that 
all researchers share a common definition of emotion. This is the reason why explicit 
definitions are often missing in studies that look at emotion in the workplace (i.e. emotion 
work).  
 
“It might be argued that a good deal of what has been 
published on the subject of emotion work does not pay 
adequate attention to defining and explaining the 
psychological construct at its centre; that being – 
emotion.”  
 
Reflecting on lack of definitions of emotion in research, Gooty et al (2009) point out that 
it makes little sense to investigate emotion without a guiding definition of what one is 
dealing with. Addressing this point, the current research proposed objective one in the 
previous chapter. That is, to explore the presence of intentionality within emotional 
experience of workers involved in change.   
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In formulating a definition of emotion, Goldie (2002b) explains that from an ontological 
viewpoint research has adopted two approaches. One approach is to define emotion by 
seeing it as a part of a causal series of stimuli. This portrays emotion impersonally as an 
inert part of some cause and effect circuit. The other approach involves seeing emotion 
as an experience. One interprets it is a personal experience that involves seeing the 
world in a certain way. The current thesis adopts this latter approach, whereby emotion 
is envisioned as a personal unfolding experience. In the section below, this view is 
expounded. A drawback here is that with a causal explanation, one can measure 
emotion as part of a causal series. This makes emotion more amenable to scientific and 
impersonal explanations adopted by the former approach (Fineman, 2008a; Goldie, 
2002a, 2002b). The latter approach, in seeing emotion as a personal experience, is less 
concerned with discrete measurements of emotion and therefore relatively less 
concerned with predictions. Within organizational change literature Klarner et al (2011) 
have pointed to the approach adopted in the current thesis as an advantage whereby 
research can illustrate the way in which an emotional worker experiences change. In so 
far as the worker is angry about something, there is a complex of stories to tell here. 
This is the richness of emotion that is unpredictable and worth explaining through a 
qualitative inquiry into the person journey in a change context.     
 
2.4.1 INTENTIONALITY  
 
The quality of emotion as something transient or continuously unfolding is another way 
of saying that emotion is a lived experience. This makes it a process and a way of 
seeing the world (Goldie, 2004, 2002a, 2002c). Central to this view is the concept of 
intentionality. The concept of intentionality was historically applied to the study of the 
mind. Intentionality means that the mind is always in a state where it is about things in 
the world (Montague, 2009; Ashman, 2008; Goldie, 2002a.p.16; Solomon, 1973). 
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Applied to emotion, one may argue that emotion as a state of mind is about things, i.e. 
you are angry about what you see as unfair dismissal from your job. This argument 
stretches back centuries. Aristotle (2001) used intentionality in defining emotion. He 
defined emotion as a form of pain or pleasure. Emotions like happiness induce pleasure 
and they are desirable. Emotions like fear induce pain and these are not desirable. 
Aristotle (2001) defined emotion as a state of mind that is always about things 
encountered in one’s experience. Others including Goldie (2004; 2002a, 2002b, 2002c) 
Sartre (2006) De Sousa (1990) and James (1957) also propose that emotion is always 
about things in the world. The philosopher Descartes (1989, p. 51) wrote about emotion 
as caused by the action of the soul, which decides to conceive of this or that object. By 
soul he meant the mind and proposed that one can become emotional either about one’s 
thoughts or about objects perceived in the material world. Similarly, James (1957.p.451) 
saw emotion as one’s attention toward ones bodily changes. He proposed that hairs 
standing on the back of your neck, goose bumps on the skin and accompanying 
variations in heartbeat are all bodily changes. When noticed as changes one’s body is 
undergoing, the person experienced emotion. It is the result of believing that the body is 
undergoing changes.  
For James, (1957) emotion is also about something, in this case my own body. The 
counter argument is provided by Solomon (1973). He argues that emotion is not always 
about things in the world. It is not always directed at things. 
“It is not necessary to press the claim that all emotions are “about” something. 
Kierkegaard’s dread may be an emotion which is not “about” anything, or, conversely, 
may be “about” everything”.       
 
Solomon (1973) argues that emotion may not be about anything in particular. It may be a 
general intense feeling. A person may feel an enduring grief beyond some specific 
cause of his or her grief. Perhaps emotion is directed at a thought that one cannot easily 
place in memory at a given point in time. One may forget or feel uneasy but not be able 
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to explain why. One may become emotional about something that sits beyond one’s 
attention. In his recent work, Solomon (2007) admits this point and so overturns his 
earlier argument and adopts the argument that emotion is inevitably about things.  
Both Goldie (2002.p.13-14) and Oakley (1992, p.11) argue that emotion may be about 
some specific object such as a person or process encountered in experience. At the 
same time, they point out that emotion is not unchanging in its focus. It is not static. It 
involves intentionality in so far as this is attention of the observer directed at an object 
along with other emotion inducing object-features or related thoughts. For instance, in a 
change context we are emotional and afraid of job loss and in that experience we have 
related thoughts such as mortgage concerns or money problems. This experience 
unfolds in a complex environment which is itself in continuous flux. The news of my job 
loss may get worse as I find out that my mortgage is now in danger due to changes in 
the economy and I may not have a place to live (Tye, 2008; Sartre, 2006; Goldie, 
2002a). The environment may seem confusing and complex because change has not 
been communicated to me or I have not been certain about where change is happening. 
This point was made earlier that change management requires worker involvement and 
often lack of involvement and clear communication can raise negative emotions (Elving, 
2005), particularly since emotion is about what the employee perceives as change.   
Goldie (2002a.p.13) makes this point in writing that emotion is not “unchanging”. It 
involves many feelings, beliefs about things, and physical changes. I return to these 
components – feelings and beliefs - in latter sections of the chapter. Solomon (1993) 
defines emotion as judgments. He argues that we cannot experience anger without 
judging that we have been wronged. This is a view similar to Nussbaum (2001). Both 
argue that as a judgment emotion therefore has to be about things or it has to be about 
people that judgments are passed over. In some way, these are things that impact our 
survival. Therefore, again it follows that emotion must be intentional: I am angry because 
I believe I was mistreated at work. In the context of change the worker may be emotional 
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about a variety of things. The data chapters present the analysis of the types of things 
my research participants experienced emotion about. 
The problem with this argument is that one may have the same judgments and not feel 
angry or any other emotion (Tye, 2008). I may judge by believing that the organisation is 
restructuring but this does not necessarily induce any anger or any fear in me about my 
job security. I may be familiar with the idea and not feel any emotion. Therefore, it seems 
that emotion may not be constituted by judgment or personal evaluations alone. Goldie 
(2002a) proposes that emotions are a special set of beliefs that enable one to escape 
from situations that don’t meet the demands of our everyday projects in life. So the 
worker becomes angry when a situation does not go her way. She uses her freedom to 
escape from the annoying colleague who does not agree with her. The colleague is 
blamed as wrong. The point is that even in being about the world or in being about 
imagined things in the mind, emotion remains very much about things one comes 
across. Intentionality seems characteristic of emotion. One may also argue that 
intentionality is not always about things outside one’s body or even about bodily 
changes. One may become emotional about the thoughts one has or the visual images 
one conjures up in the mind, things that are imagined (Tye, 2008). It follows that if the 
mind is directed at things - either imagined in the mind or sensed in the world around us 
- then emotion as a state of mind must also always be about such things (Solomon, 
1985.p.166-167).  
Contrary to this thought Tye (2008) has argued that many states of the mind (i.e. he calls 
these consciousness states) are not intentional. Thus, he argues that if emotion is a 
fundamental part of the mind then this implies that emotion too as consciousness of the 
world may not be intentional at times. One may just experience the sudden feeling of 
dread and not be particularly clear on what it is about. A person may experience anxiety 
and find that he is unable to pinpoint the reason why. Searle (1983p.2-3) argues that 
there are states such as sudden elation or joy which seem less amenable to the idea 
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that they involve intentionality. Sudden joy may not necessarily be about anything 
specific. This gives rise to the thought that perhaps emotion is not wholly intentional. 
This is a further project that follows once research has determined the place of 
intentionality in emotional experience.        
Overall, determining whether intentionality is present in emotion and to some extent 
whether it is a necessary feature of emotion remains an open problem. As commented 
earlier, a review of literature shows that studies of emotion in organisations has 
somewhat ignored intentionality. It seems implied but scarcely explicit. For my thesis, in 
pursuit of Objective two, determining the presence of intentionality presents one task. 
This means that as part of Objective two, Chapter Four will determine whether 
intentionality was displayed by participants who took part in my research. This involves 
determining whether intentionality is necessary and whether it provides a sort of 
transient (i.e. afraid of job loss and related things) quality to emotion (see section 4.5).  
In providing a definition of emotion and thinking about intentionality a related concept is 
‘feelings’. This concept has not been clearly defined in emotion research in the 
workplace (i.e. emotion work studies). The terms feeling and emotion are often used 
interchangeably (Gooty et al, 2009). For instance, Fineman, 2003.p.9-18) uses feelings 
and emotion as somewhat synonymous and is unclear in terms of how they are different. 
The two states are related and form part of the worker’s experience; however, they are 
not the same states. There are philosophical studies that define emotion and distinguish 
it from feelings. Oakley (1992.p.7) explains that to feel something involves attending to 
or noticing it. During emotion, one often feels bodily agitations such as heartbeat 
variations or hairs standing on the back of the neck. One may also feel psychic 
agitations such as being annoyed or hopeful. The latter seems less familiar than the 
former. To clarify, Oakley (1992, p.7) gives an example of psychic agitations: 
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For example, a person who has been feeling hopeful all morning of being offered a 
promotion by his employer over lunch is unlikely to have been thereby feeling bodily 
agitation for the duration of the morning. 
 
Not feeling bodily agitations means not noticing them. In not noticing bodily agitations, 
the person feels hopeful with thoughts of what his promotion might bring with it. These 
are psychic agitations. One has a feeling of elation however no physical correlate. 
Whereas feelings seem to be involved in emotion, Rey (1980) argues that feelings are 
not always present. You may be angry at your boss for yelling at you but you may not 
feel anger at that moment because your attention is directed at the slide show in the 
meeting. This view is not so difficult to justify if one argues that bodily changes are often 
not felt when one feels fear of job loss and it is only afterwards that one notices a 
change in heart rate or goose bumps on the skin. To this end feeling is intentional in that 
it is about things – you feel what you perceive. But what about psychic agitations? It 
seems that Oakley (1992) refers to psychic agitations as the quality of being angry. It is 
the what it is like to be angry experience, or what Nagel (1974) referred to as qualia. So 
the person in the passage above feels hopeful and yet has no bodily agitations 
throughout his morning of hopefulness.  
This suggests two things – first, that the feeling must be a part of emotion. One can 
subtract bodily agitations as in the example above and continue to feel emotion as a 
mental feeling of things. But taking away psychic agitation seems to strip emotion of its 
mental quality – leaving behind a cold sober state. Secondly, given feelings must be 
involved in emotion they seem to provide some knowledge because they are about 
things in the world. In other words feelings seem to be intentional. Goldie (2004) argues 
that feelings provide knowledge of bodily agitations (introspective knowledge) and some 
knowledge about one’s environment (extraspective knowledge). In fear, one may notice 
bodily changes such as hairs standing at the back of the neck. One may also notice 
there is danger around the corner through an alarming feeling of fear. There is some 
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feeling of danger or risk. Goldie (2004) argues that feeling in this sense provides rough 
knowledge about what requires attention in the environment. It is a general indicator that 
guides the attention of the observer. For instance, the worker who is anxious about 
organisational restructuring may feel a guiding fear to look out for cues. Literature thus 
offers feeling as a feature of emotional experience and something that involves 
intentionality in so far as it is feeling towards things in our experience. In defining 
emotion, my thesis seeks to position feeling as a feature of emotion. In Chapter Four, 
the nature and role of feelings is presented based on research conducted with the 
participants at the cancer care network (see section 4.7).    
Studies covered up to this point argue that intentionality is a feature of emotion.  Studies 
also place an emphasis on feeling as a component of emotion. We have seen that 
feelings seem to be directed either towards the self or towards other things in the 
environment. In this sense they are clearly intentional in nature. Whether and to what 
extent this is the case will also be determined by an answer to whether emotion always 
displays intentionality, for without intentionality, how can feeling exist in so far as it has to 
be about things?        
The third and last important argument I want to cover in this section is about how 
emotion is grasped in the current thesis in relation to intentionality and feelings. The 
previous chapter presented an ontological appreciation of emotion (section 1.4). There, I 
described emotion as an experience. Nagel (1974) and Goldie (2007) describe emotion 
as a reality that is lived. It is the experience of what it is like to be emotional at a 
particular time and place through the perspective of a particular person who sees the 
world emotionally. Ontologically, the causal pathway traversed by an individual observer 
is his personal journey. To appreciate this more fully, first consider the alternative 
approach, that emotion can be represented as a series of causal links that fit as a part of 
a larger causal circuit of effects.  
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This description would provide a mechanical sense of emotion as a system made of 
smaller parts that fit together into a material order most likely bodily developments that 
represent emotion at a neurological level (see LeDoux, 1993; Damasio, 1994). Such a 
description is faced with the task of relating the body with the mind: (the Cartesian 
dualism) a task that still remains a challenge for philosophers and psychologists (Goldie 
and Spicer, 2002). However, causal accounts only deal in brute matter and thus a causal 
description is impoverished because there is no mental view of what that experience is 
like from the inside. By a mental view, studies mean the experience of living an 
emotional encounter (Solomon, 2007; Lacewing 2004; Goldie, 2002.p.17-23; Lazarus, 
1991). It is the inner view of the person. As conscious entities, we experience emotion 
not merely through bodily agitations but also as a way of seeing the world. This way in 
which we see the world is the experience of what it is like and it sits in tandem with 
visceral changes such as variations in heartbeat and increased perspiration. Goldie 
(2006) argues that this mind stuff – the emotion as experience – cannot be explained 
sufficiently by cause-effect type explanations found in the hard sciences. While such 
criticism might be warranted, we find that it portrays mind stuff or objects of experience 
as something other than caused. Objects of emotion for instance are then experienced 
rather than caused. The reality of emotion is the view from the inside. If this is taken 
away, then we are left with mere bodily developments.     
In the context of most contemporary emotion work literature, Ashman (2008) argues that 
emotional experience is seen as received as if it is something that happens to workers 
like a disease or condition. Alternatively, he argues that emotion is a deliberate action 
that is directed at things and represents a type of experience that one lives and therefore 
has the power to form. Similarly, Fineman (2003) in looking at emotion work, (i.e. tasks 
that involve emotion – see Bolton, 2005) argues that the experience involves workers as 
thinking entities that give meaning to the world when they are emotional. Solomon 
(1993) and Goldie (2002a, 2002b) argue that such experience is necessary for 
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understanding emotion because it is what sets us apart from inanimate objects placed 
under the scientific lens. The current thesis adopts this view of emotion as an 
experience. Ontologically, then the current thesis employs this understanding and 
constructs findings offered in subsequence chapters with this viewpoint of emotion.  
      
The current section presented some key concepts related to intentionality including 
feelings. To define emotional experience of the workers, it seems that intentionality is 
an essential concepts proposed in literature. I return to these throughout the current 
chapter. For now, we can think about emotion as a psychological experience about 
things in the world (intentionality) that involves making sense of and seeing the world in 
a certain way.  Below, I turn to arguments that support the third research objective which 
was briefly introduced in Chapter One. This looks at beliefs in emotion and their 
formation.   
 
2.5 EMOTION AND BELIEFS 
 
The current section addresses Objective three: To investigate relationships between 
intentionality, beliefs and feelings in workers involved in change. We begin with a 
perspective that organizes emotion and beliefs (cognitions) as topics treated separately 
by research. Next, feeling is brought in, the above section has explained that feelings 
seem intentional and this implies that they might be related to beliefs that are also 
inherently intentional as argued here. The overall purpose here is to review arguments 
about intentionality, beliefs, and feelings – as components of emotion.  
Organization studies examining worker behaviour during the 1990’s primarily employed 
theories of worker cognition (Lord, 1995). In these theories, cognition normally referred 
to the inferentially organised beliefs held by workers. These were seen to have 
explanatory power in accounting for worker behaviour such as decision making. Around 
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the same time, but at a slower pace, emotion research was gaining momentum. With 
these two distinct streams of research, the concepts of emotion and cognition (beliefs) 
were kept apart. Out emerged two different streams of research applied to worker 
behaviour in organizations. As a result, the focus of the current thesis has not been 
addressed because that would require thinking about emotion and beliefs as joined and 
not as separate topics in different research streams. Fortunately – given that there is 
little to draw on in organisation research on emotion - there are cognitive theories of 
emotion that link emotion and beliefs. In this section I will review these theories. In 
particular, there is the Lazarus theory argued by Klarner et al (2011) which presents an 
opportunity for looking at emotion and beliefs in an organisational change context from a 
fresh perspective. The review demonstrates two positions adopted by cognitive theories 
that stand in contrast with the position of the current thesis.  
The first position consists of research that focuses on a belief as an antecedent of 
emotion. The second position consists of research that focuses on a belief as a 
consequence of emotion. Here, a gap in knowledge is exposed because a third position 
is little researched. This third position focuses on emotion as an experience consisting of 
beliefs.      
 
2.5.1 WHAT IS A BELIEF? 
 
De Sousa (1990.p.7) defines a belief as some claim about things. It is an assertion about 
the existence of some state of affairs thought to be the case. For instance, a worker may 
believe that a colleague has been dishonest about work. This is a belief in the sense that 
the worker forms it in his mind. It is about the presence of some state of affairs, whether 
perceived as happening in the environment or imagined in the observers mind. In this 
sense a belief involves intentionality since it is about something (Goldie, 2002b). A 
worker who experiences emotion during change believes in some aspect of change as 
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meaning something, and it is this something, perhaps an adverse consequence such as 
job loss, that the worker might be angry about. 
Emotion theories have presented two sorts of beliefs – evaluative beliefs and reactive 
beliefs. In connection with emotion, Goldie (2004) explains that an evaluative belief 
involves weighing the benefits or harms in a situation. Once this is established, the 
person forms reactive beliefs expressing how one should react to the situation – this 
reaction is sometimes recognised as a decision of the worker (Scruton, 1996; Frijda, 
1986; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984.p.267). This is the belief of re-acting in some way 
specific to one’s situation (Simon, 1987). According to Goldie (2002a.p.20-24), both 
types of beliefs seem to have existential and attribution conditions. The existential 
condition is the assertion of the mere existence of a thing. For instance, a job task is 
carried out as existing or we believe that a worker simply ‘is’. Anything believed to exist 
is thereafter attributed some condition that specifies how it exists. This is the attribution 
condition. For instance, the worker ‘is productive’. Thus the worker believed to exist is 
attributed productivity as the specific way in which it continues to exist. One cannot have 
a belief without at least the existential condition followed by add-on conditions such as 
productivity in the above example. To understand the necessity of these conditions let us 
for a moment refute Goldie (2000) by assuming that both conditions vanish. Then it 
seems logically false to hold a belief because we have a claim and it needs to be about 
something posited as existing with this or that property. Without a thing, the belief is 
attributed nothing – hence it’s logically incoherent.   
Given that we have some idea of what we mean by the term ‘belief’, we can turn towards 
arguments from cognitive accounts and philosophical explorations of emotion. Related to 
this, a number of concepts are reviewed, including intellectualization, pre-existing 
beliefs, congruence, immediacy, and belief certainty.      
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2.5.2 COGNITIVE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION 
 
Cognitive accounts of emotion such as those by Schachter and Singer, 1962; Oatley and 
Laird, 1987, Ortony et al., 1988, Forgas. 1995; Scherer, 1984, 1999, 2004 and Lazarus, 
1991 – are concerned with evaluative and reactive beliefs. These studies primarily 
consider a belief as an antecedent to emotion rather than as something that forms 
during emotion. The studies imply that beliefs bring about emotion as antecedents. But 
they do not follow this through to infer that the same beliefs may persist in that 
experience after it has arrived (i.e. when the person is emotional). This highlights two 
things – on the one hand, it highlights how beliefs have been researched in relation to 
emotion. The emphasis has been on beliefs as antecedents. On the other hand, this 
highlights that previous research was limited in its scope.  
One of the early studies that considered beliefs was Schachter and Singer (1962). They 
tried to explain how emotion occurs. They showed that an individual forms an evaluative 
belief to recognise his bodily agitations. This leads to the experience of emotion. That is, 
a belief in the body undergoing certain changes is the antecedent that generates 
emotion. One notices an increase in perspiration, a weakening sensation in the knees, 
and a variation in heartbeat and labels this his feeling of fear. The drawback with 
Schachter and Singer (1962) is that their theory of emotion does not pay attention to the 
person-environment relationship. They only refer to beliefs about the body (notice beliefs 
in being about the body are intentional). For instance, Schachter and Singer (1962) do 
not explain how a person may feel fear because he understands that company 
restructuring is to blame whilst he undergoes bodily agitations such as goose bumps and 
perspiration. Instead, the theory assumes the person labels bodily agitations as for 
instance fear without knowing why. Schachter and Singer (1962) do not consider the 
environment’s impact on belief formation. A few years later Mandler (1975) argued that 
beliefs evaluating person-environment relationships are important because beliefs 
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evaluating one’s bodily agitations are not enough. One also has to believe in something 
fearful or angering lurking about. The environment is scanned for cues to understand 
why the goose bumps occurred and why one feels afraid.  
However, both studies propose that evaluative beliefs are essential for emotion. Beliefs 
might in turn also result from emotion. That is, emotion may be followed by some 
reasoning about things and how one felt in retrospect. Power and Dalgelish (2003) 
explain that prior to the above studies beliefs were not important variables and most 
studies expressed emotion through bodily agitations. Before the 1960’s, studies such as 
the Canon (1931) experiment expounded emotion in terms of central autonomic activity. 
At the time, psychological accounts were not center stage. However following Schachter 
and Singer (1962), subsequent studies placed an increasing emphasis on beliefs – see 
(Niedenthal et al, 2006; Lazarus, 1994, 1991; Scherer, 1988; Marr, 1982 – for their ideas 
on the categorization of sensory input as feeling type shortcuts; and Bower, 1981 – on 
network theories of emotion). These subsequent studies argued that beliefs are 
essential for emotion because an emotion is not just bodily agitation on its own.  There is 
something more and one would surmise that mind stuff is also necessary for a person to 
feel emotional. Whilst beliefs were used to represent emotion, some studies such as 
Ortony et al (1988) over-intellectualized emotion. By this I mean that Ortony et al (1988) 
took a set of beliefs and arranging them hierarchically they argued that through the 
successive formation of these beliefs the individual would experience emotion. In this 
approach, all one needs is a set of beliefs to represent emotion. In philosophical circles 
this view is strongly proposed by Solomon (1993.p.126) who claims that I cannot be 
angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or offended me. Solomon (1993) 
argues that given the right beliefs thought up in the right sequence, one will inevitably 
feel an emotion. This argument conveniently leaves out the component of feelings as 
something other than a sequence of beliefs. The need to consider feelings as an 
additional component alongside beliefs was not a focus under this over intellectualizing 
53 
 
view. As Goldie (2002a) notes such approaches are watered down explanations that 
lose the richness of emotional experience. In attempts to explain emotion using beliefs 
research mechanizes emotion and leaves out components like feelings.  
According to Oakley (1992), the argument offered by Solomon (1993) is weak for the 
reason that we may hold the same belief – that someone has wronged me - without 
necessarily experiencing an emotion such as anger. We may believe someone has 
wronged us but we may be too arrogant to let this bother us. So whilst beliefs seem to 
be involved in emotion, one must take care not to over-intellectualize an account and 
pay too much attention to beliefs as sufficient in understanding emotion (Goldie, 
2002a.p.32). Here, one is in danger of ignoring other ingredients. Studies explained that 
emotion also involves intentionality and feelings. So whilst other components are 
important in understanding the complexity of emotion, this does not in some way make 
beliefs less important. The arguments covered in the current section place beliefs as 
antecedents to emotion. Other studies treat beliefs as consequences that follow on from 
emotion states (Scherer, 2001 p.372). Past research has not focused on how emotion 
after arriving on the scene forms beliefs.  As argued earlier, beliefs are antecedent to 
emotion and they may persist during that state. You may continue to be angry by holding 
the same beliefs with more certainty. This highlights that research emphasizes beliefs as 
antecedents leaving aside a focus on how during emotion beliefs are formed.       
It seems that emotion necessarily involves evaluative beliefs. Otherwise, as Solomon 
(1993) points out, one could not feel angry unless one believes in some wrongdoing that 
has had an impact on one’s life. One cannot feel afraid without believing that a fearful 
thing lurks around the corner. One cannot feel sad without the belief that something has 
been lost. Goldie (2002a) however, proposes that sometimes beliefs are not involved. 
He argues that we may have animal-like emotional responses where in the heat of the 
moment we do not consciously believe in something as dangerous for having this or that 
harmful feature. Instead we react with a sudden reflex like fear without taking a moment 
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to think. In hindsight, looking back on the experience, a person may post-rationalize to 
explain the experience by ascribing beliefs to account for the fear (Goldie, 2002a.p.34). 
This suggests that in addition to beliefs about things, which are clear expressions of 
intentionality, a worker involved in change may respond to news about change with a 
sudden reflex like feeling. This reaction involves no beliefs conjured up consciously. 
Similar to this idea Goldie (2004) and Goldie (2002b) has argued that feeling towards 
something is a kind of intentional expression that is a general knowledge or indicator that 
there is something in the environment that requires the observers attention. Before the 
worker conceives some definite cause for concern, she initially reacts by experiencing a 
feeling about might be a threat to her prospects. This suggests that emotional 
experience involves intentionality both in terms of beliefs as well as feelings. The latter 
has received little attention as a component in its own right. The term feeling is often 
used loosely. Fineman (2003) proposes that feelings are those components of emotion 
that are more personal whereas an emotion is the public expression that is the front 
face. It is not clear here how emotional experience involves intentionality through, beliefs 
and feelings as components. These components as they persist in relation to each other 
remain absent in change management literature and within management research in 
general.          
In addition to evaluative beliefs, Lazarus and Folkman (1984.p.152) argue that to tackle 
or cope with the environment, the individual forms reactive beliefs. This second type of 
belief, which I mentioned earlier, is a person’s decision to react to the environment. 
Lazarus (1991) and Solomon (2007) note that an evaluative belief is employed up to a 
point and then reactive beliefs emerge amidst emotion because an evaluation often 
requires some re-action by the person. Fineman (2003) proposes that reactive beliefs 
are often immersed in emotion and involve feelings towards employees in workplace 
situations. How this happens has not been coherently researched. Addressing the 
relation between intentionality, beliefs, and feelings – covered in the above arguments – 
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the current thesis proposes research objective three. That is, to investigate relationships 
between intentionality, beliefs and feelings in workers involved in change. Some 
arguments further supporting this position are reviewed in latter sections. 
In relation to beliefs and feelings as components of emotion, in their conceptual paper, 
Frijda and Mesquita (2000.p.45) focus on beliefs alone. They argue that emotion impacts 
beliefs in two ways – “They may give rise to beliefs where none existed, or change 
existing beliefs; and they may enhance or decrease the strength with which a belief is 
held.” At a detailed level, Frijda and Mesquita (2000) are referring to three impacts here. 
First, they note that pre-existing beliefs one brings to a situation may be impacted by 
being modified and consequently, emotion ensues. The pre-existing beliefs enter into 
emotion and hence in some way are modified or persist through emotion. Secondly, new 
beliefs may form during emotion. These may be generated from perceptions of the 
situation or past memories that are recalled as the situation develops (Tye, 2008). Both 
pre-existing and generated beliefs are relevant in so far as they persist during emotion. 
Thirdly, through emotion the strength, which is the certainty attached to a belief as true, 
is enhanced or decreased. In the following section I now proceed to consider these 
impacts one at a time. Arguments implying the potential role of feelings are also 
reviewed.  
 
2.5.3 PRE-EXISTING BELIEFS  
  
We saw that according to Solomon, (1993) pre-existing beliefs can give rise to emotions 
like anger or shame. If there is a situation where a person has a pre-existing belief that 
one should be treated kindly and this mis- matches with his belief formed during the 
situation, that I was not treated kindly, in such cases, it is likely that anger would ensue 
(Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). At the same time a person’s pre-existing belief that led to 
anger may continue to persist during her anger. Goldie (2009) suggests a similar idea he 
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calls counterfactual thinking - that emotion emerges when one believes he or another 
person did not act as they should have acted in a situation. This gives rise to emotions 
like regret, shame and anger. In these cases, pre-existing beliefs require adherence to 
or validation through a situation perceived in a certain way. Such situations usually 
involve moral beliefs about the rights and wrongs committed against self or others in a 
given situation. Frijda et al (2000) suggest that moral beliefs about righteousness or fair 
treatment are often already imbued with emotion. As such, Goldie (2002a.p.144) agrees 
that pre-existing beliefs bring with them emotions and feelings from past experiences. In 
a change context often such emotion imbued beliefs are stubbornly latched onto. When 
experience negates the held beliefs the person becomes emotional. Mesquita and Frijda 
(2000) note that we just don’t know how beliefs persist or form once the individual is in 
his or her emotional state. In subsequent chapters on data analysis, particularly Chapter 
Four, I will use empirical evidence to illustrate the behavior of pre-existing beliefs in the 
emotional experiences of the research participants.    
 
2.5.4 BELIEF FORMATION  
 
Once we are in the grip of emotion, the red mist covers our eyes and the world looks 
different. Goldie (2002a.p.186) writes  
 
“If I am already angry at having had to wait so long 
for the bus, I may tend to see the person getting on 
in front of me as going especially slowly (just to 
annoy me?), and therefore I am likely to have 
thoughts about him which will justify, from my point 
of view, my anger towards him.” 
 
The man in the passage is angry. In anger, he generates beliefs that justify and fuel his 
anger further. The point here is that for the angry person the world looks especially grim. 
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Similarly, for a jealous husband a phone call by his wife’s colleague asking to speak to 
her may seem unjustifiably suspicious and inappropriate. News of unemployment in the 
economy may fuel fear in a worker generating consonant thoughts of job loss and impact 
on personal life. In cognitive psychology, Niedenthal et al (2006) call this emotional 
congruence. That is, emotion states generate congruent beliefs. But is this a necessary 
condition of emotion? It seems to me that one may very well not have congruent 
thoughts that propagate an angry experience into further intensity. Goldie (2002b p. 243) 
proposes that “We adult humans, however, are capable of a turn of reflectiveness.” This 
means that in anger we can become aware that we are angry. Such awareness of one's 
state can reduce the likelihood of generating congruent beliefs that may otherwise seem 
unjustified. The reason is that an angry person who realizes the skewing impact of his 
anger may be inclined to question the beliefs generated in that state. That is, he may 
question emotional congruence. He may ask himself about the beliefs he holds and 
whether these are good assertions such that reliable explanations of situations are 
gained. Goldie (2004) proposes that such self-realization is difficult because one is 
absorbed in the red mist of emotion and unable to think otherwise. This somewhat 
explains the undesirability of emotion in the workplace. It is a skewing impact on the 
workers thoughts; a bad impact for worker reasoning which should be dispassionate and 
in line with minimization of economic costs and maximization of benefits – as advocated 
by the traditional management theorists view. Goldie (2002b) suggests that feelings 
have role here. Consider the worker who has to attend a change management initiative 
(a training session) as a part of change being administered at his workplace. While he 
has beliefs about the training, he also has feelings directed at the training. Goldie 
(2002b) argues that feeling towards things is a puzzling idea. The feeling a worker may 
have is clearly intentional however is it to be perceived as an add-on to a belief the 
person may be harboring. This is not known. Perhaps feelings may direct one to adopt a 
congruent belief that is in consonant with an already held view. An early study by Flam 
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(1993) has suggested that feelings may organize beliefs and so possess a governing 
role in making the world appear to the observer who is under its influence.         
A study by Staw and Bardade (1992) showed that emotions such as anger and sadness 
can also lead to lack of creativity because the person does not pay attention to 
alternative explanations of a scenario. Congruence means the person thinks in one 
direction. A tunnel vision effect settles in and hinders creativity that would otherwise 
come from thinking about alternative solutions to a given problem. Slovic et al (2007) 
also propose emotional congruence; they propose that negative states like fear or anger 
provide a pessimistic picture of the world. Likewise, positive states like happiness can 
provide unjustified optimism. One seeks congruent beliefs that spiral further into the 
emotion. The angry person becomes more and more angry. In the context of the current 
thesis, emotional congruence is interpreted in terms of how one experiences the world 
through it. Ontologically, congruence is a part of being emotional. Chapter five will 
demonstrate that emotional experiences of participants involved an iterative train of 
thought. In Chapter Five, I focus on beliefs and through data analysis I show that a 
participant formed beliefs in emotion such that their experience progressively got worse 
in anger and fear. My thesis explores emotional congruence and it demonstrates that it 
leads to specific beliefs through emotion (see section 5.3). Chapter four also covers 
some ideas on how intentionality, beliefs, and feelings seem inter-related.    
Reflecting on belief formation, some studies also propose that emotion guides attention 
towards problems or threats in one’s environment (Goldie, 2004; Sartre, 2006, Flam, 
1993; Simon, 1987; Frijda, 1986). For example, a worker in anger may find that he 
notices the angering non-cooperative actions of his colleague. The onset of anger will 
guide his attention such that reactive beliefs (i.e. Decisions) to cope with the problem are 
formed. He might confront the colleague about the situation. However, Fineman (2003) 
argues that we do not know what types of beliefs form in such workplace situations. In 
our example, will anger guide the person to confront his colleague by aggressive 
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accusations? This is a fertile area of research. Specifically, Frijda (1986) suggests that a 
person in emotion will give attention to the problem believed to be inducing the emotion. 
In fact, both Goldie (2004) and Lazarus (1991) argue that anger generates beliefs to 
cope with problems. This is the adaptive function of emotion. Goldie (2004.p.11) argues 
like he has done earlier in Goldie (2002a), that in reacting to the environment, our 
emotion focuses our attention on the emotion inducing property of the problem we face. 
For example, the insulting slant that embarrassed and angered me in front of other 
colleagues is what I form beliefs about. Similarly, Scruton (1974) and Solomon (1993) 
propose that our belief in the fearful property of a thing fixes our attention towards finding 
resolve in what we come across. These writers were inspired by Sartre (2006) who 
offers an alternative account of emotion. He proposes that a person is always involved in 
life long projects, constantly evaluating situations and using his freedom to make 
decisions to attain goals. When these projects come up against barriers, the person 
escapes into emotion. Sartre (2006) sees this as deliberate action. For instance, a 
worker who receives a pay rise escapes into his happiness, an imaginary world, where 
he imagines the pay rise and the better life. Similarly, a worker fearing loss of face 
breaks down and faints in front of colleagues. He escapes the barrier (loss of face). In 
emotion, Sartre (2006) suggests that an imaginary world is created. He explains in the 
following passage 
  
“For example, this face that I see ten yards away behind the window must 
be lived as an immediate, present threat to myself. But this is possible 
only in an act of consciousness which destroys all the structures of the 
world that might dispel the magic and reduce the event to reasonable 
proportions. It would require, for instance, that the window as ‘object that 
must first be broken’ and the ten yards as ‘distance that must first be 
covered’ should be annihilated.” 
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The passage shows that an emotional world is different. Beliefs in emotion are not like 
beliefs in everyday cold states. Beliefs in emotion are not just assertive claims about the 
world. Instead, through them, the “structures of the world” change. Such beliefs do not 
depict distance as one would experience it in a non-emotional state. In the passage, 
distance separating the face in the window and the observer must be “annihilated”. To 
this fearful observer, the face in the window looks closer than normal. Thus, the distance 
in this imaginary world vanishes. The condition Sartre (2006) depicts here is similar to an 
idea called immediacy.  
Elster (2012) highlights that immediacy is not well understood in research. He explains 
that immediacy depicts the emotional person as an impatient person. The idea is that in 
emotion objects and events seem magnified, closer, and more likely. A worker might 
believe that something such as job loss is a close threat. What might happen to ‘me’ 
seems closer. Elster (2009) argues that in addition to the belief that something is closer 
than it might otherwise seem, the emotional person may also have a tendency to react 
more swiftly because things seem closer. Goldie (2004) also notes that the skewing 
impact of emotion on beliefs portrays the world as an exaggerated reality. In this reality 
the person has a tendency to evaluate the situation and react (i.e. form a reactive belief). 
The emotional person may think that this problem in my pathway is a barrier that is an 
immediate threat. This requires coping. A theory that was developed along these lines is 
offered by Frijda (1986) who refers to an emotion as an action readiness state. The idea 
is that a person faced with harm or benefit tends to react in a way such that needs are 
preserved – what we call reactive beliefs or decisions. This notion of action readiness 
means that emotion is defined as a form of mobility or tendency to re-act. So Frijda 
(1986) argues that anger drives the individual to focus on the angering problem in his 
environment. Likewise, fear drives one to take precautions in the face of a perceived 
threat. However, similar to Lazarus (1991), the idea offered by Frijda (1986) is that harm 
or benefit is assessed as an impact on what one prefers. In other words, the person 
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asks: How does my situation impact my goals in terms of harming the chances of 
achieving them or benefiting my cause? How one reacts by forming specific evaluative 
and reactive beliefs in this respect represents under-researched territory (Frijda et al, 
2000). This is territory that is addressed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis (see 
Sections 5.6 and 5.7) where the goal of research participants immersed in an 
organisational change context was impacted – the goals being to carry out job tasks 
without barriers seen as features of change.    The point is that these theories present 
management research with an opportunity to understand how emotional workers might 
react by decisions (formation of beliefs to react) in workplace situations where anger is 
experienced. Elster (2012) points out that given the Frijda (1986) theory, research 
cannot tell us whether for example fear leads to avoidance or confrontation. The beliefs 
connecting emotion and reactions are missing. The employee may not run away from 
imminent threat or as Sartre (2006) proposes he may not faint to escape the situation. 
He might confront the person to find out more about the fearful aspect of the situation. I 
will gauge the concept of immediacy with empirical data presented in Chapter Five. It 
seems that an understanding of immediacy is necessary for knowing how beliefs are 
formed and to what end do emotional workers react or make decisions to act (see 
Chapter Five, Section 5.6).    
 
2.5.5 BELIEF STRENGTH   
 
The last concept I want to cover in this section is Belief Strength which is the third impact 
of emotion on beliefs proposed by Frijda and Mesquita (2000.p.45). They argue that 
emotion attaches a degree of certainty to beliefs. This strengthens the hold one has on 
the particular belief which one believes to be especially true in anger. Frijda and 
Mesquita (2000) propose that even in the face of contrary experiences, the person will 
stand by his belief no matter how outlandish it may seem to others. The emotional 
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rationality here is such that certainty of one’s belief drives evaluations and reactions in 
the face of contrary logical evidence (Averill, 2001; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). Belief 
strength is not the same as emotional congruence, a concept we covered earlier. It 
seems to me that belief strength gains some of its certainty from congruence but the two 
are not the same thing. Belief strength is the absolute trueness of a belief - so you hold 
as Frijda and Mesquita (2000) argue - certainty that such and such is the case with 
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. By contrast, congruent beliefs are beliefs that 
contribute to that one belief you are certain about. In your anger you may be certain that 
your boss is unfair, and you may seek out congruent beliefs such as asserting that he 
has been unfair to others as well on past occasions. This contributes to your belief that 
he is unfair.     
In their study, Small and Lerner (2008) found that people in anger have a tendency to 
attach a high degree of certainty in blaming others. Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2011) 
found that such increase in certainty leads to an increase in the intensity of emotion. 
Therefore, in a recursive loop, this suggests that an increase in certainty makes the 
angry person even angrier. A study by Lerner and Tiedens (2006) suggests that this 
increase in certainty may have an adverse impact on employee reactions. We saw 
above that anger breeds certainty and this in turn makes the person angrier. Lerner and 
Tiedens (2006) found that angry people are likely to blame other people of wrongdoing 
rather than place blame on circumstances. Thus, the employee in anger may form a sort 
of tunnel vision that targets others. By contrast, sad people tend to place blame on the 
environmental conditions of an event (Small and Lerner, 2008). Thus, reactions are 
skewed by the certainty increase of emotion.       
Nonetheless, the formation of evaluative and reactive beliefs during emotion in terms of 
the impacts just discussed does remain fertile ground for research. We saw that the kind 
of picture that emerges for the emotional worker thus depends on how pre-existing 
beliefs are changed, what beliefs form during emotion, and the strengthening impact of 
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emotion on beliefs. For the emotional worker this may paint a certain picture of the 
world. 
Another argument I want to cover here proposes an idea called the affect heuristic. This 
argument shows that emotion is involved sometimes without beliefs and sometimes with 
beliefs held by organisational actors. An affect heuristic is a type of heuristic. Bazerman 
(2006p.8-14) defines a heuristic as a “what if” rule. It is a mental shortcut for thinking fast 
without having to reflect or ponder about a problem. For instance, I believe that my 
manager used to work for a competitor a few years ago. A heuristic to organize my 
thinking in this regard might be that my manager as a former competitor is beneficial in 
terms of experience. Vastfjall and Slovic (2013.p.253) propose that an affect heuristic 
replaces beliefs with felt emotions. One feels that this is the right thing to do. So you hire 
an employee because you feel like it is intuitively correct to do so. This reliance on brute 
feeling means that beliefs are entirely taken out of the equation. Vastfjall and Slovic 
(2013) note that this widespread concept is useful in making instant decisions but it can 
also lead to bias. The affect heuristic seems an excessive reliance on feelings which 
may have been useful to early man in the hunter gatherer sense. However, in 
contemporary society a worker often will employ beliefs laden with emotion to gain a 
picture of the world that is emotionally seen - involving an organization of beliefs 
alongside intentionality and feelings.  However, this does not mean that feelings have no 
value apart from when they are experienced alongside beliefs. As argued in the earlier 
section, Goldie (2004) posits that brute feelings can give us some signal or general 
guidance towards the harmful or beneficial things in the environment. This type of 
guidance too has limits. For without beliefs, it seems emotional experience would be an 
impoverished existence where one feels one's way through for instance a logical 
problem faced in the workplace. Surely here beliefs would be helpful in so far as 
addressing such problems requires a degree of conceptual sophistication. In connection 
with heuristics, Forgas (2006) has argued based on earlier similar ideas in Bower and 
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Forgas (2001); that beyond heuristics if we respond in conceptually sophisticated ways 
(i.e. a set of concepts strung together as beliefs) then emotion will more likely form 
beliefs. The reason is that the more ideas we generate, the more likely we are to 
respond with and recall those memories that are emotionally laden.  
This idea resounds in studies by scholars including Fineman (1993), Harlos and Pinder 
(2000), Peter et al (2006) and Fischer and Jansz (2008). The argument is thus two-fold. 
On the one hand, affective heuristics do away with beliefs entirely in emotional 
responses. On the other hand, responses that are not heuristic are more likely to involve 
emotion. Indeed Forgas (2006) aligns closely to my thesis in so far as he argues that 
organisational experience of actors cannot be studied without a focus on emotion.          
In this section, I covered a host of concepts related to the second objective of my thesis.  
That is to - Explore how emotional experience forms beliefs. This objective is addressed 
in Chapter Five. That chapter revisits the concepts found in through data analysis. These 
were congruence, Immediacy, and certainty. The chapter demonstrates how in emotion, 
participants displayed a sort of reasoning that involves what Goldie (2002a.p.12) 
recognised as beliefs of a sort found only in emotional experience. Now I turn to 
consider Objective Three that was proposed in the previous. This third objective is about 
combining the focus of the first two objectives and providing conceptual coherence that 
sharpens the research contribution of the current thesis.     
 
2.6   A MODEL OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE  
  
The arguments reviewed so far have covered how emotional experience involves 
intentionality alongside a place for feelings and beliefs. These components further 
develop through processes like congruence, immediacy, and certainty. Overall, they 
represent worker experience as a personal journey through organisations and through 
65 
 
times of changes. Ideas about how best to represent such experience coherently, is the 
focus of the current section.   
Psychological studies of emotion have used models to represent how for instance anger 
emerges (Bower 1981; Ortony et al, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Bower and Forgas, 2001; 
Buantempo, 2004). In organizational change literature, models have also been proposed 
(Klarner et al, 2011; Liu and Perrewe, 2005; Huy, 2002; Kiefer, 2002, 2005). Models 
have looked at antecedents of emotion, coping efforts, and consequences for change. At 
a broad level, studies use two types of models: normative and descriptive (Simon, 1986). 
A normative model of emotion would provide a prescription or an ideal to strive towards 
(Elster, 2009). In other words, normative models are about what the worker ought to 
believe, feel, and how he ought to act in organizations. This type of thinking is a regress 
back towards Taylor’s philosophy where the central idea is that scientific management 
can engineer workers such that they will react as they should in accordance with 
mathematical rules and reliability. A counter argument is that this type of thinking is a 
watered down way of representing emotion. In other words, a normative model deprives 
emotion of the personal experience that is intrinsic to the quality of feeling emotional 
(Goldie, 2002a, 2002c, 2004; Goldie and Spicer, 2002). Studies that try to develop 
normative models of emotion are essentially attempts to rationalize away emotion. One 
uses reason, a set of inferred beliefs, to explain the experience of emotion. That is, we 
return here to the notion of over-intellectualization of emotion. A study offers an 
explanation of action out of emotion that could equally be applied in explaining the same 
action carried out without emotion (Goldie, 2002a). This does not address the 
heightened experiences of being emotional.   
For normative models, the onus is on finding regularities in worker behaviour – typically 
a cause and effect series comprising of logical or biological networks, is proposed (see 
Bower, 1981; LeDoux, 1993). This kind of an explanation characterizes emotion, not as 
an experience that is actively lived, but instead as a passive cause-effect trajectory of 
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events. In one sense, this sort of explanation presents the emotional worker much like 
an inert thing such as a rock which falls down a building subject to various natural forces 
with no mind of its own. Simon (1987.p.62) argues that normative models are not 
sufficient for explaining worker emotion because workers do not follow mathematical 
reasoning proposed by such models. A person often experiences a feeling of satisfaction 
when goals are met and does not go further to look for some mathematically better 
option. The happiness derived from meeting personal goals is enough. Likewise, the fear 
of going further than what is personally deemed enough tends to drive workers to 
deviate from pursuing the mathematically optimal reaction (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986; Bazerman, 2005 p.7). During change workers are anything but mathematically 
rational (Flam, 1993; Huy, 2002).    
In order to explain how workers actually behave in the workplace, descriptive models are 
used. This type of a model attempts to represents actual rather than some ideal type of 
worker action (see Huy, 2002). This includes worker actions out of emotion. As Goldie 
(2002a) has argued action out of emotion is one that occurs when emotional experience 
forms beliefs about a situation and about how to react in a situation (i.e. reactive beliefs). 
A descriptive model of emotion would illustrate the experience of what it is like to be 
emotional. The aim of such a model would be to provide a way of thinking about emotion 
rather than provide prescriptions of worker emotion. Bardade and Gibson (2003) point 
out that such explanation about the psychology of emotion and the way of seeing 
through emotion is scarce in research circles. Klarner et al (2012) argue that more 
models are required to advance understanding of emotion in change. From a practical 
viewpoint, this presents value in the form of better management understanding of 
employee behavior. To this end, the current thesis proposes objective five. Based on 
empirical data analysis develop a model, to develop a model that depicts the 
components and dynamics of workers emotional experiences in a change context.     
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The current study proposes a model in chapter six (see section 6.3). This is the tripartite 
model of emotion experienced by workers during organizational change. To some extent 
the model is guided by ideas in the current literature review. However, it primarily draws 
on the empirical findings presented in chapters four and five. The proposed model 
coherently represents emotion as a transient experience that can be thought about 
across three layers. These layers are interpreted in chapter six and contain the 
components intentionality, feelings, and beliefs, as well as related components of 
congruence, immediacy, and certainty. Overall, the model will contribute to research in 
the form of a descriptive model that aligns with ideas of Lazarus (1991, 1994) and Goldie 
(2004, 2002a, 2002b). In the model emotion is represented as a process and this 
answers the call to research by (Klarner et al, 2011) who asked for the development of 
such research efforts in organizational change literature.  
Thus far, the current chapter has covered relevant arguments in cross-disciplinary areas 
spanning across from philosophy of mind, psychology of emotion, through to 
Organizational change. In this regard, research objectives have been proposed. The 
following section will review the value of a movement in organisation research which has 
some relevance, and it provides ideas that may be somewhat informative in reflecting on 
emotional experience of workers.  
 
 
2.7 IDEAS FROM EMOTIONAL LABOUR RESEARCH 
  
In organisation research, emotional Labour is a concept that has gained momentum and 
one that provides a focus on emotion. The concept was developed by Hocschild (1983) 
who introduced and defined it as the management of one’s emotion in jobs that require 
interaction with the public. The worker expresses the socially accepted facial 
expressions and bodily reactions whilst managing to hide the actual emotion they are 
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feeling. Emotion is a commodity to be used in the workplace such that the customer is 
kept satisfied. There are several definitions of emotional labour (Morris and Feldman, 
1996; Kruml and Geddes, 2000; Grandey, 2003, Mann, 1999; Fisher and Ashkanasy, 
2000; Hancock and Tyler, 2001). At the same time, Brook (2009) and Fisher and 
Ashkanasy (2000) point out that there is no widely accepted definition. The current 
thesis sees emotion as a psychological experience. A relevant definition close to this 
would be that emotional labour is an attempt by the worker to conform to rules about 
emotional display through psychological formation of emotions (Ashforth and Tomiuk, 
2000). With this definition, the effort is from the inside out rather than a sociological 
conception where social forces - the outside - bring about change in the mind (emotional 
labour).   
In the context of the current study, the main limitation of emotional labour is that it is not 
about psychological experience of the individual, or about belief formation. Emotional 
labour is a sociological concept. Ashkanasy and Humphrey (2011) identified levels of 
emotion research in organisations. The intra-personal level, the between-person 
emotional variation level, the interpersonal level, and the leadership and team’s level. 
The Intra-personal level is about the psychological workings of the worker and this is 
where the current thesis may be positioned. By contrast, Ashkanasy and Humphreys 
(2011) position emotional labour at the interpersonal level. Emotional labour is about 
social interactions rather than intrapersonal workings of the mind.  
At the same time, some studies in emotional labour open up space to suggest support 
for the current thesis. One example is a study by Martin et al. (2000). They explain an 
encounter between a shopkeeper behind the counter and a customer. The decision to 
serve the customer with a smile, even though the worker felt angry inside, is driven by 
her commitment to maintaining company norms. She attempts to control her expressions 
of emotions.  
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“A customer wanted to buy two identical baskets of Body Shop products. 
Two similar Baskets had already been made up, but they were not exactly 
the same; the washcloths were different colors. Karen said, ‘OK, I’ll make 
you one exactly the same’. As Karen turned away from the customer, she 
rolled her eyes and smiled at the observing researcher. (Researcher, 
Observation in Franchise Shop, USA)”  
 
Martin et al., (2000, p.124) 
 
This exchange shows that emotional experience involves beliefs. Karen feels anger but 
in that experience the belief to suppress the anger is generated, whereby the anger is 
managed. Thus clearly emotion does form beliefs for Karen; however, the study like 
other emotional labour studies is not concerned with the intra-personal level. Another 
example is the study by Locke (1996), which looked at emotions within a hospital setting. 
Locke (1996) explains that the decision of a Medical Doctor to give his patient a 
particular treatment, even though he is aware of the low chances of success and has 
fears about this; is driven by beliefs about providing hope and comfort to the patient and 
his family. In one sense, the Doctor’s belief that he can provide some comfort to patients 
and their families persists during fears about the low chances of success. So clearly fear 
does form beliefs that evaluate and lead to reactions. Overall, the concept of emotional 
labour grows with popularity. Ashforth and Humphreys (2011.p.220) emphasize the 
“need for more research at level 1 (within person)”. This is where the current thesis is 
positioned and contributes to.    
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2.8 CONCLUSION: THE KEY THEMES 
 
In general, the current chapter reviewed arguments that support the proposed research 
objectives. These objectives underlie the following research question: How is emotion 
experienced by workers involved in organisational change? The current chapter 
revealed several themes in research. In early sections of the chapter, organizational 
change studies justified the need to research emotion as a common reaction during 
change. Arguments demonstrate that emotion has implications for change management, 
namely, if left unmanaged, emotion can be a hindrance to the implementation of 
effective change. In a change context, negative emotions frequently prevail (Klarner et 
al, 2011; Maitlis and Sonensheim, 2010; Kiefer, 2005) and their impact can be in the 
form of resistance and voluntary disengagement. Following this, a tighter focus on 
emotion and its mental components was developed. Initially, the argument pertaining to 
intentionality was addressed. This was followed by a review of arguments about feelings 
and beliefs, and the emergence of components that explain how beliefs are formed 
during emotion, such as congruence, immediacy, and certainty. From a historical 
viewpoint, the general trend indicates that organisation studies have given little attention 
to emotion. For the most part it has been viewed as a bad thing that contaminates 
reason. However, in the last couple of decades that research has generated increasing 
interest in emotion.  
The current review found that definitions of emotional experience are often neglected in 
organisation research (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). In relation to this, the theme of 
intentionality emerged. The problem of intentionality asks whether emotion is always 
about things, either perceived in the environment, or conceived as something in the mind 
of the individual (Tye, 2008; Goldie, 2002a). Determining if intentionality is a necessary 
condition of emotion emerged as a focus. Chapter four draws on empirical data and 
discusses this theme. It was a widespread character of emotional experiences. Chapter 
six will proceed to present intentionality as a central component of the proposed tripartite 
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model of emotion. A related focus in studies has been an emphasis on feelings. To 
define emotion would involve further clarity on where feelings stand in that experience. 
Gooty et al (2009) point out that this distinction is often ignored by scholars. From an 
ontological viewpoint, the current thesis does not see emotional experience as a causal 
series that involves intentionality and related components. This is an impoverished 
perspective. Instead it is conceived as the experience of what it is like to live through an 
emotion. It is the experience of being emotional about something. Whether, to be 
emotional is to always be emotional about something, is an idea explored in chapters 
four and five. Overall, with respect to research objectives one and two, chapter four will 
present research findings and reflect on where within the emotional experience of 
research participant’s demonstrated intentionality. Latter sections delve into the related 
components of feelings and beliefs manifested during emotion.   
A review of studies related to objectives three and four showed that emotion forms 
beliefs and feelings that enable one to appraise situations and then to react to them (i.e. 
decisions) (Goldie, 2002a.p.35-40; Lazarus, 1991). Both beliefs and feelings displayed 
the notion of intentionality in so far as both mental states were directed at things that the 
observer was emotional about. Subsequently arguments suggested three themes that 
reflect the formation of beliefs and some involvement of feelings– congruence, 
immediacy, and certainty. The congruence of beliefs where a negative belief leads to a 
gloomy picture and a positive emotion leads to an optimistic view of the world is one 
area for focus (Goldie, 2002a, 2004, 2009). In emotional experience, beliefs and to some 
extent feelings, provide the experience whereby things seem more immanent. This is the 
immediacy condition suggested by Goldie (2002a) and Elster (2012). This forms the 
second theme for focus. Thirdly, research also suggests that emotion forms beliefs that 
make one more certain of blaming others or of knowing things about one’s angering 
situation (Goldie, 2002, Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). The third theme to emerge is the 
notion of certainty as a condition of emotion formed beliefs. In emotion, one experiences 
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a conviction that is absolute in a sense not experienced outside emotion. Chapter five 
will address research objectives three and four covering the issues in this paragraph. 
The three themes resonated with the evaluative and reactive beliefs that research 
participants formed during emotion. These will be presented and then discussed 
subsequently in chapter six.  
Lastly, Research objective five was supported by studies that represent emotion as a 
model. Instead of using a normative model to represent research findings, a descriptive 
model seems justified. A normative model is not suitable because it presents idealistic 
‘ought to’ illustrations of emotion (Simon, 1983, 1986; Plous, 1994). For instance, this is 
the emotion one ought to experience. What resonates here is the idea of emotional labor 
whereby emotion is a commodity readily available prescription useful in commercial 
transaction. By comparison, a descriptive model is justified because the current thesis 
focuses on presenting emotional experience in terms of ‘what it is like’ or the personal 
encounters of the individual. The operative term is ‘actual’ unfolding of emotion. The 
tripartite model of emotion presented in chapter six ties together the answer to the 
proposed research question. In other words, it illustrates how components integrate to 
provide a way of thinking emotion in a change context. The model succinctly organizes 
the themes that have come to the surface in the current chapter and were empirically 
derived by data analysis, presented in chapters four and five. It addresses the question 
at the heart of the current thesis, that is: How is emotion experienced by workers 
involved in organisational change?   
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The first two chapters reviewed arguments about the research question – How is 
emotion experienced during change? The current chapter looks at how research was 
done in order to find answers. The starting point is philosophy. And this is not without 
reason. Consider that emotion sits alongside a range of other research topics loosely 
coupled under the label ‘organisation research.’ Philosophy is a unifying thread binding 
these topics together (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2004). The idea is that if a group of 
researchers use philosophical ideas to interpret something, than the aim here is to grasp 
the nature of thing, with clarity. Through consensus researchers can then proceed to 
study topics of interest. The value of philosophy according to Russell (1912) is that it 
provides a specific type of knowledge that unifies a discipline. 
  
"The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the 
body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the 
grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs" 
Russell (1912.p.22) 
  
For Russell (1912) philosophy involves the act of questioning held assumptions. The 
researcher challenges held "convictions, prejudices, and beliefs". He holds them up for 
questioning and explores underlying assumptions that are often taken for granted. 
Generally, these are the unchecked assumptions we operate with in going about doing 
research. Scruton (1996.p.3) proposes that philosophy is about asking abstract 
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questions. For instance in researching emotion the focus from a philosophical viewpoint 
is on asking the basic question about the essence of emotion. I may ask - what is the 
nature of emotion in terms of the thing that makes it the way it is? Philosophy asks about 
the true nature of things in the world. Given its primacy over other disciplines and 
certainly as a unifying thread for management research the chapter starts with a 
discussion of philosophical ideas underpinning research. First a range of philosophical 
arguments and debates about emotion research are reviewed. My thesis rests on the 
argument that constructive alternativism – a philosophy proposed by Kelly (1955) – is 
the right position for my research because it enables exploration of the personal view of 
the emotional worker. Following this the research design is presented. This opens space 
for arguments about repertory grid technique (RGT) which is the data collection and 
analysis tool used for my research and one that sits adjacent to constructive 
alternativism. This is followed by a discussion of the reliability, validity, and the ethics of 
research.  
 
3.2 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: ONTOLOGICAL VIEWS OF EMOTION 
 
This section reviews philosophical arguments and considers ideas useful in thinking 
about emotion. The ontology of emotion discussed in the previous two chapters – that is 
emotion is an experience – is also addressed from different philosophical viewpoints. 
Three main arguments applicable to emotion are found in the branch of Philosophy 
known as Philosophy of mind. Scruton (1996, p.39-41) proposes that philosophy of mind 
consists of three groups of philosophers. These are the empiricists, the rationalists and 
the phenomenologists. Philosophers in these groups hold ideas about the nature of 
reality (what is termed ontology) and about the nature of knowledge of reality (what is 
termed epistemology). This section demonstrates that the current thesis warms up to the 
Phenomenologists interpretations of emotion and it is interested in the experience of 
75 
 
what it is like to be emotional. That is, the current thesis is interested in appearances. 
Related to this the data collection section explains that interviews conducted. In 
interviews conversations provided some access to how the world appears to emotional 
participants. Through analysis this was organized to represent the internal workings of 
the mind. Chapters four, five and six represent how emotion made the world appear and 
a model is provided to represent the internal workings of the mind.   
The empiricist argues that we can develop knowledge of emotion only through direct 
experience of the material world. Ontologically emotion is a material development. We 
use our body to experience emotion. Epistemologically the way to understand emotion is 
through observation. Knowledge about how the mind works or what it is - are generated 
through experience (Bhaskar, 2007.p.19). The problem with this idea is that we presume 
to know the world of experience (physical entities) using our beliefs and feelings which 
themselves are not physical entities. Unless we can reduce beliefs to physical variations 
such as bodily agitations we are using apples to represents pears. The thought that 
matter and mind are separate substances is the mind-body problem. This remains an 
open problem (Goldie and Spicer, 2002). The idea is that mind and body are two 
different substances. As such we can spend time slicing up and mixing up one 
substance (i.e. the body) and we will still not account for the other substance (the mind). 
The two are fundamentally different.  
This problem was addressed by Leibniz (1989) who was a rationalist (the second group 
philosophers in the philosophy of mind arena). Whereas empiricists prize material order 
and the direct experience of observing the world, rationalists like Leibniz (1989) look 
towards reason as the ultimate road to reality. Leibniz (1989) had faith in mental reality. 
He rejected materialism which is the idea that matter can explain away mental 
developments like memory, beliefs, emotion. For him the mind is a different substance. 
Upholding materialism emotion would then be wholly reducible to material 
developments. This position is adopted by contemporary neurologists such as Damasio 
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(1994) and LeDoux (1993) who see emotion as chemical and material bodily agitations. 
As a rationalist, Leibniz (1989) argues that ontologically emotion is made of mind stuff. 
The mind brings with it some a priori truths independent of what is gained from the 
outside world. Scruton (1996) explains that for Leibniz (1989) the mind is a fundamental 
reality. Emotion as a part of the mind is also fundamentally mind-stuff. Similarly Solomon 
(1985) also points out that for Leibniz (1989) emotions are confused perceptions. This 
means that emotional people see things in a skewed manner. Here as mind stuff that 
skews perceptions of the world emotion is then disorder in rational thinking. A view 
upheld by rationalists like Spinoza as well as the philosopher Kant, both of whom saw 
emotion as a disease of the mind. Amongst philosophers the idea that emotion is bad for 
thinking has deep roots. Goldie and Spicer (2002) note that emotion has been ill 
researched and ignored in modern philosophy due to the very idea that emotion is bad.  
However with Leibniz (1989) his account demonstrates the primacy of mind and 
therefore the primacy of emotion as mind stuff which he believed was different from 
matter in substance. Emotion is then not seen as good or bad but instead as mind stuff 
that is intrinsically different. Rationalists who want to use reason to explain emotion are 
faced with this problem of the mind matter ontological divide. This remains an unsolved 
problem in philosophy (Goldie and Spicer, 2002). Using reason to explain emotion 
seems to face the problem of over-intellectualization (chapter two section 2.5.2). The 
current thesis in finding emotional experience formed beliefs takes care in keeping site 
of this problem. Ontologically the current thesis does not aim to explain away emotion as 
merely a set of beliefs held by the worker. Chapter five exposes that during emotion the 
set of beliefs that account for some way of reasoning makes use of themes of certainty, 
immediacy, and congruence which were discussed in chapter two.  
Phenomenologists are the third group of philosophers in the philosophy of mind. Here I 
would refer to Husserl (1999) as a key figure and the father of this movement. Sartre 
(2006.p.10) argues that phenomenology is the study of appearances. It is the study of 
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that which appears and “announces itself”, without any hidden remains. Husserl’s (1999) 
primary interest was in appearances or what we call perceptions. In terms of the 
ontological divide of mind and matter Husserl (1999) was interested in studying the 
human mind. Specifically he was concerned with knowledge of things-in-themselves (i.e. 
mind independent objects) and knowledge about a priori truths (i.e. knowledge not 
gained from experience). Solomon (1985.p.144) argues that Husserl (1999) believed it 
was possible to have knowledge of both things-in-themselves and a priori truths. To 
make some sense of where emotion stands in Husserl' (1999) thinking we must look at a 
prior truths.  
To understanding a prior truths, Husserl (1999) proposed a method called 
phenomenological reduction (PR). This method works to suggest that emotion may be a 
mental occurrence over and beyond material reality. Consider the following - in a 
newspaper you come across the sentence 'economic slump will cause high prices' you 
read this and fear creeps over you. Following the PR method, you bracket this sentence 
and as a sentence it is a part of the world and it represents something you are afraid of. 
In this way, you bracket everything in your experience as separate from your mind. 
Things about the world including things that you may feel an emotion about such as fear. 
You bracket until you come to what Husserl (1999) calls the essences of the mind. 
These essences are the priori truths you bring with you to the situation. Ontologically, 
through bracketing, one looks to the mind. Everything is put into brackets as apart from 
the mind until even the thinker himself is seen as a part of the physical world at which 
point we bracket him and go into a region abstracted of all matter. This is what Husserl 
(1999) called the transcendental ego. Here pure ideas are the ultimate a priori truths. 
They are purely mental and not contaminated by experience. The nature of emotion in 
this regard would then be whatever is left over once we have bracketed everything from 
the realm of experience. Consequently, in seeing emotion as something made up of 
transcendental mental stuff, we abstract it from the world. This includes the things that 
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we often become emotional about. If emotion is separated from objects in the world than 
it becomes difficult to think about emotion as a standalone concept. For instance, can we 
think about anger as just anger and not anger about something in the world?    
Ontologically, then we see that for phenomenologists the answers are to be found in the 
nature of appearances that are pure and abstracted from the world. Epistemologically, 
Husserl (1999) proposes phenomenological reduction. In so far as one here brackets 
things found in experience as not part of the mind, the experience of emotion then 
becomes non-experiential (a contradiction). Abstracting emotion in this way makes it a 
transcendental quality of the mind imposed upon experience from the outside. As such 
through phenomenological reduction we are then only gaining knowledge of something 
that is already within us. Something that is only grounded in the experiences we walk 
into as we journey through our life. If the current thesis were to adopt this position then it 
would not be concerned with the contents of the world (emotional experience). It would 
instead be concerned with some abstract principles. This falls outside the scope of the 
current thesis.     
Empiricists, rationalists, and phenomenologists to this day face the ontological divide of 
mind and matter. For empiricists emotion is found in the world. For rationalists and 
phenomenologists the answers lie in the mind. The current thesis ontologically sees 
emotion as an experience. In this sense the rationalist concern with the mind and the 
phenomenologists with a concern with appearances offer the overlapping idea that 
emotion ontologically is an experience. However as remarked in chapter one the 
possibility of a reality outside of the observers experience is conceded in the current 
chapter. As such the current thesis sits in a position which is expounded in the section 
below. This position is commonly called constructive alternativism.    
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3.3 POSITIVISM AND INTERPRETIVISM  
The above section presented the Empiricist who relies on experience for scientific 
knowledge. Then there is the Rationalist who prefers reason as the ultimate route to 
knowledge. The movement known as positivism emphasizes both experience and 
reason. This is currently the dominant movement in research (Johnson and Duberely, 
2000). Positivism is important for two reasons. First emotion studies use this movement 
(see Mayer and Salovey, 1992; Damasio, 2006; Small and Lerner, 2008). Secondly 
positivism stands in contrast to the position adopted by this thesis (i.e. Constructive 
Alternativism)  
The French philosopher Comte (1865) coined the term positivism. In his version of 
positivism there are six tenets about how society should be researched. These are 
ontological and epistemological claims. The six tenets claim that ontologically social 
science is just like the physical sciences. What is real is material order which we can 
observe. Epistemologically knowledge is represented as laws explaining how social 
organizations work as a set of cause-effect instances. These laws are hypothesis 
represented using language that has a single interpretation (i.e. theory neutral 
language). The researcher observes instances which are used to confirm or modify 
some the hypothesis. The hypothesis can be tested by subsequent observations 
(Bryman, 2004). In a piece meal fashion joined statements (hypothesis) form a picture of 
how things actually work. Johnson and Duberely (2000 p.39) note that for a positivist 
  
“The aim of research should be to identify causal explanations 
and fundamental laws that explain regularities in human social 
behaviour.” 
 
 A positivist just like the empiricist observes the world. And like the rationalist the 
positivist constructs reason by putting hypothesis together in statements commonly 
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expressed as if that then this follows. As emphasized in chapter one and two the current 
thesis is not interested in finding causal laws and testing hypothesis. Nonetheless a 
body of emotion research has progressed down this route. For example Small and 
Lerner (2008) studied anger and sadness. The study used a large data sample to 
facilitate generalization. Statistical analysis (analysis of variance) provided statistically 
significant results. Anger and sadness impacted one’s evaluation of events. Positivists 
interpret this as a law expressing likelihood of repeat results. Russell (1912) criticizes 
this approach. Consider the positivist assumption of a physical reality outside the 
observer. If the observer looks at some object and it appears red than this is due to 
photons, light particles, bouncing off the object and travelling along a certain causal path 
towards the eye of the observer. His brain interprets the signals and the object appears 
red. Russell (1912) argues that this means the object is not red. The redness is the 
sensation created due to the movement of photons. Aside from its appearance as red 
the object exists independent of the observer. Knowledge of on this front cannot be 
obtained through scientific inquiry. The object sits beyond our senses. Epistemologically 
even if laws were possible studies focused on finding causal relations by looking at 
statistical trends still fall short of the mark. Positivist studies do not answer ‘why’ 
questions on anything more than a shallow level. The respondent’s interpretations are 
not the main focus. This means positivism is not suitable for the current thesis. First a 
positivist inquiry determines patterns. The current thesis is not about determining causal 
relations. Ontologically it is the experience of the worker that is center stage. Secondly 
positivist research will not support an in depth exploration of emotion.   
During the 1960’s a focus on interpretations – the persons set of concepts employed in 
making sense of the world – gave rise to Interpretivism (Scwandt, 2001). This 
philosophical movement is not concerned with quantities employed in representing 
regularities between variables. Interpretivism proposes that people are not passive 
agents. Instead they are “active, self-aware, reflexive and capable of perceiving and 
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generating meaning” (Ramsay, 1998.p.165). As active agents individuals continue to 
reflect on their position in relation to things they come across in the world. This 
relationship is one that is described by meanings generated by the active individual 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). There are two important concepts here; one is reflexive 
research and the other is meaning making. Reflexive research is the understanding that 
in the process of seeking answers the researcher influences those very answers and 
influences the research process as a whole (Nightingale and Cromby, 1999). Ignorance 
of one’s influence on the research being conducted enables the increasing impact of 
bias or preconceptions brought to the research. Interpretivism proposes that the 
individual recognize biases brought to a situation. Hughes (1980.p.117) explains that 
“As far as social reality is concerned, it cannot be studied independently of the theories, 
conceptions, subjectivities if you will, of the members of that society; and, as an arguable 
implication, there is no reality apart from the subjectivities for our theories to correspond 
to. As far as social reality is concerned, it is constituted subjectively.” 
 
 
Chapter seven addresses reflexivity and presents my reflections on my research journey 
that brought me to learn from experiences. Secondly Interpretivism ontologically tries to 
make meaning of the subjective world of the individual. If society is constructed by 
interactions between the individual and other people then surely these interactions 
constitute the reality one should be concerned with. This is the extreme position adopted 
by interpretivists. One is agnostic to some objective world lying hidden beneath social 
reality (Schwandt, 2000). But there are researchers who take a softer position. These 
are known as soft constructionists. They are interested in social interactions and at the 
same time acknowledge the existence of a reality outside observation. Soft 
constructionists sit close to the ideas adopted by the current thesis in that the current 
thesis is interested in the experience of the worker and yet leaves room to concede the 
existence of a perceived objective reality – whatever that may be. This enables 
exploration of emotion as experience whilst at the same time leaving room for ideas in 
research some of which come from biological studies and stimulate thinking in 
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organisation research. The position of the current thesis is more fully exposed in the next 
section on Constructive Alternativism.  
  
One argument is that there exists an objective reality, which at the same time is 
mediated and interpreted by negotiation and consensus (Longino, 1993). Historically, the 
argument that interpretations or ideas are somehow primary in explaining the existence 
of things in the world is not novel. There is a movement called idealism which argues 
that everything in existence is an idea. For instance, the table being observed by a 
person exists in the sense that it is known. The table as it may exist outside the observer 
is in turn an idea in Gods mind. Everything is either an idea in the observers mind or the 
mind of God that subsumes everything. Therefore, it follows that everything in idealism 
exists as an idea (Russell, 1912). Both Russell (1912) and Sartre (2010) argue that 
everything is not an idea. There exist things outside the realm of ideas. This means that 
a researcher studying emotion can look at a participant and notice the expression on 
their face. The researcher may talk to the participant to find out more. The participant 
may in fact not be angry. This illustrates that the internal contents of the mind are not 
directly accessible. Contents can only be inferred (Sartre, 2010.p.3-5). What the 
participant says gives a hint about their emotional state. Ontologically, if there is reality 
beyond observations then we are faced with the question of how to develop reliable 
knowledge of the emotions the research participant is experiencing. This is an 
epistemological question. Goldie (2006) argues that a researcher may provide a causal 
series of events that provides some sort of a biological explanation – a mechanistic 
theory of cause-effect. Alternatively the research may provide a social account of the 
person and their social environments. One may directly engage the person. Listen to 
their accounts of how they experienced emotion. One may induce emotion by providing 
the person with an emotional story to induce emotional states and talk to them in their 
emotional state. Goldie (2006) argues that types of knowledge is different from what 
causal accounts provide. To explore how emotion was experienced by participants, what 
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is required are philosophical ideas that support methods, which enable the participant to 
tell their story. For this, the constructive alternativism movement was adopted. 
   
3.3.1 CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVISM- THESIS ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The above sections covered ideas by empiricists, rationalists, and 
phenomenologists. This was followed by a look at positivism and interpretivism. The 
current thesis on this spectrum sits close to the interpretivist movement that arose 
around the 1960’s. Specifically the thesis draws on ideas from a movement called 
constructive alternativism. This movement proposes ideas that sit broadly within 
interpretivism and close to soft constructionism. Overall ideas in constructive 
alternativism are suitable for this thesis because they are about exploring the experience 
of the individual. In other words about the experience of what it is like to be emotional for 
the participants. Kelly (1963) proposed the movement during mid-20th century when 
movements like behaviourism (see Skinner, 1953) treated the individual as a stimulus-
response system and in some sense as a passive agent. By contrast Kelly (1955) saw 
the individual as proactive. The purpose of his philosophy was to conduct research 
aimed at finding out about how people actively form interpretations of events and make 
sense of the world. More recent research on emotion shares this aim (Armon-Jones, 
1986; Goldie, 2002a; FIneman, 1993, 2003, 2008).  
The fundamental postulate of the movement is that “A person’s processes are 
psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events” (Kelly, 
2003.p.4). When a person comes across an event they make sense of it, process it, 
using constructs. They anticipate the event through constructs. Each person has their 
own set of personal constructs (i.e. subjectivity). Each construct is a bi-polar 
organization of concepts. So for example if a person comes across a colleague they may 
use the following constructs about them ‘good-bad’, ‘tall-short’, ‘upset-happy’, or ‘angry-
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calm’. The colleague is seen as perhaps ‘good’ at doing appraisals because she remains 
‘calm’ during one to one interactions. The deployment of constructs involves the idea 
that from situation to situation persons can use the same constructs to ascribe different 
meanings. This is because each construct is part of a larger set superseding and 
subordinating collections of constructs. The person can use alternative concepts to 
make sense of the same event or of different events. Constructs continue to develop 
through experience and provide meaning in the context of overarching and subordinate 
constructs (Bannister and Fransella, 1989). I return to the notion of construct in latter 
sections on data collection and analysis where the repertory grid is presented – a 
research tool also proposed by Kelly (1955, 1963).  
Given the idea of constructs, Kelly (2003) proposes the ontological assumption 
that there is an objective reality that exists independent of the observer. This reality runs 
parallel to the personal world of the individual observer (their subjective reality). The two 
fit together and interlock and this bond develops with the person’s experience. This is an 
active process whereby objective and subjective forces are in flux with each other. The 
position accommodates the view of the main writers Goldie (2002a, 2002b, 2004) and 
Lazarus (1991, 1994), and Frijda (1986) – all of whom acknowledge the possibility of an 
objective reality that is perceived and fits with subjective realities. These studies like the 
current thesis are focused on the emotional experience of the individual. The ideas 
above fit within interpretivism and specifically within the field of soft constructionism 
where an objective reality is conceded and the focus remains on the subjective reality of 
the individual worker (see schwandt, 2000 for soft constructionism).   
In terms of epistemology, Kelly (1955, 1969, 2003) proposes a sort of supreme 
position where the assumption is that subjectivity - the persons collection of constructs 
organized in a variety of combinations with each other - can provide alternative 
constructions of any event. The person has the power and freedom to know an event in 
as many ways as they can contrive it. This assumption is suitable for the current thesis 
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because it enables the possibility that participants can construct their own personal 
experiences as they wish. They can experience an emotion as a personal journey. This 
is what is referred to in the current thesis as the experience of what it is like to be 
emotional (Goldie, 2002a, 2002b). The assumption that a person can contrive events in 
many ways is suitable because it provides a leeway to explore many contrivances of 
emotional experiences. Specifically it shows that each experience is unique. This means 
that each emotional experience is to be explored in depth and not as part of a regularity 
or some pattern of repeating units.    
The second reason is that given the focus of the current thesis is on the 
emotional experiences of the individual and how they form beliefs; Kelly (2003) assumes 
that the participant can contrive emotional experiences from memory in a variety of ways 
and a part of this is the contrivance of beliefs. Thus, the emotional experiences are 
meaningful through the ways in which they are also a believing in the world to be a 
certain way. This assumption provides grounds for the exploration of emotion formed 
beliefs because both co-exist. This is a feature of subjectivity and one that is accepted 
under the assumption that participants can interpret their emotions in personal ways. In 
his endeavors to provide a new perspective on doing research and looking at people as 
active agents, Kelly (1955, 2003) also emphasized reflexive research practice. Looking 
at himself he wrote that  
 
“Our own theory, particularly if it proves to be practical, will also have to be considered 
expendable in the light of tomorrow’s outlooks and discoveries. At best it is an ad interim 
theory”   
Kelly (1955.p.14) 
 
The idea is that researchers just like the people they study should reflect on their 
learning and assumptions and be ready to revise them in light of new experiences 
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“particularly if it proves to be practical”. We need to be flexible as researchers and this 
means that we must return to our assumptions and review them in terms of how 
applicable they seem in explaining an event. Kelly (1969.p.55) writes “One does not 
have to disprove one proposition before entertaining one of its alternatives.” In order to 
do this the competent researcher needs to be capable of replacing one interpretation of 
an event with some other interpretation. Or the same interpretation revised in light of 
new experiences. Science of the social can develop if as Kelly (2003.p.5) asserts “There 
are always other constructions, and there is the lurking likelihood that some of them will 
turn out to be better.” Acknowledging and adopting new constructions or interpretations, 
may enable a better explanation of social interactions which themselves are often driven 
by emotion. Constructive Alternativism thus means that the theory itself is applicable to 
the researcher (Bannister and Fransella, 1989).   As a researcher reflexivity means that I 
accept that I am not detached from the research process. Akin to the research 
participants I too had emotional experiences in my research journey. Perhaps one 
becomes emotional about theory and this influences one’s interpretation of empirical 
data. To this end, I made notes where possible on my research journey. One can keep a 
diary. Chapter Seven addresses reflexivity as a dimension of doing qualitative research. 
It explores my reflections in-depth and the limits of my research as well as lessons 
learnt. Overall, there are three assumptions adopted in the current thesis. Given an 
emphasis on what it is like to be emotional and gaining knowledge of this, the following 
are proposed based on Bannister and Fransella, (1989) and Kelly (2003, 1969, 1955).  
Ontological Assumption – There is a reality outside the observer within which 
the observer lives and continues to make sense of through his personal interpretations, 
which are actively developed throughout life.   
Epistemological Assumptions – The first assumption about the nature of 
knowledge is that alternative constructions of an event can be used by the participant in 
a given context. The second assumption is that just like the alternative constructions 
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available to the participants of research, the researcher also enjoys the possibility of 
changing his constructions which may themselves be challenged in the research 
process.  
Emotion is therefore seen as a construal of events or a social construction of 
research participants. To this, we add the position proposed by Goldie (2002a) who 
argues that emotion is a complex of not just constructs but rather something that 
contains components, namely, feelings, intentionality and beliefs. This offers an 
understanding of emotion which enables the pursuit, at a philosophical level, of the 
proposed research. Concluding this section, it is worth noting that the central idea 
whereby the individual is free to construe the world (Kelly, 1955, 1969, 2003) and 
thereby bring about emotional experience is one that has been suggested by Sartre 
(2006, 2010). On this front, Chapters four and five will demonstrate that research 
findings defined emotion as a complex of components. Moreover, emotion in the world is 
a form of existing that guides the workers to exercise beliefs and feel his way through 
things; a finding that extends work by Lazarus (1991) and by Goldie (2002, 2004, 2006).    
 
3.4 CASE STUDY 
  
The case study approach was used to conduct research at the cancer care 
network. The case study approach arises from the assumption that what is under study 
is to be examined in great detail (Yin, 2009). For instance, a person or some object can 
be studied in detail as a system consisting of a collection of small parts, which behave, 
in their respective relations. These relations and the parts they connect may be 
researched from multiple points of view. One may take the view of the researcher, or the 
view of the researched, or perhaps adopt the view of some theory (Stake, 1995). Stake 
(1995) describes a case as 
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“A child may be a case. A teacher may be a case. But her 
teaching lacks the specificity, the boundedness, to be called a 
case. An innovative program may be a case. All the schools in 
Sweden may be a case. But a relationship among schools, the 
reasons for innovative teaching, or the policies of school reform 
are less commonly considered a case. These topics are 
generalities rather than specifics. The case is specific, a complex, 
functioning thing.”  
Stake (1995) p.76 
 
In this sense, a person might be a case, or alternatively an organization may be 
taken as a case. However, stake (1995) suggests that vague and less clearly bounded 
occurrences, such as relationships between people, may be less likely to constitute a 
case. The reason is that such entities are difficult to bound and define clearly, and 
therefore not easy to research.  In his studies, Freud (1997) often treated his patients as 
cases. He asked them how they saw their experiences in a certain way. He sought to 
study how experiences appeared to his research subjects. The current study is also 
interested in appearances in so far as the individual is under the microscope. The case 
is taken to be the individual research participant. The case study approach will enable a 
focused study of the individual person’s psychology and specifically their emotional 
experiences. These experiences are likely those that took place within organizational 
interactions during a context of change (chapter four elaborates on this further).  
 
 
3.5 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
  
In the case study approach, in addition to the case, there is also the unit of 
analysis. Once the researcher has determined a case, the second priority is to clarify the 
unit of analysis. Although in organisation research a case under investigation is 
sometimes the unit of analysis, the two concepts are not always synonymous (Yin, 
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2009). For example Freud (1997) treated the individual person as a case, but his unit of 
analysis was the particular dream of the person. It was the dream that illustrated certain 
psychic forces and the patient’s development. In this way the unit of analysis can be 
nested within the case. Another example is a recent study of emotion and decision 
processes by Maitlis and Ozcelik’s (2004). They treated a British orchestra as their case. 
The unit of analysis was the drama played out between the performers in that orchestra. 
So again there is a difference in level of detail. For the current research determining the 
unit of analysis was partly based on the adopted philosophical position. 
Epistemologically, the focus is on the interpretations of actors immersed in emotion 
during change. This means that the unit of analysis should enable attention towards the 
components of emotional experience.  
This includes intentionality, feelings, and beliefs. Thus, each unit of analysis for 
my research was the personal emotional incident experienced by the research 
participant. A single incident is one event remembered by a participant. In the current 
thesis this is their emotional journey through change (Stewart and Stewart, 1981; 
Cassell and Walsh, 2003; Bell, 2003; Kelly, 2003). The participants shared a total of 36 
such incidents. These are emotional episodes where delta team members had formed 
beliefs about change, and had reacted to organizational change negatively (See data 
chapters four and five. Appendix 5 also provides summaries of incidents shared by the 
seven research participants).   
Each incident was elicited through semi-structured interviews, which are 
presented later in the chapter. Generally, elicitation involves asking members to recall 
emotional stories from memory, and to discuss the feelings and beliefs they had whilst in 
their emotional experience. A tool used to organize the conversation is known as the 
repertory grid. Appendix 5.1 provides the grids. These are explained below, where 
examples of the conversations that took place with the use of repertory grids are 
provided. Overall, from a unit of analysis viewpoint, in the current thesis the case is the 
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individual person, the unit of analysis is that person’s remembered emotional 
experiences, and these incidents as products of the psyche involve beliefs as well as 
feelings. This enables a guide towards organizing how data is viewed.  
 
3.5.1 DATA COLLECTION 
The next stage involved the collection of data. Research data in the current thesis took 
several forms. The basic form was ‘conversations’. The semi-structured interview was 
used. This facilitated the construction of in depth conversations about emotional 
experiences of participants. Based on Kelly (2003) a conversation is defined as the 
construction of meanings as outcomes of negotiations between the researched and the 
researcher. From this viewpoint there is an inherent bias in the interview process 
because both the researched and the researcher bring with them a bag of concepts from 
previous experiences. The conversations were held at the hospital in Nottingham. The 
repertory grid technique was employed to facilitate conversations and to maintain a 
focus around relevant concepts. Ultimately, using the grid enables the researcher to go 
deeper and to gain some understanding of the participant’s world (Chiari and Nuzzo, 
2003).    
In order to explore the interviews a certain mindset had to be achieved. In terms of my 
mindset as a researcher there were preconceptions that I carried with me to the 
interviews. Initially, after contact had been established with research participants, I had 
arranged to travel to Nottingham and to carry out interviews at the hospital located near 
the city center. The first important concern was to think about conducting one to one 
interviews with the participants. On the day the interviews took place in a room at the 
hospital. I recorded the conversations using a Dictaphone. Making a recording on a 
Dictaphone provided the advantage of replaying the tapes at a later date and recovering 
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any data that might have been lost in the interview. The recordings were translated into 
transcripts which were analyzed at a later date.  
To elicit emotional experiences of the delta team members, I had to establish some trust 
with them. A part of this was to provide a setting that made them feel secure and gave 
confidence that our interview conversations were strictly between me (researcher) and 
the team members (researched). The issue of ethics is addressed in the latter section of 
the current chapter where similar concerns arise. The second important concern for 
getting the right mindset was to attend the interviews with an open mind. Given the 
philosophical concern with how emotional experience is lived by the hospital workers, I 
had to leave my pre-conceptions behind. The psychoanalyst Jung (1964) once remarked 
that in collecting and analyzing data (the participant’s experiences), one should 
deliberately forget what has been learnt from books and theories. One should make a 
conscious attempt to make sense of the data afresh, with minimum preconceptions. The 
narratives of the team members should be facilitated in their emergence, with guiding 
dialogue. But is this possible? Well one can take a careful approach and follow the 
advice by Glaser and Strauss (1967 p.3) 
“Of course, the researcher does not approach reality 
as tabula rasa. He must have a perspective that will 
help him see relevant data and abstract significant 
categories from his scrutiny of the data.” 
 
With this advice in mind, however certain I was about it, I proceeded to conduct the 
seven face to face interviews. Each interview was a conversation between the 
researcher (myself) and the participant (Delta member) that took place in one of the 
rooms in the hospital building in Nottingham. The interviews were semi-structured, this 
means that the structure of the dialogue to some extent emerged by doing the interviews 
(see appendix 3.1 for interview schedule copy). However, the interviews were not 
entirely devoid of structure. I used the repertory grid technique (RGT); this is the 
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framework that Kelly (1963) came up with about half a century earlier when he proposed 
his philosophical ideas expressed at the beginning of the current chapter. The central 
tenet underlying RGT is the assumption by Kelly (1963) that people in general make 
sense of the world in a bi-polar way. What this means is that an observer looking at 
another person’s conduct may perceive it as morally unacceptable and use the term 
‘immoral’. For this term immoral to have some meaning for the observer, he has to have 
some internal sense of what is implicitly assumed by the notion “moral”. So whilst the 
observer sees something as immoral conduct, at the same time, he internally negates 
the suppressed notion of moral conduct. Kelly (1963) argues that it is a set of such bi-
polar conceptions that link together to provide an interpretation of the situations we 
experience in everyday organizational life. Given the bi-polar assumption one can 
proceed by using the RGT as a way of structuring and representing concepts held by 
participants. One should also be clear that a bi-polar construct is a connection of two 
concepts where one is understood with the help of the other as an alternative. Not that 
one concept is a synonym for the other. In the observers mind, the two are connected as 
alternatives. In line with the philosophical assumption that the individual is free to 
contrive events with whatever constructs they wish such bi-polar arrangements of 
concepts can emerge as willed by the participant.  The RGT takes the form of a matrix 
structure. It was proposed by Kelly (1963) and has since been employed by researchers 
in several ways (Bell, 2003; Jankowicz, 2003). As a matrix structure the RGT consists of 
elements, constructs, and ratings. These are the three common parts that together form 
the grid.  
  
1 Angry so 
contacted 
Ben 
Anger and 
frustration at 
Re-grading 
Felt 
Angry 
left job 
Confrontation with 
colleague, felt 
angry, contacted 
Richard. 
Felt frustrated 
and angry, 
decided to 
expanded 
pathways 
8 
Felt let down 2 1 1 4 1 Supported 
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Let Down 7 7 7 3 1 Anger 
Trust 7 7 8 7 7 Lack of trust 
Angry with 
Others 
1 8 1 1 8 Angry at 
nobody 
More Aware 2 2 2 3 4 Less Aware 
Frustration 2 1 1 2 2 Being heard 
Others with 
Unjust 
behaviour 
2 4 2 2 4 Myself with 
Unjust 
behaviour 
Felt Ignored 4 1 4 4 4 Included 
Not 
appreciated 
1 2 2 2 4 Valued 
Achieved 
personal 
goals 
4 4 2 4 4 Not 
Achieved 
Personal 
goals 
Self-Aware 2 2 2 1 2 Little insight 
into self 
 
Figure 3.1 – Sample Grid 
 
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a grid. This was constructed during one of the 
interviews at the hospital. Vertically aligned on each side of the grid stand the constructs. 
These are the bipolar structures proposed by Kelly (1963), which were discussed earlier. 
Each construct consists of two concepts, which sit on opposite ends. So the figure for 
instance shows several constructs. One example is the construct comprised of two 
opposing ends, where “angry with others” is a concept that sits opposite to “angry at 
nobody”. The logic is that whilst the individual person employs one concept, for instance 
“angry with others”, at the same instance, the person also implicitly holds on to the 
opposite concept “angry at nobody”. By comparing the two concepts, he is thus able to 
provide significance to the explicitly held concept of “angry with others”. In this way, the 
constructs in the grid forms part of a conversation between the interviewer and the 
interviewed. This conversation then provides additional significance, which will be 
explained in the data analysis section. Do constructs always contain what may seem like 
opposite concepts? Kelly (2003) advocated in his theory the importance of flexibility 
around constructs. What makes personal construct psychology a journey into the 
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personal world of the participant is the acceptance that their interpretation of opposite 
concepts is their own.  For instance, the opposite of a ‘good act’ is generally recognized 
to be a ’bad act’. However, for a worker involved in change, the opposite of a good act 
(helping a friend) might be sitting around at his desk playing a game on the computer. 
Opposites are subjective because constructs are personal constructs (Bannister, 2003).   
In figure 3.1 aligned horizontally along the top of the grid are the elements. These can be 
defined according to the research needs or aims, such that the relevant concepts in the 
form of constructs are elicited in relation to the elements. Fransella (2003) explains that 
the elements in a grid can represent many things. An element may be a story, a person’s 
name, or some profession. For my research the elements were incidents (stories). 
Participants were asked to recall from memory and to share emotional experiences. The 
reason for selecting these types of incidents was that they provided a platform where 
concepts relevant for answering the research question were likely to be negotiated. I use 
the term negotiated because according to constructive alternativism the conversation in 
an interview is never the actual past experience but rather a co-constructed version. This 
is where the researcher and the researched use their alternative constructs to negotiate 
meaning of the topic at hand. Illustrative examples of conversations are provided in the 
section on grid generation, and throughout the findings chapter. 
The third part of the grid consists of ratings. Figure 3.1 shows these ratings, 
which are in the form of numbers between 1 to 8. Number 1 indicates one end of the 
matrix represented in the column on your left hand side and number 8 indicates the 
other end, the right hand side column. A given rating implies the extent to which the 
participant believes that a certain concept either on left hand side or the opposite one is 
relevant in explaining some aspect of the incident. Given this structure of the grid I will 
now provide examples illustrating how the three parts – the elements, constructs, and 
ratings – were generated in the interview. This will illuminate the guiding role of the grid 
during interviews.  
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3.5.2 THE INTERVIEWS 
  
Prior to conducting interviews there are three things to establish at the outset: the 
element, the construct, and the ratings. The types of elements employed in data 
collection are incidents. These are the stories told by the participant, which unfold 
through a dialogue between the researcher and the researched. The research 
participants provided 36 such stories. These were windows into their past emotional 
experiences. The other task was to elicit the personal constructs of participants. Prior to 
the interviews these were less pre-determined and less known in terms of their content. 
During the interviews the constructs that emerge come from the participant’s recall of 
memories. Their constructs are reflections of their emotional incidents (Kelly, 2003). 
Once there is a grasp of elements and constructs, the next thing is to conduct the 
interview. To expound the interviews, I now provide an illustrative example, describing 
one of the interviews. This is an interview with the assistant manager of the team, 
Charlie. The interview took place in one of the rooms provided by the hospital. I began 
by explaining my research to Charlie, including the reasons for carrying it out, and the 
aim of my research. In other words what I told her about what I was trying to find. 
  
Me (Researcher): “Well, I am a researcher [usman], trying to develop some 
knowledge about emotions in the workplace. So I thought you may be able 
to help, and thanks again for taking time out from work. You know, just a 
casual free conversation, where you can feel free to talk about times when 
you experienced some emotion.” 
Charlie: “You mean emotion, any emotion? In the workplace?” 
Me (Researcher) “yeah, just take your time and try to recall whenever you 
feel you were emotional at work” 
Charlie: Ok, so any episode when I experienced emotions? 
Me (Researcher) Yeup, what I am really trying to get to grips with, is the 
way in which you saw things in an emotional state. And, I will be recording 
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the interview on a Dictaphone with your permission of course. What we talk 
about here stays between us, so wherever I use ideas learnt from you, I will 
keep it anonymous and confidential. Just take your time…. 
 
The conversation that followed involved Charlie explaining the emotional incidents. 
And each conversation about the incidents she shared consisted of her reconstructions 
of past emotional experiences. This is what Kelly (2003) would call alternative 
constructions in line with the philosophy of constructive alternativism. There was no 
prescribed structure or sequence which the discussed concepts. Every participant is a 
different personality. And Charlie told her story. To keep track of incidents I recorded the 
incidents on blank cards which I later wrote on the grids when we would take a break. So 
whilst Charlie recalled an incident, I would towards the end of her story, ask her to 
confirm “Ok so it’s fair to say that this is an incident where you were angry and decided 
to contact Ben, your team manager”, she would then reply “Exactly, it’s when I think I felt 
angry, because she was unfair and went behind my back, and so I made the decision to 
go to Peter, and clarify the situation”.   
 
Written Down elements on Cards 
To record this, I then took a card and wrote on it “Angry at Colleague for going 
behind back and contacted Peter.” In this manner, all the incidents that we discussed 
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were recorded on corresponding cards. Whilst doing this, I also wrote down notes, to 
mark any concepts I thought were relevant in the incidents, writing them on a pad as well 
as the cards. However, one difficulty in recording elements was about managing the 
conversation. At different points in the interview, Charlie seemed to move tangential to 
the incident, and at these points I had to guide her back towards the relevant 
conversation, whilst not losing sight of my research question and objectives. At these 
points in the interview the participant exhibited emotional expressions, such as changes 
in facial expressions, varying tones ranging from aggressive accentuated style of 
speaking, through to hesitant weak whimpering, and bodily postures such as crossed 
arms. The concepts which Charlie referred to, which I interpreted as somewhat 
tangential at times, were about emotional situations not directly related to work. But she 
still associated them with the incident. Here it became difficult to delineate this mesh of 
concepts. Some of the concepts seemed indirectly related to the incident but not that 
relevant. She spoke about similar problems she had experienced outside the workplace 
on a separate occasion. The related incidents she briefly recalled were tangential. They 
seemed related to the incident itself, in so far as it enriched her recollection of the 
incident. However, I guided her back by to the original incident by asking her to maintain 
that focus. One example where this problem of tangential derailment or hijacking of the 
conversation took place was when an incident was being shared between Charlie and 
me. In explaining her ordeal, Charlie became overwhelmed by emotion to the point that 
she broke down into tears and started crying. The incident was about delivery provision 
and treatment of patients (pathways), and how the recent procedures and performance 
of the team was not enabling productive outcomes. Charlie felt this was not fair, and was 
duly angry because other people were not performing, as they should, in her view. She 
had a separate incident in her private life, where her father had suffered from poor 
treatment, and she related this with the incident we were discussing. The following 
passage from our conversation illustrates this problem, and the difficulties involved in 
managing the situation. 
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Charlie: Certainly from a point of view of redesigning pathways, about life 
care for patients, we have been working on delivering services, so that 
when you come into the hospital, we can work with your GP. So we make 
sure to design procedures where you get seen within two weeks. And you 
have to have your first diagnostic check in 31 days, and treatment within 
62 days. Say if you have gastrointestinal cancer, and surgery is quite 
complex and difficult for that, to plan and all. But the bit of the surgery 
that’s never been looked at is what happens after that first treatment. And 
that’s the work we have been looking at, what happens in secondary 
treatment, which may impact the whole outcome.  
Me (Researcher) Ok, sure. Go on 
Charlie: So the problem is that we found that two patients with the same 
symptoms would receive different attention and care. And we have not 
been able to deal with that. There are people inside and outside our 
teams, but it’s a mess.  
 
 
At this point in the conversation, Charlie, unexpectedly went silent, and broke 
down into tears. From the view of a researcher, I was at this moment in unexplored 
territory. She broke down. To deal with this I had to keep my composure and to provide 
empathic gestures. I paused the recording on the Dictaphone. This was a good time to 
give her a moment to recuperate and so I left the room and brought her back some 
water. I passed her a tissue and a glass of water which I went out of the room to get, 
while she composed herself. I came back and gave her some time. And then I asked her 
if she was feeling alright and could continue with the interview. She replied 
 
Charlie: My father, we were going through a very hard time, and he 
suffered. And it was a similar thing. And now I can’t help, but I should 
have, and we still haven’t.     
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Once the incidents had been recorded and revisited by us, my next act was to 
help the participant’s elicit the constructs for the grid. For this, Caputi and Reddy (1999) 
explain that one can employ a triadic or a dyadic sequence for eliciting responses. The 
dyadic sequence involves taking the incidents (written down on paper in my case), and 
asking the participant to select two incidents, and then compare them for similarities or 
differences. In the same way, triadic sequence instead involves selecting three incidents 
and asking the participant to compare these. At the same time, the researcher has the 
task of coaching the participant and navigating their thinking along the relevant path. In 
line with this suggestion, for my interviews the elicitation of constructs was rather chaotic 
and not as neatly structured as some methods may suggest. In the interviews I noted 
down relevant concepts whilst the members shared their stories. After the incidents had 
been recorded, I would choose one incident, and revisit the details of the incident. With 
the written down concepts I had noted, I would then ask the participant to think back and 
remember whether the concept was important for that incident and why that might be the 
case. In this manner the participants would sometimes refer to the incident and the 
concepts, coming up with related associations. In other instances, they would refer to 
some other incident related to the one currently under discussion. Kelly (1955) has 
stressed that the grid is a guiding tool, and that because each person is different, one 
may sculpture this tool to meet the personalities one comes into contact with. To 
improvise and construct the tool in the context of the interview or therapy (Bannister and 
Fransella, 1989), such that the person is managed and can himself manage 
remembering events comfortably (see appendix 5.1 for personal grids of participants).  
 
3.5.3 INTERVIEW SKILLS   
 
In conducting interviews, there are a few skills that are recommended. Fransella 
(2003) advises that an interviewer who has left his preconceptions at the door in so far 
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as this is possible and who aims to subsume the concepts of others must construct the 
conversation meticulously. The key point is that whilst the event is being explained by 
the participant, careful listening is to be exercised. The reason is that the next question 
asked by the interviewer may very well be based on the explanations of the interviewed. 
Fransella (2003) also comments that another skill a competent interviewer must possess 
is the verbal skill. He refers to George Kelly’s work and in his words explains 
 
“Kelly also says the therapist and counselor need to be verbally 
skilled that is not so much about vocabulary but about being able 
to get to the meaning that often lies behind words”  
Fransella (2003) p.109. 
 
Bannister (2003) suggests another idea about interview skills; he argues that the 
researcher must exercise a degree of reflexivity. A researcher must at times step back 
and consider that what he sees in the behaviour of data for instance may very well be 
his own behaviour. Reflexivity was briefly commented on in the introduction chapter. 
Chapter Seven addresses reflexivity. Also the conclusion chapter towards the end of this 
thesis presents a case (Richard the team manager), which is explained as an awakening 
to some degree of self-awareness of my own actions as a researcher in the research 
process. Lessons learnt as a researcher are presented as well. 
  
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
In general, emotion research has employed a host of methods. Quantitative analysis has 
been conducted on variables designed to detect correlations (Buantempo, 2005). This 
falls in the positivist tradition. From an ontological viewpoint there is a concern with 
finding regularities. This includes a desire to find probable laws intended to predict how 
variables might behave over time (Johnson and Duberely, 2000). In comparison, 
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qualitative analysis is relatively emergent. This means that qualitative methods of 
analysis are less rigid and more open to interpretations of the researcher (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Lincoln, 1995; Schwandt, 2000). One example is the narrative analysis 
by Goldie (2009), who wrote about emotion and found themes interwoven in the 
personal experiences of workers. The choice of method employed in the current thesis 
falls into the qualitative approach. The data took the form of conversations and repertory 
grids. In order to analyse the data a procedure was developed, which is presented in this 
section.  
To some extent, the ontology of the interview data implies that qualitative analysis is the 
suitable tool. The ontology of the data refers to its nature. Conversations by their nature 
are non-homogenous (Easterby et al, 2008). Consider that the meaning of a word is not 
similar to the meaning of a number. Generally, compared to a word, a number has a 
somewhat fixed interpretation. That is, one quantity or occurrence of something is just 
that. It can be replicated and populated as a summation. By comparison, the use of a 
word in a conversation is more context sensitive. For example, the meaning of the word 
‘fear’ is sensitive to the sentence it belongs to, and this in turn is sensitive to a 
paragraph, which is part of a larger argument made by a person who has a history 
(Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009). This means that interview data has to be interpreted in 
relation to the messages hidden in the dialogue that took place during the interviews. 
This sits in the larger pre-interview and post-interview interpretations. Therefore, the 
data analysis involved the practice of moving back and forth between words, sentences, 
passages, and the larger context of the research purpose.  
The other data form was the repertory grid. This was prepared during the interview 
dialogues. The data is a co-construction resulting from the efforts of the participant and 
the researcher (King and Horrocks, 2010). The structure of the data makes it seem 
perhaps more homogenous. In particular, the use of numbers in grids to indicate degree 
of impact a construct represents seems somewhat simplistic. From an ontological 
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viewpoint, the grid was an organisation of concepts designed to facilitate the participants 
thinking during the interviews (Fransella, 2003; Bell, 2003; Caputi and Reddy, 1999). 
Post interview the analysis mapped the personal grid data on the interview transcripts. In 
this way, grid data was interpreted in relation to the interview dialogues. The 
interpretation of the data did not treat it as homogenous in nature.    
Silverman (2000) has argued that writing up transcripts increases one’s familiarity with 
the content and structure of the conversations. Following on from this, the next step was 
to analyse the data. Miles and Huberman (1994) explain that data analysis in the 
qualitative sense involves three stages: Data reduction (breaking down data into smaller 
parts/codes), Data display (presenting data), and Data verification/conclusion. 
Interpretivist studies tend to employ coding or the use of excerpts, such as the type 
recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994), or Corbin and Strauss (1990).  
In view of the diversity of methodologies in organisation research, my analysis structure 
unfolded and developed through iterative movements, back and forth between the 
collected data and the reviewed literature. Consequently, the analysis structure emerged 
through the actual practice of doing the data analysis. I began writing up the incidents 
and in parallel analyzed the transcripts that I had written out. This involved reading the 
transcripts and teasing out key terms. The terms in the grids were compared with the 
transcript paragraphs. The explanations of emotional incidents in the transcripts shed 
light on the corresponding constructs in the grids. In doing the analysis, my thoughts 
were inspired by Freud (1997), and the structure he used in analyzing his patients. This 
involved a line by line reading of the transcripts, and making sense of the concepts 
hidden in the sentences. Figure 3.2 shows the iterative process of moving between the 
transcript sentences and some of the grid constructs. This is a process that was 
generated through my interpretations and making sense of data. The arrows show the 
movement of attention from transcripts to constructs and back (feedback loops). The 
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constructs in this example were subsumed under the concept of ‘unfair treatment’, a 
concept that was generated through analysis. (See figure 3.2) 
“We cannot do much, you can’t beat this, it has to come 
from the top to bottom. You just can’t. I feel helpless and 
victimized you know. They don’t care they just are in a 
position to do that” (Transcript sentence) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Analysis procedures  
In order to develop some knowledge and coherence into the accounts shared by 
the persons; a structure or template for making sense of the data emerged. This 
structure took the following form illustrated in Figure. 3.3 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control -----------------------------------------------Anarchy 
Influence -----------------------------------Lack of Influence 
Order ----------------------------------------Dis-Order 
Unfair 
 Incident Summary -   Explaining the incidents in my own words using where helpful the 
excerpts directly from the interview. Within this summary the grid was situated and 
compared to transcript paragraphs (explained above). 
 The Emotion – Explanation of the emotion(s) in the incidents and what they were about. 
 The Beliefs to evaluate and react to the situation – Explanation of what decision was taken. 
 Discussion – A critical commentary of the main concepts that constituted what the 
incidents were about, those used by the participant to see the situation in their own ways.  
  How emotion impacted evaluations and reactions - The sequence of arranging the 
concepts one following or parallel to another. 
Fig 3.3 Template  
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Rather than a mere description of what the participants had told me in the interviews, 
this template facilitated thinking about the data. The template begins with the general 
incident summary and funnels concepts towards the specific research questions. An 
important skill in this process is to maintain skepticism about what appears at first sight 
to be the case. One has to sometimes go back and forth iteratively between data sets.  
The personal grids were situated within the template in figure 3.3. The Grid has been 
used more so in a qualitative sense rather than in a quantitative fashion. Specifically, the 
interpretation placed on the grid contents – the concepts, ratings, and elements is an 
interpretation concerned with making sense of opinions and not the search for causal 
patterns. Through a pilot study conducted earlier in my first year (Talat, 2007), I had 
found that personal grid content can be interpreted using statistical methods conducted 
by previous studies (Jankowicz, 2003). This included cluster analysis, principal 
components analysis, or simpler techniques such as counting the numerical ratings to 
calculate means or modes. My analysis of the grids did not treat the ratings, neither the 
constructs nor elements, as homogenous, but as idiosyncratic. An example is provided 
below in figure 3.4. The figure shows analysis of ratings conducted in a qualitative way. 
The figure shows two incidents. These are rated along the construct of distrust and trust. 
The person in this example rated both incidents 1 on a scale of 1 to 8. The figure shows 
that 1 represents extreme distrust and 8 represents trust. However the two incidents do 
not mean the same thing and do not indicate the same distrust. If one reads the passage 
in incident 1 then it seems that the sort of distrust that is implied in this passage is one 
where the participant feels let down and it is distrust in this specific sense. This has more 
meaning when one reads the passage in the larger paragraph to which it belongs. 
Similarly the passage in incident 2 implies the sort of distrust that is about personal 
friendship or attack. Distrust means something in the context of the passage which 
provides importance to the grid ratings.         
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Figure 3.4. Qualitative Rating Analysis 
In other words, even within the same incident, the same rating across two 
constructs is interpreted in light of the written up transcripts and their meanings in the 
context of the emotional narratives that team members shared. In conducting the 
analysis through the aforementioned steps, the participants view was somewhat 
discerned with the help of a focus on her beliefs. To reiterate what has been explained in 
the previous chapter: a belief is described as taking the form of a statement, to which a 
person attaches a degree of certainty that gives it merit over alternative statements. A 
statement is a belief in so far as it is viewed as the likely explanation for some 
occurrence, whether mental or material (Kelly, 1955; Bower, 1981; Goldie, 2000). The 
previous chapter has shown the central role of beliefs in uncovering the need to answer 
the proposed research question, particularly where beliefs are held in relation to self, 
others, and goals. To discern a belief, the sentences in the template in figure 3.3 were 
viewed in the context of the whole template. Here phrases that direct attention towards 
 
 1 
Incident 
one 
Incident 
two 
 
 
 8 
distrust 1 1 Trust 
“Just to get away from the situation, 
because I felt very let down, I didn’t 
want to stay here. Just because I was 
so angry, I would have taken any 
financial hit. I still am angry actually. 
 INCIDENT 1 
“She fought it like a murder trial, 
threw a lot of stuff at me, to 
discredit me. It was a personal 
attack on my character” 
INCIDENT 2 
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the development of an event or behaviour as attributable to another played a central 
role. Thus, for example the statement “it is her fault” is different from “it is definitely her 
fault”. The latter exhibits a stronger sense of being a belief, whereas the former 
attributes simply the direction for attributing what occurred through her fault. In this 
context a grid construct with for example Certain-Uncertain as two opposite poles, adds 
further strength if the participant provides a rating of 1 on a scale of 1 to 8 in the direction 
of the concept of “certain”. If asked to explain why it is her fault, the participant may then 
add the explanation that “It is definitely her fault, because she is incompetent.” 
Consequently, we can see that from the belief that “she is incompetent” the participant 
reaches the belief that “It is her fault”. In this way beliefs were seen as explanations of 
the views of the participants. They were explanations about how participants saw 
themselves or others acting in such and such a way during their emotional experiences 
or incidents. Beliefs are thus explanations with a degree of certainty attached to them 
(Goldie, 2009). In this way logic emerges in how one inferentially links beliefs through 
the narrative structure.  
 
3.7 AUTHENTICITY 
The term authenticity is used in different studies to mean different things. In 
general authenticity in the reviewed literature represents an indication of the quality of 
the research data and the claim that is made based on conducted research. That is, 
whether that which is purported to be measured is what is being measured (Silverman, 
2000). For Lincoln and Guba (2000) authenticity is a central concern and it involves 
asking the question 
 
“Are these findings sufficiently authentic (isomorphic to some reality, 
trustworthy, related to the way others construct their social worlds) that I 
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may trust myself in acting on their implications? More to the point, would I 
feel sufficiently secure about these findings to construct social policy of 
legislation based on them?” 
Lincoln and Guba (2000) p.178 
 
There are two points here: one is that authentic research is spoken about in terms 
of a social human existence and not in terms of physical or material development. For 
example, for my research a concern would be to ask whether the behaviour of research 
participants does enunciate some social perceptions/beliefs held by them. Lincoln and 
Guba (2000) argue that research has increasingly shifted from quantification towards a 
narrative explanation of social truths. The implication is that a truth is authentic within the 
personal narrative of the individual who presents rational, emotional and intuitive 
responses as components that integrate through the narrative. That is the participants 
truth reflects reason that is similar to related experiences. This speaks directly to 
Fineman’s (2008) idea; that narratives can be employed within constructionist research 
that is about studying interpretations. In this context informed by the research interviews, 
in chapter four and five my thesis presents participant constructions of experiences that 
bring out personal truths held by research participants. These are authentic within the 
context of their experiences.  
The second point in the remark by Lincoln and Guba (2000) is about implications 
that can follow from research findings. For instance, to construct some social policy or 
legislation one develops outputs, and one may ask about the practical implications that 
follow from outputs. To this end my thesis presents theoretical implications in the 
discussion (chapter 5) and practical implications are covered in (chapter 6). Quite apart 
from this, for case study research design, and from the view of interpretivist research, the 
notion of validity presents itself through different implication. It is expressed as the 
underlying reasoning that one can provide to justify claims, particularly in terms of the 
content of those claims (Stake, 2000).  
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Therefore, authenticity of research is addressed as the logic running through the 
presented research data. More precisely, in chapter five, where the data is presented 
alongside analysis, there are justification and reasons that make arguments valid in the 
context of participant incidents (see sections 5.5/ 5.6 / 5.7). In other words, as Lincoln 
and Guba (2000) suggest validity about social phenomena can be intrinsic to narratives 
that emerge during the research process. So it makes sense to present data (i.e. 
excerpts) and to para-phrase it into some other concepts, in so far as the link appears 
reasonable (Miles and Huberman, 1994). My research clings to the assumption that 
epistemologically, we are concerned with appearances. The current thesis is about how 
emotion is experienced within the personal constructions of the participants. In view of 
this the practice of interviewing and developing a narrative through dialogue is an 
emergent process that enables one to ask the respondent whether a particular 
conception or belief is represented as they see it. Within the interviews, using the 
repertory grid the team members were also shown the record incidents, and asked to 
confirm and comment on its accuracy – “Is this what you mean?” It was at a later stage 
within the data analysis, where transcripts were utilized, that validity was reasoned 
through narratives. This added further authenticity to the trustworthiness of the research. 
 
3.8 THE HOSPITAL AND THE PARTICIPANTS 
 
Following from arguments above, this section is about where research was 
conducted (i.e. the research participants). Chapter one commented on the context in 
which data was collected. The context involved organizational change taking place at the 
hospital located in the city of Nottingham, United Kingdom. The hospital like other 
healthcare institutions in the UK was a public funded health care provider. This meant 
that the government allocated resources for the hospital out of its annual budget. These 
resources were then spent on running the hospital. The research participants worked in 
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an area of the hospital known as the Cancer Care network. The network was a part of a 
scheme introduced by the government to improve the provision of cancer care and the 
treatment of patients. It was a part of the UK government’s strategy to improve the 
provision and treatment of cancerous diseases through reallocation of resources.  
The purpose was to increase productivity. Cancer care networks were spread in 
hospitals around the country. They consisted of clinicians, doctors, and Administrators; 
grouped into teams, which worked with each other. Organisational change presented a 
good opportunity to do research. The change was taking place in order to improve 
service delivery speed and quality. A context of change induces emotional experiences 
in workers because their regular job routines are disrupted and this can be met with 
emotional reactions (Klarner et al, 2011; Carr, 2001; Elving, 2005). This was certainly 
the case at the network in the hospital. As chapter four will explore the overall attitude of 
the participants was negative. There was uncertainty and perceptions not in favor of 
change. Silverman (2013 p.215-16) proposes that access to research participants is one 
concern and the second concern is gaining access to data. Access to the participants 
can often be facilitated if the novice researcher knows someone who is perhaps a friend 
with somebody in the relevant organization one desires access to. This was the route I 
was fortunate enough to profit from. The second concern of gaining access to data is 
about whether the researcher is trusted by all participants (Silverman, 2013 p.216). 
There is always the danger that not every participant in the research has a reliable 
impression of the researcher (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983 p.78).         
Seven participants from the cancer care network at the hospital Nottingham 
volunteered to take part in the research. The participants had been working together as 
a team for some years. Some of the participants had been in the profession longer than 
others.  
From a research viewpoint there might arise a concern about the number of 
participants and about whether seven is a sufficient number. Crouch and McKenzie 
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(2006) recommend that research based on interviews seeking to study participant views 
in depth requires less than 20 participants. Such in depth interviews provide what 
Silverman (1993 p.91) recognizes as “..authentic insight into people’s experiences”. A 
review of qualitative PhD studies in the UK conducted by Mason (2010) found research 
sample sizes consisted of at least 6 participants. Smith, Flowers, and Larkin (2009) 
suggest that a sample of 5 to 7 is reasonable for studying participant’s interpretations. 
Qualitative samples in being small enable rigorous exploration of topics. This is 
particularly suitable for emerging topics such as ‘emotional experience of workers in 
change’ where novel conceptions are being explored in their inter-relations (Hartley, 
2004 p.328). A criticism is that qualitative approaches such as case studies are a poor 
basis for generalizations to a wider population (Hartley, 2004 p.324). In case study 
research one is not there to “enumerate frequencies” (Yin 2003 p.10).  
My research interviewed 7 participants and it reaps the above mentioned benefits 
of greater focus and in-depth exploration of their emotional experiences. The positivist 
goal of generalizing for the purpose of predicting future variable behavior is not the onus. 
Qualitative research is not an exact science; rather it is the study of categories that 
explain how interpretations mater. In due course this can become open to enumeration 
by other quantitative studies, if they wish to do so. The seven participants made up one 
such team at the network in Nottingham (i.e. team Delta. A report by the hospital 
explained that the overall aim of the cancer network was to reduce monetary and non-
monetary costs (i.e. time, low work performance, bad communication), and to improve 
the care for cancer patients. The goal was to detect cancers in early stages as reported 
by local trusts, and to work diligently to prevent mortality rates from rising in the UK. In 
this sense, the networks were a form of organisational change. The Delta team worked 
to this initiative of faster service delivery along with better quality for end of life care for 
cancer patients. Currently, the team was amidst organizational change. This change had 
sort of frozen up the network due to shifting around of job roles and the development of 
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processes to deliver faster services and better patient care. The research participants 
called the organisational change “restructuring”. In the organizational change literature 
this is defined as a two-stage process. The first stage requires change in the behavior of 
workers, particularly their beliefs and affective actions. Secondly it requires change in 
the structures, routines, and tasks carried out by those workers (Burke and Litwin, 1992; 
Vollman,1996).  
According to Meyer et al (1990), such change inside the organization often 
happens due to changes in the external environment.  The study by Meyer et al (1990) 
specifically explained that changes in a health care provider (i.e. hospitals) occur due to 
changes in costs of acquiring and implementing resources. Consistent with this idea the 
report by the hospital gave precisely the same reason. Restructuring in the hospital was 
an exercise in cost reduction, as well as an attempt to improve patient care. New 
routines were to be established, new reporting lines, and worker training was to be 
provided to shape attitudes and skills. At the same time the restructuring was not very 
well understood with the research participants. Their views and the conversations we 
had are presented and analysed in the empirical chapters four and five which provide 
research data and interpretations of the data.  
In general, as the next chapter will elaborate there were negative perceptions of 
the change at the hospital as something undesirable. The main reason was that the 
research participants experienced negative emotions and had very many beliefs to share 
with me about their feelings.  Their perceptions of change were negative because 
change was alien to them. The people and processes of change were unfair and the 
impact on their jobs was uncertain. This made the hospital what Fineman (1993) has 
described as an emotional arena; the data was rich in beliefs along with 36 incidents that 
participants had shared with me. This somewhat justifies that 7 interviews were sufficient 
because the experiences were shared in great depth. This provided a deep 
understanding of emotional experiences. Negative perception of change held by 
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participants are explored in detail in chapter four where conversations presented 
alongside analytical commentary and illustrative grid data (also see appendix 5).  
Previous studies have investigated links between emotion and 
cognitive/behavioral processes within hospital settings (Hatfield et al, 1987; Meyerson, 
1990; Theorell et al 1993). These studies argue that in a hospital emotions are likely to 
arise in everyday routines. The reason appears to be the activities one carries out in 
hospitals. In other words workers in hospital settings deal with life and death, as well as 
the impact of disease on the lives of patients, relatives, and workers. Concerns about 
these topics can often invoke emotional responses from hospital workers. The seven 
research participants in the current thesis will hitherto be collectively referred to as Delta 
team. Each member in the team had a particular job and associated set of tasks.  
 
RICHARD 
The team leader was Richard. He was also the most experienced worker in the 
team. Richard was a high ranking manager with a wealth of experience in managing 
people. He had also known and worked with some team members for several years. At 
the time of the interview Richard shared with me plans about retirement from his job. In 
what inspired a sense of emotion in me he wanted to go sailing around the world. In this 
desire one could see that sailing would be a business of managing yet breaking free 
from organizational structures that were perhaps seen to be adrift. Richard was my 
guide and he provided access to the other research participants at the hospital in 
Nottingham. At his request, they had all agreed to take part in the research. The overall 
response from Ben, one that is expounded in chapter four, was one that did not agree 
with the organizational change taking place at the hospital.  
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CHARLIE 
The second senior ranking person in the team was the assistant manager named 
Charlie. Like Richard she had also had several years of experience working in the 
hospital. She started as a nurse and subsequently she switched her position for 
managerial roles at the hospital. Charlie was not on route for retirement anytime soon 
and she held aspirations about developing her career further, something that comes out 
in the next chapter where she shares her views on the restructuring taking place at the 
hospital. Particularly she overall felt the change was not good and it would leave her 
isolated in terms of her professional and personal situation.  Richard and Charlie were 
the two managers I had interviewed from the Delta team at the hospital network. Overall 
Charlie’s personal grid indicated a very angry and negative response to the change. This 
is a point expounded in chapters four and five.  
 
SUSAN 
 
The third participant was Susan. She was the personal assistant to Ben. She 
carried out tasks such as organizing meetings, writing letters, and sending memos. 
Susan seemed like a punctual worker with a sense of organization. She had not worked 
with anybody other than Richard while at the hospital. Susan saw herself as relatively 
inexperienced and had been at the hospital for about three years. Susan was not happy 
about the restructuring because she saw it as a threat to her job and to her career 
development. Her particular perspective is discussed in chapter four.   
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DANIELA 
The fourth participant was an administrator in the team. Daniela had been with 
the team for a few years. She was aspiring to continue a career in the Health service. 
Daniela lived locale and her ambition was to develop so she could advance her career 
from nursing towards management, a little bit like the team manager Charlie had done. 
Overall, Daniela was not happy with the restructuring. She felt a little bit afloat and was 
uncertain about what the restructuring meant for her.  
 
RACHEL 
One of the experienced workers at the network was Rachel. She had been a 
nurse for a number of years and her aim was to make the team work. She was in 
agreement with the team leader Richard. In Rachel’s view, the restricting was ill thought 
out and it provided little chance for experienced individual like Richard to make 
decisions. Overall, Rachel did believe like the others that the restructuring was not a 
good idea and that restructuring was carried out by people who were not familiar with 
how the hospital worked. It was an outside in approach that was met with perceptions of 
resistance.  
 
EMMA 
Another member of the team was Emma. She was the most calm and least 
overtly upset in the team about the change. In what she shared with me, Emma seemed 
to believe in alliance with her team members that the change was a bad idea. There was 
no rationale provided nor was there any certainty about the impact the change would 
have for her job. Emma planned to develop her career in the health service. However, 
her belief in the hospital had gone down. As her personal grid in appendix 3 shows, 
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Emma was fearful of the impact on her position. This included her position at the 
network as well as her future plans.  
 
 
PENNY  
The seventh person in the team was Penny. She was an experienced woman 
with a few years of experience in the health industry.  In her role at the network, Penny 
carried out several tasks on a daily basis including analysis of financial data, developing 
communication documents, formal recording of patient conditions, reporting data to other 
teams in the network, attending meetings, and reviewing historical data to produce 
monthly work output, targets, and costs incurred. She had been the most vocal about 
her contribution to the network. Penny presented the most negative view out of the 
whole team. She was very angry with the organizational change. Based on her personal 
views, she saw herself as a victim of change. In so far as this was somewhat the case 
with other participants, Penny seemed to believe this the most. Something indicated by 
her personal grid in appendix 3. A perception explained in latter sections on repertory 
grid.  
Conclusively, it seems that broadly speaking the seven research participants did 
not support the organizational change at the hospital. The team saw the change as 
unnecessary and undesirable. Chapter Four expounds this point and explains the 
attitude towards change categorized into two themes: perception of change and 
uncertainty. Chapter Five further expounds the emotion formed beliefs about unfairness 
and adverse impact on job tasks. 
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3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
One dimension of empirical research that has gained momentum is organization 
research is ethics (Schwandt, 2000). In a broad sense, ethical considerations in the 
social sciences, suggests that the stakeholders in a given research process, be treated 
such that there is no harm to them. In the current study emotional incidents were shared 
and the implication was that there were boundaries whereby the participants were 
clearly advised that private matters are respected and they do not have to share 
anything that may cause them distress.  However, ethical ideas are specific to 
communities that a person enters and engages. This much has been verified by 
researchers like Denzin, (2008). What is considered appropriate or acceptable in one 
organization is not always transferrable to another.  There are many dimensions of 
ethics and indeed one can write much on the topic (Finley, 2008). For management 
research one idea that arises is commonly named anonymity. The term anonymity 
represents the practice of keeping your data sources anonymous, so that no potential 
harm may reach them. For instance, an organization may suffer through a bad repute if 
some interpretation of research highlights its weaknesses (Goode, 1996).  
For my research, I have kept the name of the hospital and the team members 
anonymous. This conforms to the conventional practice of research within management 
studies. A dimension of ethics is the idea of balance of power (Bryman, 2004). In the 
research process from a theoretical point of view, the researcher usually has more 
knowledge about the research process than the researched/participants. If the 
researcher were to disclose every part of research, then the danger is that the 
participant may be inclined to be not honest in his responses. The participant may try to 
hide important data from the researcher. In order to deal with this challenge I tried to 
come across as a trustworthy person. However this may not always work. One may also 
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try to piece together what is said in a conversation and look out for logical 
inconsistencies.  
A third dimension is the notion of informed consent. This implies that the 
research participant has been consulted about their role in the research. Consent over 
becoming intentional partners in developing research was given by the participants 
involved in the current study. Obtaining participant consent is a concern common in 
studies where covert observation or undisclosed ethnographic practices occur (Denzin, 
1996). For my research, there was no covert participation, and so there was open 
consent. At the beginning of the meeting, each participant was informally told about the 
research, and was briefed about their importance in attaining research objectives. All the 
participants voluntarily agreed to take part in developing the research because they 
understood and saw the research as important in terms of potential research output and 
implications. Another ethical dimension also mostly associated with covert observation is 
deception. Is the researcher honest with participants? This again involves providing 
correct data to communicate the purpose and nature of one’s research. Deception may 
be argued as acceptable in research where there is no other way of gaining access to an 
environment that little is known about (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). In my research 
deception was not a significant dimension, because the research was exposed and 
communicated honestly. Team members at the hospital could not be kept in the dark 
about the research, because the incidents they had to discuss, would have to be 
recalled by participants whilst keeping in mind the purpose of the project.                 
 
 
3.10 CHAPTER CONCLUSION    
 
The current chapter presented ideas on research methodology. The chapter started with 
a review of philosophical ideas including arguments about dualism in philosophy of mind 
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through to interpretivism. The current thesis proposes that in terms of ontology there 
may be some objective reality independent of the observer. At the same time there is 
also a mental reality that develops in flux with objective reality. From the viewpoint of 
reflexivity the interpretations of the researcher are also imprinted over the interpretations 
of participants. To enable in-depth inquiry into the personal inner view that furnishes the 
experience of what it is like to be emotional the research engaged with seven 
participants who were interviewed on site at the network in Nottingham. This allowed for 
a deeper focus into the thinking and emotions of their personalities 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND 
EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapters one and two reviewed current research and found that post world war 
two and leading up to 1990 the study of emotion was off the research agenda. 
Subsequently, post 1990, there was an increase in emotion research (Ashkanasy and 
Humphrey, 2011). On this front whilst studies continue to relate a variety of topics with 
emotion such as leadership and teamwork; the question “How is emotion experienced by 
workers involved in organizational change?” remains unanswered.   
The current chapter addresses this question by looking at two things. First, I 
explore the context of change at the network in Nottingham where the focus is on 
research objective one. The context was important because it informed the participant’s 
everyday thinking about change and their emotional experiences. Following this I 
address objective two. That is, to define emotional experience in terms of intentionality. 
The data analysis revealed how change was understood by the participants who were 
emotional about it. On the whole this chapter provides a definition of emotion where as 
an experience emotion involves the concept of intentionality. The concept of feeling is 
introduced in relation to intentionality. This to some extent addresses the third objective 
that is covered along with objective four in the next chapter. In relation to this some 
themes emerged. The chapter begins by introducing the findings. This is followed by 
analysis which illustrates the themes that emerged with the help of verbatim extracts and 
repertory grids. The literature covered in chapter two as well as some additional 
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literature is also presented and discussed throughout the remaining chapters of the 
thesis. This sheds light on findings as they emerge.  
 
4.1.2 INTRODUCTION TO FINDINGS 
 
At a general level, analysis of 36 incidents which participants shared with me in 
our interviews at the network revealed themes about organizational change and the 
emotions they had experienced. The two emotions felt by participants were anger and 
fear. On one occasion happiness was experienced. This I will also explore particularly in 
so far as only 1 incident out of 36 showed happiness. If we look at studies we find that 
during organizational change negative emotions are experienced because change is not 
understood in terms of the reasons for change. Management does not communicate the 
reasons for change and the individual worker becomes highly negative and displays 
resistance through emotion (Ford et al, 2008; Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999; Lindblom, 
1994). This rationale which I return to in looking at objective 1 shows that indeed 
participants lacked understanding of change.  
  
 
4.1.2.1 OVERVIEW OF CONTEXT OF CHANGE: ADDRESSING OBJECTIVE ONE 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the context of change. Overall, the two 
themes that emerged were perceptions of change and uncertainty about the change. 
These themes are shown in table 4.1. The table shows an overview of the data and the 
findings covered in the current chapter. Participants in their experience of anger formed 
perceptions of change. And in their fear they grew evermore uncertain about the change. 
Uncertainty was present in all the cases although the terms used to refer to it varied. 
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Some terms used were ‘not sure’, ‘no idea’, ‘it’s just really uncertain’, ‘we don’t know 
what will happen’. The data shows some claims made by the participants, which 
illustrate perceptions of change and uncertainty about change. 
 
 
  
Emotion Theme  Data – Verbatim extracts 
   
Anger/Fear Perceptions of 
Change 
It’s just wrong. Frustrated. I don’t care 
because I don’t really understand the 
impact on my job. There seems to be no 
need for it. Everybody in the team is 
feeling in some way worried. Felt insecure. 
There is inadequate support here. Yes I 
am feeling very confused. But who is our 
line manager? Probably wasn’t given the 
being given the support needed or should 
have had. I would you know support (i.e. 
other team members to resist change). Its 
turned me into a cynical negative person at 
the moment. Their agenda will destroy a 
lot of what has been built over the past. 
 
(The above are quotes taken from the 
interviews illustrating the perceptions. 
   
 
 
 
  
Fear and      
Uneasiness 
Uncertain about 
the Change 
Not certain. Confused. No one is sure or 
knows what is going on. Am I gonna have 
a job after this? So basically that’s dealing 
with developing future programs when the 
future isn’t actually clear I suppose. Yeah 
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definitely, there is uncertainty from day to 
day. This type of thing has been talked 
about in the past and nothing has 
happened.    
   
 
Overview of Change at the Hospital – 4.1 
 
In large part, the perceptions were negative due to lack of understanding about 
how change impacted job tasks. As a result the participants were uncertain about what 
was going to happen to ‘my’ job. This bred anger and fear and frustration (the notion of 
frustration has a specific meaning discussed later in the chapter). Three emotions seem 
somewhat surprising. Methodologically the interview was driven by the participants. 
Participants were not asked to select an emotion provided on a questionnaire. The 
emotion emerges from the participant as her opinion. This is the philosophical focus of 
the current research where emotion is not a set of causal patterns but the experience of 
the person expounded through conversations. 
 
4.1.2.2. OVERVIEW OF INTENTIONALITY (OBJECTIVE TWO) 
 
This section provides an overview of data that addressed research objective two. 
In the context of perceptions and uncertainty, the participants were intensely emotional. 
To understand their experiences, one key research objective is to describe what emotion 
is. This objective draws on the component identified in chapter two as Intentionality. That 
is research objective two – To explore the presence of intentionality within emotional 
experiences for change management. Feelings are covered in the latter parts where 
beliefs are somewhat addressed. These components in relation to beliefs are more fully 
covered in chapter five where research objectives 3 and 4 are addressed.  Following 
123 
 
this, chapter six presents a discussion of findings, and addressing research objective 5, 
it also presents a model of emotion in change.  
The term intentionality refers to the idea that emotion is about things that a 
person comes across in the environment. These may be things imagined in the mind of 
the observer or perceived by him as existing in the environment - I may be afraid of 
imagined consequences of change such as redundancy or I may be afraid of actual job 
loss (Goldie, 2002a.p. 8; Tye, 2008; Lazarus, 1991). This may involve feelings directed 
at something (Goldie, 2004). A person simply has a feeling of fear directed at the idea of 
job loss and that is what the feeling is about.  
Summarizing responses table 4.2 shows research data. Some of it is analyzed 
and some is raw data. The data supports the themes; Intentionality, non-Intentionality, 
and Feelings. These are about research objective two. That is about intentionality. 
Overall it was found that Intentionality was sometimes discernable during emotional 
experiences of participants. During some incidents, participants clearly stated what they 
were angry about something to do with change or afraid of change. The emotion was 
directed at something. However, intentionality was not discernable during some other 
emotional experiences. When asked what they were emotional about change some of 
the participants in speaking about their experiences could not single out an object or an 
event. The participant’s anger or fear was not always about something recognizable in 
the environment. I explore this in more detail in latter parts of the chapter. A key 
research finding of this thesis is that intentionality as a feature of emotion needs to be 
considered as belonging to some emotional experiences in the workplace while it may 
not always be present in emotion. This I argue in latter parts. 
Table 4.2 also shows feelings, which is another component of emotion. The 
difference between emotion and feelings is not clear in management research (Gooty et 
al, 2009). A feeling is described by Goldie (2004) as something that happens during 
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emotion. He argues that feelings are knowledge of the environment in a visceral sense. 
For instance, a feeling of fear with raised hairs on the back of one’s neck alerts the 
individual of something that may be lurking around the bend in the shadows. This feeling 
based knowing is a general alert that tells the individual about something in the 
environment that requires attention. Here feeling is not described as exact knowledge of 
the world. Such that it is not known exactly what one is afraid of?  Feeling is rather an 
indicator of something that requires attention.   
 
    
Theme Theme  Participant Data – Verbatim extracts/ 
Grid Data 
    
 
Intentionality 
Intentional 
(about 
implementers 
of change)l 
 
Richard 
   It was about them not 
knowing and doing things. 
(Frustration and Anger) 
 
 
Emma 
She didn’t want me to get 
ahead(Anger). 
 
Penny 
I deserved it and they just 
took it away from me 
(anger). It was about her 
she was a bad manager 
(Anger). Sometimes I just 
felt fear (fear). 
 
Rachel 
They were not doing what 
they were suppose to do 
and to provide me with the 
correct 
information.(Frustration and 
Anger) 
 
Susan 
There seems to be no work 
done. I am angry ‘at what 
they did’ and it was ‘not fair’. 
 
Daniela 
Anger at not being fairly 
treated by colleague 
(change project manager).  
 
 
 
  
Charlie 
They re-graded and didn’t 
take our abilities into 
consideration 
Non- 
Intentional 
(No particular 
 
 
Richard 
Frustrated and in this 
experience finds it difficult to 
“you see its not so easy for 
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direction just 
frustration) 
me to pinpoint.” There is 
just a frustration inside at 
“Not being heard” in the 
midst of change.  
 
 
Susan 
Struggles to determine what 
her feeling of frustration is 
about. 
“I am not sure. I almost had 
a word for it.” ‘It’s difficult to 
express.” “Its just a feeling 
you get, do you know what I 
mean?”  
 
 
Charlie 
Immense frustration at not 
being able to influence the 
situation “felt ignored”. See 
Grid in Appendix 
Frustration/Being heard 
construct. 
Feelings loss of who I 
am 
(frustration) 
 
 
Charlie 
Nobody knows where the 
change is headed. There is 
not enough information. It 
just feels wrong. I feel 
something but I am not sure 
what it is.  
  
 
 
Emma 
Not certain. Confused. “We 
just feel lost.” In one 
situation oppressed by 
manager felt fear and anger 
and loss of who she was. 
Frustrated. 
 
 
Susan 
“No one is sure or knows 
what is going on.” Unable to 
do her job as usual feel at a 
loss. Feels frustrated at 
unable to change things her 
way.   
 
Penny 
“I don’t know who I am 
anymore they have taken 
that away from me.” 
Uncertain and feels just lost. 
“I have lost the will to live.” 
 
Rachel 
“We have been thrown 
around with no idea of what 
we are suppose to do.  
 
Qualitative Research provides themes above that are not frequencies repeated in equal measure. 
The theme intentionality and feelings subsume terms that signify the same meaning. Terms are 
not added up to equal for instance ‘intentionality’.  
Emotional experiences through intentionality and feelings – 4.2 
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Table 4.2 shows feelings experienced during emotion. These were categorized 
as the theme ‘loss of who I am.’ The cases below will demonstrate that this led to a Lack 
of direction for participants and they felt Frustration. Here emerged the idea of non-
intentionality. The participants spoke about their feelings in a very personal way. They 
identified with the term feeling. It was proximal to who they were in their incidents. 
Feelings particularly came out when there was uncertainty about the environment and a 
feeling of loss of who I am. Table 4.2 shows illustrative extracts “I don’t know who I am 
anymore, they have taken that away from me” and another participant remarked “We 
have been thrown around with no idea of what we are supposed to do”. These extracts 
show a felt loss rather than some rational calculations by the participants.     
At the same time, a related idea that appeared in parallel was lack of direction. 
Amidst change in parallel to loss of identity there was the feeling of lack of direction. The 
idea is that in everyday job tasks the worker establishes a movement in some direction. 
So for instance if I am doing a task such as ‘typing up a letter’ – this action directs me in 
so far as it is an instance of me becoming more and more that which my job is. In typing 
a letter, I have a feeling of typing it up as a manager because this task constitutes ‘me 
as manager’. I am becoming that which my job is. My direction is towards my identity as 
manager. When this ‘loss of who I am’ settles in it is accompanied by lack of direction 
towards that identity because I am not sure whether I am any longer working at being a 
manager. This is frustration. 
The above section provided an overview of the context of change at the network. 
Particularly as seen through the eyes of the participants (whether one can see another’s 
perspective is a contentious issue I return to in the penultimate chapter on reflexivity). An 
overview of objective one was also presented. This was about the definition of emotion 
with respect to intentionality and feelings. Below I will cover these issues in more detail.   
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4.1.3 THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE AT THE NETWORK- THE CASES USED TO 
EXPOUND VIEWS ADDRESSING RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ONE  
 
I explained earlier that change was understood in a certain way by the 
participants. There were two types of themes that illustrate their responses to change 
stated in table 4.1. The angry participant perceives the change and does not want 
change. By contrast, the frustrated and afraid participants were uncertain about the 
change. One may think about whether it is possible to experience several emotions 
together. This very interesting thought falls outside the scope of the current thesis. One 
can address it after a good grasp of what emotion is has been developed. Overall, the 
themes showed that participants did not know what was going on at the network. To 
explain these two themes further the current section will use some cases that are 
particularly potent and illustrative of the two themes. These cases go in-depth and delve 
into the attitude adopted toward the change. The attitude was one of perceiving change 
as a negative thing. In anger and fear participants resisted the environment and felt 
uncertainty about where the network was headed. Here these concerns address 
research objective one, that is, to explore the implications of workers emotional 
experiences for change management.     
Perceptions of change - Participants shared views that can be categorized into 
two types of Perceptions of change. Those concerned with the long term impact of 
change and those that are about everyday impact on job tasks. To illustrate the long 
term impact I will use explanations offered by Richard (the team Leader) and Charlie 
(the deputy manager). Richard’s case is a good example because it strongly 
demonstrates a focus on long term sustainability of the change at the hospital. He 
explores the change initiatives at the network. Richard provides explanations about how 
the context is changing in the long term and the detrimental impact on change 
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management. Similarly Susan’s case was a good example because it showed a focus 
on sustainability of change. Her perspective was not as high level as Richard’s but 
showed emotions about long term consequences. The use of phrases like “overall it’s 
bad” and “they don’t know what they are doing” signaled disapproval of change and poor 
change management. 
The second type of perception was about short term everyday impact of change. 
This was a concern with everyday tasks and it was a concern for all of the participants. 
The case that most potently illustrates such resistance is Susan’s Case (Richard’s 
Personal Assistant). She vividly described her concerns with what will happen to her job 
tasks. I will also draw on other participants who demonstrated perceptions. The repertory 
grids in appendix 5.1 informed analysis. For instance, perception of long term and short 
term change is represented in Penny’s grid where she rates her experiences at an 
extreme of 8 for Not Trustworthy. She saw change implementers as not trustworthy 
managers of change. Another example is Emma whose grid showed experiences 
wherein she believed everyone had a voice (rated 1) but not in change procedures that 
would be important for enhancing workplace conditions. Change was not supported and 
implementers of change were rigid, which represented poor management.    
 Uncertainty about Change – The second theme illustrating the participants 
understanding of change was ‘uncertainty about change’. To some degree uncertainty 
was expressed by all of the participants. This meant that participants did not understand 
change and they did not welcome it. Overall change was managed poorly in terms of 
how it was carried out. Here again, the repertory grids also informed analysis and 
interpretation (appendix 5.1). For instance, Emma’s grid explicitly rated 1 in favor of 
uncertainty. Daniela’s grid showed a rating of 1 for intense feelings of not knowing. 
There was uncertainty about how their job tasks are impacted. In particular a case that 
potently illustrates uncertainty was Susan’s Case. Her case was a good example 
because she was completely in the dark about the change. The impact on her job tasks 
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was not known to her. Her fear involved seeing change as an uncertain enterprise; a 
threat to her job. There was a defeatist attitude that resonated in her uncertainty. This 
formed during my conversation with Susan. Other participants had also hinted at this 
defeatist position. There seemed a certain iterative cycle between fear and uncertainty 
that only got more intense as Susan shared her incidents with me. I now turn to consider 
the first theme categorized as ‘Perception of change.’   
 
4.2. PERCEPTION OF CHANGE – RICHARD’S LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE 
 
Richard was the senior manager at the network. His case illustrated what I 
described above as his long term perspective about change management failure which 
he was angry about. Before delving into the conversations with Richard perhaps it would 
do well to say a little something about my impression of Richard. Overall through our 
meetings it seemed that Richard had a strong character. By this I mean that he was the 
sort of person who seemed fond of leading situations. The first time I had noticed this 
was when he came into the room at the network when we were about to start our 
interview. Richard walked through the door and firmly shook my hand. He spoke first “So 
has everything been ok?” I replied that things were going well. But I also thought that his 
question meant that if things were not ok then he saw himself as able to address any 
issues forthcoming because he was the leader of the team. About gaining access to the 
participants I had spoken to Richard a few weeks earlier. We had met in a pub and I had 
explained my research and that I needed access to his team for my research. So 
Richard had some idea about my interests. I explained my research again in the 
interview. I explained that I was looking into emotional experiences during change and I 
was interested in his experiences. In a concerned tone Richard asked whether the rest 
of the participants I had spoken to were happy about the change.  
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I was cautious to not share what I had found from the other participants. Saying 
whether participants were happy about the change might influence what Richard had to 
share with me. I simply reacted with a nod and a smile. In the next 2 hours we had a 
conversation about the long term impact of change. In the passage below Richard 
explains a picture of the struggle with a group of people implementing the restructuring. 
Richard was against the change. He pushed against the change agenda. In the dialogue 
below he starts off with his general attitude and talks about a meeting about change that 
formed his perceptions of the change.     
            
Richard: Yes, I took a conscious decision to push it. I could have bit my leg. But I 
decided that in that particular instance the behavior that I was experiencing from 
these other people was no longer acceptable. And needed to be challenged. But 
its difficult for me to pick out specific instances.     
Me: ok sure. Please take your time, maybe something comes to mind. 
Richard: There was a meeting.[pauses for a minute]…  
Richard: “I know what job needs to be done for the future and I believe that 
the proposal that had been put forward will not do it, will not achieve it. Will 
destroy a lot of what has been built up over the past few years. It’s a desire 
to preserve not the status quo, but the success that we have had. Let the 
success continue. You are doing it for the better good then just to hen your 
own nest 
 
 The passage demonstrates a long term understanding of change. His 
Perception of change was based on his particular reasoning. He was angry 
because he saw change as ill planned and destructive. Listening to Richard I did 
sense anger about the change. In the passage his tone of voice was aggressive. 
He believed the proposals shared in the meeting were bad. He had been in a 
meeting with people who were put in-charge of planning and implementing change 
at the network. We called this incident “Angry at meeting proposals”. Richard said 
this was one of the few times he had felt anger. This was in the context of an 
earlier remark he had made where he had said that he was one of those people 
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who managed his emotions. From his viewpoint, this was important because he 
was setting the tone for the rest of the team as their leader.     
Let us briefly consider an idea about anger and then return to Richard. The 
emotion anger paints a negative picture of the world. The angry person typically 
sees the situation or instigators of change as against him or against what he stands 
for (Elving, 2005; Lazarus, 1991). Similarly Richard was angry in opposition to the 
change. He explained in his own words that he made a conscious decision to push 
it. He actively pushed his view by communicating to the implementers of change 
that he was angry about the proposals because they will not achieve it. The 
proposal will not achieve success.  Richard felt the change was planned and 
implemented by people who were in it just to hen their own nest. In other words, 
people who wanted change were interested in personal benefit and promotions. 
However if Richard felt that the change was a failure then this was not just because 
he thought the proposals were vague or ill-informed. At a deeper level of analysis it 
seemed that Richard felt that the proposals were an attack on his legacy at the 
network. Proposals would not preserve the success Richard and his team had built 
in the past years. He felt angry about this. Studies show that anger is experienced 
when what is mine is seen as under attack (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus and Folkman, 
1984). Similarly Richard disapproved of the proposals because they represented 
an attack on what is his. The implication of becoming angry was that change 
management under the new implementers was seen as a long term threat. The 
proposals would change the rules and jobs he had worked hard to develop. 
Addressing objective one the implication is that in anger change is seen as 
doomed because it will fail for two reasons. The implementers are not sincere and 
that what has been built by Richard would be destroyed.   
  Studies also show that in anger a person has a sense of control over the 
situation and a sense of certainty that increases with anger. A person becomes 
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certain that his anger is righteous (Zeelenberg, 2006). In Richard’s case there was 
a sense of control as well as immense certainty indicated in his personal grid (see 
Appendix 5.1 for copy of personal grids). 
 
1  Incident One  
 “Angry at meeting 
proposals” 
7 
Control 1 Anarchy 
Sure of things 1 Not really sure 
 
 
Incident one above was rated by Richard as a 1 in favor of control on a 
scale of 1 to 7. This implies Richard felt that he had control. At the same time, he 
rated a 1 in favor of sure of things. In the context of incident one, it was that 
Richard in anger felt he had control in so far as what he had built –his legacy – was 
still intact. He was sure of things in the sense that what he had built should be the 
success that continues. And he was sure that it would not continue given the 
change proposals. He was certain that the proposals were bad. This pairing of a 
sense of control and certainty fuelled anger. Overall in his words Richard saw long 
term dis-order. In anger Richard’s perspective had the following logic to it.  
The proposals are bad because they are ill informed. These proposals are 
not researched and not carried out by the right people. If the proposals for change 
are implemented then what has been put in place by Richard through years of 
work, the jobs and routines, all of such things will be destroyed. Richard’s anger is 
about such destructive change. He told me that “their plans were no good.” With 
regard to objective one this shows that anger kept Richard certain about the 
badness of change. The implication was that this constituted resistance to change 
as certainly a bad thing. 
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4.2.1 PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE – CHARLIE’S LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE 
 
The other participant to demonstrate a long term perspective on change 
and how change impacted the network was the participant named Charlie. She 
was the second senior manager in the team. Our conversation took place on an 
optimistic note. She walked in the room and I shook her hand. She sat across from 
me in a humble pose. Charlie spoke first and asked “so you’re the researcher”. I 
acknowledged her remark with a smile. I explained my research to Charlie. 
Compared to Richard the view that Charlie took about the change was slightly 
more personal. Richard was concerned above with the impact of change on the 
network on the team, and on his legacy. Compared to this Charlie was focused on 
how change impacted her overall personal role at the network. Like Richard she 
also viewed change at the network as undesirable, but at the same time in her 
anger her logic was different. The incident that most potently illustrated her 
understanding of change was about something called re-grading linked to the 
change at the network. Charlie’s perspective on change came through in 
discussing this incident.   
As a part of change, the network was following a re-grading process. The 
central idea was that change at the network would involve reviewing grades of 
managers and other workers such as clinicians and nurses. A grade was a position 
in the network that indicated job tasks, and determined the employee’s salary. High 
grades meant better positions. Charlie said that through the re-grading process the 
grades of clinicians/doctors were changed to higher grades. This meant promotions 
and better remuneration. Charlie argued that this was detrimental in the long term. 
Change was distinguishing Clinicians and Doctors as more worthy compared to 
other administrative workers like her. This meant that in the long term there would 
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be negativity. Workers who were not regarded to a higher grade might feel 
discriminated. On the face of it one might think that this is deliberate favoritism 
towards clinical staff and that this represents unfair practice.  
However, Charlie explained that the reason was that there was enough 
information available regarding clinicians/Doctors. Their job tasks and skills were 
known and information about this was readily available to change implementers. 
However there was not enough information available to re-grade other workers 
such as managers and nurses. There was not enough information available to 
understand the value these non-clinical workers, the nurses, brought to the 
network. As a result managers like Charlie were overlooked. This made Charlie 
angry. Couples with a sense of unfair treatment she believed that her contributions 
to the running of the network were not understood because the right information 
was not available. In the long term this meant that clinical and medical practices 
were encouraged through higher grading and promotions whilst managers/nurses 
felt discouraged because they were relatively invisible and one could expect them 
to be angry due to a sense of unfair treatment. Their work was not recognized. 
Applying this to her position at the network Charlie believed that her strategic 
thinking and expertise were overlooked. She explained in her own words. 
 
“So if you did not have a clinical caseload or weren’t physically dealing with 
patients, you tended to have a place lower down the scale, because the 
tools were not sophisticated enough to pick up responsibilities around 
management and strategic thinking” 
 
“They didn’t understand the fact that we sit here, and actually through 
contacts with people, we resource the whole of Lincolnshire and 
Nottinghamshire, and the people who had done the re-grading hadn’t 
understood that, hadn’t run to clarify that.” 
 Charlie – Team Assistant Manager 
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For people like Charlie who were managers this meant disaster in the long 
term. The clinical side was considered and the non-clinical arm that managed the 
network as a business model was overlooked. This was unsustainable because re-
grading left clinicians motivated but at the same time managers like Charlie felt ‘let 
down’ (see appendix 5.1).  
Similar to Richard’s perspective, Charlie believed that the root of the problem 
was lack of information and lack of understanding on the part of the people 
planning the change. However, is there an alternative explanation? According to 
Trader-Leigh (2002) who built on ideas by Lindblom (1994), managers are more 
likely to resist change rather than lower level workers, particularly because of their 
status and influence. The managers that participated in the current study resisted 
change. The manager’s Richard and Charlie resisted change because they 
believed that in the long term the proposals of change were not sustainable. Their 
explanation was that the change would be a long term failure because they had not 
been included in the change. This was at the heart of their anger and their long 
term perspectives. It seems that they were excluded from the change. In Richard’s 
case he was not consulted about the proposals. In Charlie’s case she had not been 
consulted and had been overlooked by the implementers of change. This exclusion 
of senior managers in the change process aroused anger and validated their views 
about organisational change at the network as a non-sustainable enterprise. The 
attitude was that without their expertise which provides an inner view of how the 
organization works – the change was not sustainable. Appendix 5.2 provides case 
summaries that support this view and instantiate it.    
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4.2.2 EVERYDAY PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE –SUSAN’S CASE  
 
 In addressing research objective one that looks at worker emotion and 
implications for change the ideas above provide the view of two senior managers. 
The managers adopted a long term view and expressed related perceptions of 
change. The other research participants I met with were more concerned with the 
day to day impact of change on their jobs. From a general viewpoint, the 
operational workers who were in the team at the network were particularly worried 
about the everyday impact of change. They were afraid of the change and resisted 
the idea of change. The attitude toward change was elaborated in some passages 
that were quite revealing. One of the passages is a conversation I had with Susan.   
I met Susan on the network premises at the hospital. I noticed that she was 
quite young. My bias immediately furnished the thought that she was probably a 
worker with little experience. She also seemed a little tense in her posture. There 
was something that seemed to worry her. At the same time I thought to myself that 
my intuition is an element of bias and it is not necessarily to be relied upon, rather it 
is to be made explicit. Susan’s worry became clear once our conversation set off. I 
started by explaining my research to her.  
 
Researcher: “So I am interested in emotions and how these are experienced in 
work environments such as this place where you work. The purpose is to learn 
from your emotional experiences in the workplace. To get an inner view.” 
Susan: “well than you have come at a good time ..[referring to the change taking 
place at the network]..” 
Researcher: “ok, interesting”  
She went on to call the change “unclear” and told me that “we don’t know what is 
really going on, on a daily basis. You come in and do your job and you just don’t 
know.”  
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Susan was concerned about the change and she seemed afraid and had 
remarked “its fear more than anything”. What exactly fear as an emotion means is 
something covered in the latter sections. Compared to senior managers, her short 
term everyday resistance was different in two ways. First, Susan resisted the 
change on an everyday basis by showing concern with her own position. She told 
me “we don’t know what is really going on, on a daily basis”. Here she is referring 
to her position, her job at the network. She imagined that she might lose her job. 
She imagined that her job tasks may not be required anymore. This made her 
afraid. Losing her job was not something she wanted. The logic employed by 
Susan is that - if change would lead to job loss and job loss is not wanted than it 
follows that in the grip of fear Susan resisted job loss. In fear the job loss seemed 
imminent. This is related to the idea of immediacy – the idea that in fear anticipated 
outcomes seem closer or more likely (Sartre, 2006; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000).  I 
will come back to this in the next chapter where immediacy is more fully explored in 
relation to how emotion forms beliefs. Getting back to our current focus it seems 
that Susan’s Perceptions of change was her anticipation that in work her job tasks 
were under threat every day. She imagined her tasks might be taken away. This 
was pronounced when she joked that “I might not have a job tomorrow you know”.   
The attitude here is a general view or perspective that – change is not good 
because every day I worry about it. Unlike senior management that has a strategic 
view of things the concern is not with some long term benefit of the network or 
some strategic consequences. This suggests that perhaps the sort of attitude 
adopted by Susan is expected at lower levels in the organizational hierarchy. In 
relation to objective one we might conclude that the emotion fear has a specific 
implication. This was that it kept Susan quiet regardless of her everyday mental 
struggle with the thought that she might lose her job. This confirms the idea by 
Flam (1993) that the emotion ‘fear’ can have the impact of silencing a person who 
anticipates undesirable outcomes. The individual stews away inside and suffers 
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mental worry from day to day. Change that requires management would have to 
address such suffering on the part of the worker.    
The second difference that Susan’s perspective brought was that it showed 
passive resistance. Senior managers Richard and Charlie were overt about their 
resistance. They openly expressed it. However Susan was very passive. The term 
passive in the oxford dictionary means “or allowing what happens or what others 
do, without active response or resistance”. The operative term for Susan case here 
is allowing. This distinguishes her reaction from the senior management because it 
is not up to her to allow or prevent. As a person at low levels in the hierarchy she 
has no power to resist or to question the change. This is a concern tangential to the 
focus of the current thesis in the sense that it is about power and the role power 
plays in implementing change. As in Susan’s case there are studies to support the 
idea that those lower in the hierarchy with less power may be less likely to explicitly 
fight against the management. However this does show that a negative attitude 
towards change is something that does not facilitate change. Managing change 
requires that the emotional turmoil of the worker be addressed (Carr, 2001; Elving, 
2005). This may apply especially to those lower down the hierarchy. Klarner et al 
(2011) argue that mental suffering of the worker is not well understood in terms of 
how emotional experiences unfold and impact change, particularly where the 
impact might be adverse.    
 
4.3 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CHANGE 
 
    In addition to an attitude of resistance towards change, the research 
participants also responded with feelings of uncertainty about the change (see 
table 4.1). Research has found that during change there is uncertainty prevalent 
amongst workers (Elving, 2005). Studies also propose that uncertainty may be over 
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job insecurity in a changing environment where the individual has concerns about 
her position (Hartley, 1995). A person facing uncertainty may react by building 
some sort of hope to tackle with the uneasiness experienced (Lazarus, 1991).  
Participants in my study experienced uncertainty about their jobs. Susan’s 
case discussed above illustrates uncertainty. She saw the change as an uncertain 
grip over the network. As a worker at the network she is low in the hierarchy. 
Compared to management she is powerless to influence change. Powerless 
employees may experience uncertainty due to lack of influence and they may also 
feel fear (Elving, 2005). Susan’s felt both. Her reasoning was the following. She 
experienced fear because she saw the change as an unknown force. One may 
question this by arguing that just because a person sees change as an unknown it 
does not follow that this provides grounds for negative thoughts. It also does not 
follow that where no thoughts are involved the person may automatically move 
from uncertainty towards the experience of fear. There must be grounds. In fear 
Susan saw uncertainty as something she experienced because as an unknown 
force the change was replaced in her mind by anticipated outcomes. She 
anticipated negative undesirable outcomes for her future at the network. Research 
shows that fear will breed thoughts that are negative and these may seem likely to 
occur compared to how they would otherwise seem (Goldie, 2002a; Frijda and 
Mesquita, 2000; Flam, 1993). The reasoning in fear is that change is unknown and 
in this case change is then anticipated as negative due to fear. Susan explained in 
her own words as she sat across from me in the interview room.  
 
“It’s been fairly difficult recently, so you have probably come at a good 
time...... I suppose there have been quite a few emotional times recently 
because the network is being restructured, so when dealing with that and 
going through the consultation process, so that’s basically dealing with 
developing future work programs when the future isn’t actually clear I 
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suppose. It’s quite emotional because everybody in the team is feeling a bit 
anxious, or worried, you know.”  
(Susan – The Personal Assistant to Richard) 
 
Here Susan is referring to a consultation process. This is a process at the 
hospital that was meant to explain change to workers. These processes consisted 
of meetings between the employees and the restructurers. In meetings team 
members were asked to share information about their jobs, particularly to provide 
details about their job tasks and daily routines. Whilst these processes were taking 
place, delta team administrators continued to be shrouded in darkness about the 
restructuring, they simply did not know what the proposed change consisted of. 
Despite being involved in consultation processes, and the issuing of a document to 
explain restructuring, Susan and the administrators had little knowledge. This is 
illustrated by her remark “so that’s basically dealing with developing future 
programs when the future isn’t actually clear I suppose.”  The problem was that 
there was no clear picture about where the team members stood amidst this sea of 
change. In relation to research objective one, we find that lack of clarity for the 
worker who is uncertain can be accompanied by a feeling of fear. Susan’s 
uncertainty was potently illustrated as my conversation with Susan unfolded 
further.  
 
 Me: “Feelings of uncertainty?” 
Susan: “Yes, Yes, I mean I don’t think it is consciously felt, but it does have an 
impact on you. I suppose it’s just natural these here for now” 
Me: “Consciously, what do you mean by that?” 
Susan: “I mean that I felt it, but it was not always so obvious you know. In fact 
now that I look back, I can see that it was something that sort of drove me. I was 
uncertain, because what if my Boss leaves in this reconfiguration.” 
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Me: “I see, you mean that you sort of were guided by this feeling towards what 
was important at the time?” 
Susan: Yeah definitely, aha, well there is this uncertainty from day to day. You 
know, you think about what will happen to you, where will you go.  
 
 
The conversation above illustrates two important ideas. The first idea is that the 
reconfiguration (i.e. restructuring) seems to be pervasive as a subterranean presence 
inside Susan’s mind. In this regard she remarks “I mean that I felt it, but it was not 
always obvious”- this portrays restructuring as a background influence, something 
hanging in the mind as a feeling, something not always obvious or located within some 
specific incident. In one sense, this can be thought about as a climate of organizational 
change, a climate of uncertainty. The second related idea is that her feelings of 
uncertainty acted as a driving force directing her towards a long term perspective 
particularly in so far as she was concerned about what will happen to her once Richard 
leaves the hospital.  She might lose her job. If this happened what would happen next. 
This is what I referred to earlier as anticipatory thinking in fear. Overall then, according to 
the first idea the feeling of uncertainty almost appears as a mood towards the 
restructuring.  A mood is defined in the literature as a background subterranean 
tendency to feel good or bad (Forgas and George, 2001b). Here what is referred to in 
the passage above, by Susan, as “uncertainty from day to day”; is a negative 
undesirable subterranean feeling about the whole notion of change at the network. This 
negative feeling is a mood in the sense that it prolonged as a background discomfort, not 
a sharply felt short lived emotion, but rather, uncertainty felt as the day to day condition 
of working at the hospital. Thus we see that in talking about the restructuring there is a 
background mood. The second idea above that anticipatory thinking in fear leads to long 
term concerns suggests that her mood helped direct attention towards job security. 
Change is met with one’s attention focused upon self-preservation in the face of 
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potential and imaginable threats to job security. Another case that illustrated uncertainty 
about change was the case of Rachel. She worked within the hospital as an 
administrator in the team. What is different about Rachel’s perspective is that she sees 
change as an invisible presence. There is no explicit concern with job tasks. In our 
conversation Rachel told me about a proposal document that explained the restructuring 
as a necessary and planned change for the hospital and the networks, so that as a 
consequence better health service provisions would be put in place. 
 
“The actual proposal document, so it was actually for the restructuring. I felt 
concerned because this is the first time you have seen it, but also not 
confirmed because this type of thing has been talked about in the past and 
nothing has happened.....Because potentially these things take a long while 
and whether you should, whether you will allow yourself to be concerned for 
a long period, or just wait and see what happens. Because it could all 
suddenly be dropped or forgotten about, or you know.” 
 (Rachel) 
  
From the passage it seems that Rachel was not sure that the change would even 
happen. For her it seemed that Perceptions of change took the shape of denial that 
change would actually happen. In one sense she protected herself by not allowing 
herself to be concerned. It seems that Rachel actively believed that it was alright to be 
positive. By being positive she seemed to deal with her uncertainty about the 
restructuring. She remarked that “this type of thing has been talked about in the past and 
nothing has happened” – in other words, there was no need to think about it exhaustively 
and one should just set it aside, and get rid of this feeling of uncertainty. In Rachel’s 
case uncertainty is exhibited, and it is similar to uncertainty experienced by Susan in so 
far as there is an effort to protect the self against organizational change. At the same 
time Susan’s case more explicitly signals some subterranean concerns with job tasks, 
particularly amidst a context of uncertainty. This feeling of uncertainty seems to be rather 
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like a mood, a persistent humming noise in the background always in some way tainting 
her view of things.  
 
 
4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE      
 
  Studies have argued that change is an important environment and how change 
is understood by workers who are emotional and involved in change should be 
researched (Klarner et al, 2011; Elving, 2005; Carr, 2001). This was the basis of 
objective one that explored the implications of worker emotional experiences for change 
management. In the cases discussed above the context of change was poorly 
understood by the participants involved in change. This was because their concerns 
were not addressed. The lack of understanding occurred in two ways. On the one hand 
the two managers Richard and Charlie believed that the implementers of change did not 
understand what needed to be done. The restructuring proposals they made did not 
include Richard and Charlie – the result was a sense of unfair treatment and feelings of 
anger. The change was seen as not sustainable because the implementers were 
deemed incompetent.  Secondly there was lack of understanding at the administrative 
level. The participants I spoke to complained that they did not understand the change. 
They did not know how their jobs would be impacted. This gave rise to a climate of 
negative perceptions of change, feelings of fear, and general uncertainty. In emotion the 
change was resisted. Overall the experiences of anger and fear had a negative 
implication for change (i.e. worker disapproval) and this was largely due to the emotions 
of the workers left un-attended to by the management.   
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4.5 EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES: ADDRESSING RESEARCH OBJECTIVE TWO  
 
The current section addresses objective two. The objective is to explore the 
presence of intentionality within emotional experience of worker involved in change. 
Intentionality is the component defined in the second chapter as the essential part of 
emotion. Importantly, the presence of intentionality is not clear within management 
literature. Intentionality means that emotional experience is a consciousness of the 
world. The experience itself consists of the person having emotion about the world or the 
things within it. This is called intentionality (Goldie, 2004, 2002a, 2002b). A related 
component is ‘feeling’. Emotion often involves feelings and the difference between the 
two is something that requires clarity in management research (Gooty et al, 2009; 
Goldie, 2004). In experiencing emotion, both intentionality and feeling are two 
components that are addressed in this section. The third research objective covers 
feelings and other components including intentionality and beliefs, which I turn to in latter 
parts and return to in chapter five.   
 
4.5.1 INTENTIONALITY 
 
 It is argued that intentionality is a necessary part of everyday human experience 
and more specifically it is an integral part of emotional experience (Tyn, 2008; Goldie, 
2002a). If a person experiences the world their attention is always directed at something 
in the world. This could be a physical thing or imagined thing. Similarly if a person were 
to become angry than it follows that their anger must be directed at something in their 
experience of the world. The idea is that emotion must be about something. This 
aboutness is called intentionality (Tyn, 2008). With regard to intentionality my research 
shows that emotion is sometimes about things that make up one’s experience. Looking 
at the 36 incidents discussed with the participants, I found that on the one hand emotion 
was about several things participants experienced at the network. On the other hand, 
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there were also a few moments when emotion was not clearly discernable as about 
specific things. If we look at the 36 incidents we find that anger and fear were 
distinguished in what they were about. 
Emotion Theme  Data – (Emotion was About) 
   
Anger Intentionality Unfair Treatment by colleague. Actions by 
colleague were victimizing. At managers 
oppressive manner. Maligning remark by 
colleague. Promotion process was 
insufficient. Angry could not collect 
information about work. Asked to act up and 
process didn’t work was angry. At time 
fiddling. At proposal documents. At 
pathways process not working. At re-grading 
process not fair. At confrontation with 
colleague. At dishonesty of colleague. 
Needed resource not in place. Offer was not 
what I deserved.    
 
 
   
Fear Intentionality, 
Feelings, and 
Lack of 
Direction. 
Of colleague. Of what might happen. Of 
restructuring process. Of new role. Of other 
person taking away my role. Of alternatives. 
Of not being able to do tasks in future. Of 
oppressive manager. Seeing the 
restructuring plans happen. The feeling of 
frustration turned to emotion through 
intentionality.       
   
 
(The above are quotes taken from the interviews illustrating what the emotions 
were about) Table. 4.3 
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Table 4.3 shows the things that emotion was about. These themes are 
addressed in detail below. Generally, it seems that anger has been directed at other 
people or it has been about change processes at work. When directed at other people 
(i.e. colleagues) anger seems to be specifically about the intent of the other person. 
Alternatively anger when directed at some process has been about the absence of 
something that is seen as deserved. By comparison, fear seems to be about what 
happens to “me” or “what is mine”. In the context of organizational change fear was 
about what will happen to my job tasks. The cases of the participants informed analysis. 
For instance, Daniela’s grid demonstrates that incidents involved anger and fear directed 
at either colleagues in meetings related to change or at processes seen as not fair (see 
Appendix 5.1). Similarly, Emma’s personal grid shows ratings which at a general level 
demonstrate that emotion was directed at either tasks (i.e. carrying out processes) or at 
the actions of another person. To demonstrate this at a specific level the following 
section provides a detailed example of Rachel’s case.      
 
4.5.2 WHY USE RACHEL’S CASE TO ILLUSTRATE INTENTIONALITY 
 
Intentionality was present across the incidents. Summaries in appendix 5.2 
provide examples. A case that vividly illustrated how intentionality is involved in emotion 
was the case of Rachel. We looked at Rachel’s case earlier where uncertainty of change 
was expounded. Returning to her case we find that there was one particular incident that 
clearly showed the intentionality of her emotional experiences. This incident was about a 
situation where she had become angry. In this incident we will see that Rachel 
experiences anger as directed towards what she sees as the intent of the other person 
involved in the incident. Her incident illustrated a strong focus on the angering aspect of 
the incident that the emotion seemed to feed upon. This idea has been discussed by 
Goldie (2002a) who explains that anger for instance is a transient experience that 
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fluctuates in its relation with the thing it is directed at. This means that the angry person’s 
relation with the angering object is transient in that it develops as the person either 
becomes angrier or less angry. Rachel’s incident showed that it was frustration that was 
experienced and this turned to anger. The case shows that intentionality was a 
mediating thing here that functions to link frustration with anger. This is a way of 
understanding emotion through intentionality. Chapter six presents a model of emotion 
that situates intentionality at the Centre of emotional experience. This highlights that 
intentionality is a fundamental concern in providing a definition of emotion (Ashman, 
2008; Goldie, 2002a, 2002b).     
 
4.5.3 RACHEL’S INCIDENT 
 
We agreed to label the incident “the time I couldn’t get the information and felt 
angry”. Rachel explained that the incident occurred a while back. The fact that it had 
taken place a few years back and that Rachel remembered the incident vividly meant 
that her emotional experience lasted in her memory for a long time. Perhaps one could 
argue that memories with emotional content last longer and can be recalled more readily 
compared to other non-emotional memories of experiences. That was a thought that had 
briefly occurred to me. Rachel continued and explained to me that  
“As a part of my job here I have to do a lot of fact finding, 
information gathering……...If I send something out to 
somebody, either asking them a question, or asking them to 
look through these minutes and let me have them back. I 
would want them to just send me it back. If I have to keep 
chasing them, that really frustrates me. I get angry”  
Rachel (Administrator)     
  
In this passage resonates the idea that Rachel feels frustrated and angry at her 
colleague who has failed in providing information related to a job task. Rachel remarks 
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that one part of her job involves fact finding and information gathering. She gets 
frustrated and angry when she has to chase the other person for information she needs. 
In this case clearly Rachel’s anger is directed towards a colleague. Therefore it is 
intentional anger. It is about the colleagues actions as not sufficient which results in 
Rachel not getting the information she needs. In addition to anger, Rachel said that 
when she had to chase people for information that she needed she would become 
frustrated. Her frustration would become anger when she recognized the person 
responsible for not providing her with the requested information. Frustration was rated a 
high 1 on a scale of 1 to 8. Giving this rating on her grid, Rachel explained that her 
frustration was based on her inability to get the information she had requested. Finding 
out who is responsible enabled her to direct her intense frustration towards her 
colleague. It seems that frustration turns to anger when intentionality enables Rachel to 
claim that her colleague is at fault. “If the other colleague had done her job then it would 
all be fine. You know. But it just does not make sense when you need the information 
and you are not getting it.” In referring to her colleague’s failure to provide information, 
Rachel explained that the anger was something that was not only about some specific 
act committed at a point in time. Yes, her colleague had failed to provide information 
however the anger was not just towards the one time she had not provided information. 
One can look at this another way. Let us say that the colleague failed to provide 
information. Following on from that, the colleague may have done a number of things 
such as process reports, access information, have team meetings and other things that 
constitute her job. As she may have gone about doing such job tasks Rachel saw this 
colleague through her anger. Rachel admitted that her attention towards this colleague 
was something she returned to long after the incident had taken place. She claimed “you 
know she was there and I noticed”. The idea is that intentionality spills over from one 
specific act towards other instances in the environment. Anger at your colleague makes 
her other actions seem negative and angering. It is a transient shifting of attention from 
one angering action to other subsequent and perhaps even unrelated reactions by the 
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same person. Conclusively it seems that frustration turned to anger through 
intentionality. Appendix 5.2 summarizes and illustrates this idea across the experiences 
of the research participants. Rachel’s attention towards the angering person remained 
and painted a gloomy picture of the workplace. 
What made this idea surprising was that Rachel did not look like a gloomy 
person. She was quite upbeat and friendly in the interview. One might claim that a 
person who is generally pessimistic has a negative outlook. However in her case I found 
it difficult to comprehend that if a gloomy picture was attributable to anything other than 
her anger then why would Rachel who seemed upbeat and bubbly adopt this gloomy 
picture of the incident. One interpretation emerges if we consider her grid in more detail. 
We find that intentionality is indicated at a general level towards all the incidents. The 
indication came from the construct Inclusion-Exclusion. With a rating of 7 on a 1 to 7 
scale. 
  
1                                                                                                                                            7                              
Inclusion 7 7 7 7 Exclusion 
 
 
One interpretation here is to say that Rachel’s frustration turned to anger where 
she felt outside and excluded from all the incidents. On a general level her frustration 
was about this exclusion (Intentionality). She remarked that she “felt like an outsider”. 
She was an outsider who pointed inward to the change as something that was 
frustrating. From this general level when she shared the incidents with me her frustration 
translated to anger at the specific people or objects in the incidents. Thus we see that a 
more specific sort of intentionality emerges.   
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Addressing research objective two the current section therefore makes the point 
that intentionality seems a part of emotion in so far as it was experienced by participants 
at two levels. There is the general level indicated by my interpretation of the grid data 
where Rachel feels frustrated at being excluded. At a more specific level this general 
feeling of frustration turns to anger when attention is directed at the individual person 
responsible for not providing Rachel with information in the incident discussed above. 
One common thing is that at both the general and the specific level the frustration and 
the anger are both about something. Thus intentionality seems involved in all instances 
of emotional experiences. To this end it seems a necessary condition for defining 
emotional experiences of workers in general and for those involved in change.      
In the section below, I will consider further whether Intentionality is a necessary 
feature of emotion. The section after that will relate intentionality with the notion of 
feelings. The next chapter will review the topic of intentionality again and explore how 
during emotional experience intentionality relates with worker feelings and beliefs.    
 
4.5.4 NON-INTENTIONALITY: ANTI-THESIS OF OBJECTIVE TWO    
 
The idea of non-intentionality is an unexpected finding of my research. The idea 
is that emotional experience is not always about discernable things that may exist in the 
material world or exist in a person’s imagination. This is antithetical to research objective 
two which purports the presence of intentionality through emotion as a necessary 
condition of the workers experience. This idea has not been explored in management 
studies of emotion. Studies have considered the opposite idea that emotion is about 
things in experience (i.e. intentionality). In management literature Ashman (2008) refers 
to the idea that intentionality is a necessary feature of emotion. This is supported by 
earlier work looking at emotion and intentionality (Tye, 2008; Sartre, 2007; Solomon, 
2007; Goldie, 2004). Contrary to this the idea proposed by my analysis is that in some 
151 
 
instances emotional experience may not involve intentionality. In other words emotion 
may be non-intentional.  
Although this was not the case in most of the incidents that participants shared 
with me, it was something that did come out in my conversations with Susan. Recall 
Susan is the personal assistant to Richard who is the team manager at the network. In 
the above sections, we looked at her case where we considered the short term 
Perceptions of change and expressed her uncertainty. Here, I draw attention to an 
incident Susan spoke with me about which we labeled “Felt bad for colleague and 
confused/angry”. Sitting across from me sipping on her teacup she began with a smile 
and explained that not so long ago the team manager Richard, to whom she was the 
personal assistant, was struggling with his job. He worked in a senior management 
position where he required support in accessing processed information to help make 
decisions. However she explained that Richard was not getting the support he needed to 
do his job properly. Lack of resource limited Richard’s ability to carry out his tasks. 
Susan told me that this was wrong. She said that the resources were absent but should 
have been made available to Richard. The emotion that Susan experienced in thinking 
about what she saw as unfair treatment of her boss was difficult for her to express.  
 
Me: So take your time. Think it over. Are you feeling what you felt at that    
time?  
Susan: I don’t know. 
Me: (quiet) ok sure, take your time. 
Susan: “I am not sure, I don’t know, I don’t know; what do you 
think? Do you understand, you know what I mean....It’s hard to 
sort of place it in the right way. You know when you can imagine 
the situation you are in....It’s aaaaaaaa, I don’t know, maybe I, 
aaaaaaaaa”- (sigh) “I nearly had a word then.”  
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The above passage shows that Susan is having a difficult time pinpointing her 
heightened sensation about the incident with Richard. Her words “I am not sure, I don’t 
know” indicate that she was uncertain. One possible explanation is that perhaps Susan 
just could not articulate her memories of the incident. This would be a good explanation 
if Susan herself had not recognized that she was not sure why but the feeling was there. 
She recognizes and tries to use words to communicate her experience “I nearly had a 
word then”. However, her experience is just there aimlessly hanging.   
Alternatively, if we do not adopt a perspective concerned with how Susan 
understood her situation then we can simply reduce the sensations of uneasiness she 
experiences down to some biological imbalance or changes. Goldie and Spicer (2002) 
point out that studies have reduced emotion down to biological substrates in this way. 
From another viewpoint if we reflect on this passage in context we must refer to her 
personal grid first. On a scale of 1 to 8 we can see that the ratings are mostly in favor of 
1. Reading the grid we can make out a context. Given there was was already resistance 
and uncertainty in the background there are some key terms and ratings in the grid 
below. Susan told me that she did not know (8) and was Uncertain (2) why there was 
inadequate support for Richard (8). One would think that if Susan saw Richard in trouble 
than she might be worried about her own job (a concern she had displayed on another 
incident we had discussed) – however, she rates her sense of job security a (7). So if 
her job was safe then one may turn to consider why she rates frustration (2) about 
Richard’s situation. We find here that frustration is about Susan seeing the situation as 
out of her control (7). One may reason that if it was up to her Susan would make the 
resources available. We therefore see that Frustration is surrounded by the above 
context of ideas.  
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1 Felt bad for colleague and confused/angry 8 
Knowing 8 Not knowing 
Uncertain 2 Certain 
Insecure 7 Security 
Job Hope 2 Pessimistic 
Self-aware 2 Complacent 
Control 7 Out of control 
Afraid 4 Not afraid 
Adequate support 7 Inadequate Support 
Frustration 2 Less pressure 
 
 
To sum up, Susan told me that she did not know and was uncertain why Richard 
did not get support. She is not concerned about her job, yet she is frustrated because 
the situation looks like it is out of her control. This feeling of frustration is what she may 
be referring to when she tells me    
 
“I am not sure, I don’t know, I don’t know; what do you think? Do 
you understand, you know what I mean....Its hard to sort of place 
it in the right way.” 
 
One idea is that in experiencing frustration Susan is having a non-intentional 
moment. Her frustration is something she is able to imagine when she pictures what 
Richard might have experienced at the time. However she is unable to find a word for it. 
Now it seems that if Susan does not know why there was inadequate support then she 
does not have something to be angry at. She can only be frustrated. If she says that she 
felt angry then one would ask -what are you angry about? - If you do not know why there 
is inadequate support then you do not have anything to point at and be angered by. One 
answer is to consider is that Susan is angry at her inability. She claimed it was out of her 
control. Here anger can be directed at herself. This may be a reasonable idea if we 
consider that she rates self-aware (2). To direct anger at herself would involve increase 
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in attention to self or in self-awareness. If this is the case than one would expect Susan 
to come out and say that. In fact in our conversation I did ask Susan whether she 
thought she was to blame. She said she had nothing but the wish to see Richard 
supported.  
In the current case, what we find here is some confusion. Analysis shows that as far as 
frustration is experienced it involves a sensation of lack of control or lack of ability to 
change the situation. This means frustration may be expressed as an emotion that is not 
directed at anything specific because in Susan’s case the specific cause of the lack of 
support is not clear (non-intentionality). Susan is unable to find a word for what she 
imagines and experiences. Alternatively we find that perhaps Susan blames her- self 
and intentionality is indeed present in so far as she is angry at herself. But she does not 
admit to this idea. One might argue that the confusion leads to non-intentionality. Not 
blaming others and unable to blame herself Susan hangs in a limbo – she cannot find 
the words to express this emotion. One might claim it’s not another person or process 
because I don’t know that thing. And on the other hand it is not me.  I return to this idea 
of non-intentionality in the section below which addresses feelings experienced by the 
participants during change. The focus in the current section was on intentionality and its 
presence within emotion (addressing research objective two). In most incidents 
participants demonstrated the presence of intentionality. Participants were angry or afraid 
of things such as actions of colleagues related to change.  However there were some 
incidents where intentionality seemed difficult to discern (non-intentionality). In general 
there was uncertainty and fear of change. On a few occasions the inability to attributed 
feelings of frustration to anything discrete represented a degree of non-intentionality.    
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4.6 WHAT ABOUT FEELINGS? 
  
  
In the paragraphs above objectives one and two have been addressed. Here I want to 
begin addressing objective three. That is, to investigate relationships between 
intentionality, feelings and beliefs in workers involved in change. The reason is that a 
great portion of the current chapter is dedicated to emotion and intentionality. I want to 
continue this focus by stranding out towards the links between intentionality and feelings 
as objective three calls for. At the same time I will refer in some capacity to beliefs. The 
following chapter will address beliefs more fully with regard to both the third and fourth 
research objectives which build a focus on emotion, intentionality, feelings and beliefs in 
a change context. 
So what is a feeling? James (1957.p.451) argues that feelings are bodily developments 
which when perceived by the individual bring about the experience of emotion. Whilst 
contemporary writers argue that indeed emotion involves feelings (Goldie, 2002; 
Solomon, 2007; Lazarus, 1991) it is unclear how they are situated in management 
theories that research emotion (Gooty et al, 2009). It is argued that feelings are more 
than just brute experiences (Goldie, 2004). Emotion may involve feelings that are 
informative for the emotional person. The nature of how feelings inform is that they direct 
a person’s attention to something in the environment that may need attention (i.e. such 
as a feeling of threat which involves a person suddenly becoming alert about some 
dangerous thing nearby). Here a feeling is a general indicator and at the same time it 
also seems intentional. Feelings direct a person towards the world and towards what 
needs attention Others like Sieben and Wettergren (2012.p.3) have argued that “feelings 
serve as internal guides” helping see the world in a way that is sometimes beneficial for 
the individual. At other times this may equally distort reality such that an angry person 
sees another as blameworthy without reasonable grounds (Goldie, 2004; Fineman, 
2005). What makes feelings difficult to situate in relation to emotion is that feelings are 
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not always easy to identity as part of an emotion such as fear or anger. As Solomon 
(2007) argues a person can feel bad, or feel loyal, without classifying this as a concrete 
emotional response that is about something. Overall then it seems that a feeling can be 
informative and it is intentional. It also seems that a feeling can exist outside identifiable 
emotions such as anger. So a worker amidst change may claim – ‘I have a bad feeling 
about this restructuring initiative.’  What seems definite is put succinctly by Goldie 
(2002b p.235) that emotion typically “..involve feelings at some point during its 
existence”.   
 
4.6.1 INTENTIONALITY AND FEELINGS AT THE NETWORK                
 
 We saw earlier that Table 4.2 shows that feelings involve the theme ‘loss of who I 
am’. Before looking at this theme, the more fundamental concern is to show how feelings 
were experienced by participants and then build the view further. Analysis of the cases 
supports the idea that during emotion the participants experienced feelings that were 
usually about things in their environment. That is, intentionality is a feature of feelings. 
This idea was referred to above where Goldie (2004) argues that feelings provide you 
information of things in the environment. In this regard there are two interpretations 
illustrated in the data. One interpretation is that the feelings experienced by participants 
in the incidents were intentional. The other is that feelings were not intentional. This 
latter idea aligns with the argument made in the earlier sections that perhaps emotion is 
not always intentional.  
Analysis of the data suggests that emotion involves feelings. It suggests that 
intentionality is sometimes a feature of feelings. At other times, feelings may not involve 
intentionality. It follows that emotion may be non-intentional if feeling is that component 
of emotion which in a given instance does not involve intentionality. Here, the 
assumption is that feeling is the only component of emotion that involves intentionality. 
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Thus, if we can show that feeling does not involve intentionality then it follows that 
emotion can be without intentionality. However, this assumption is only upheld in this 
section in order to enable exploration of feelings and to understand how these are 
situated within emotional experience. In the next chapter, the assumption does not hold 
and beliefs present a component that runs parallel to feelings and both these 
components have the potential to display intentionality. In research, it is an ongoing 
argument whether all the components of emotion involve intentionality or whether 
intentionality is specific to certain components (Tye, 2008; Goldie, 2002).  
 
 
4.7 WHY PENNY’S CASE 
 
 Penny was probably one of the most emotional participants that took part in my 
research. She felt very strongly about the change and the incidents she discussed with 
me were permeated with talk of feelings. This made her case a good opportunity for 
exploring feelings. If we look at her grid we find that she spoke of feeling incapable 
throughout her five incidents she shared with me at a high rating of 1 on a scale of 1 to 
8. She saw herself as a victim of change and the actions of other people. Her overall 
picture of the workplace was a negative one. In all of the incidents she shared with me, 
her anger and fear was directed at colleagues. She indicated that in her incidents 
colleagues who were involved were poor managers. She gave “Poor management by 
others” a high rating of 1 in all the incidents she shared with me. In addition feelings of 
incapability and being a victim of change were present in other cases summarized in 
appendix 5.2. This section uses Penny’s case to provide a detailed view.    
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4.7.1 PENNY’S CASE – FEELINGS, INTENTIONALITY, AND EMOTION 
 
 The interview with Penny was very emotional. By this, I mean that during the 
interview Penny expressed a lot of emotion. It was in her facial expressions, her tone, 
her posture, and in the incidents she shared with me. There were also moments in her 
interview and within other interviews that I had to actively reflect on my own emotions as 
a researcher and to manage them. This latter idea about managing your own emotion as 
a researcher is discussed in chapter seven that looks at the notion of Reflexivity. Overall 
the one common thread that ran through her incidents was the idea that she was a 
victim. This meant that her anger was about the blame she placed on others. Penny 
used her feelings to point out the incompetence in others. This feeling was something 
that initially surfaced as frustration and this is where she directed it at others who were to 
blame for wrongdoings. This culminated in anger. This case demonstrates the theme of 
Feelings. Consider the incident she shared with me about the time colleagues had been 
dishonest.  
 We called this incident “fiddling with time made me angry”. She explained that 
amidst organizational change timesheets had been introduced at the network where she 
worked. These were sheets that could account for any extra hours people had done and 
would therefore get remuneration. Penny told me that two workers who she knew were 
fiddling with the time sheets. I asked her to explain further. She said that time fiddling 
was a practice that involved putting in more hours that a person had actually worked. 
The implication was that change at the network which had brought about the time sheets 
provided a way of being dishonest and beating the system. Penny told me that she took 
it upon herself to complain to Charlie the team assistant manager. I asked about what 
happened next and she replied  
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“Instead of the manger dealing with people not pulling their 
weight, or people who are not doing what they should be, an 
email goes out to the whole team, making us and also me feel 
small.”      
Penny (Administrator) 
 
She believed that unfair practices were taking place. If we look at her personal 
grid we find that as with the other incidents there was a feeling of incapability 
experienced by Penny. She gave “felt incapable” a rating of 1 on a 1 to 8 scale (see 
appendix 5.2 Emma’s incident for another example of incapability and frustration as well 
as other cases summarized in the appendix). In this particular incident we see that 
Penny feels incapable because she could not stop other people from fiddling with time. 
But also that the manager she had reported the incident to did not take any action to 
correct things. Unable to do anything she felt frustrated. It seems that her feeling is one 
of frustration that is about her-self being unable to modify some aspect of her 
experience. Her belief in unfair practices and her feelings towards these beliefs drove 
her into anger. For Penny her feeling of frustration seems to be a loop. Recursively she 
feels frustrated and recognizes her inability, and this frustrates her more. This built up of 
frustration is recognized by her. In this regard talking about frustration she told me that “I 
just contain with a lid, learnt to lip up, and bury it deep inside”. And this suppression is 
something that runs across her incidents. We find that she rated a 1 on a 1 to 8 scale.  
 
 
 
 
If a feeling of frustration is built up and contained (Lid up), we find that the 
recursive loop seems to keep working iteratively. Lazarus (1991) suggests that such 
8  1 
Expressed 1 1 1 1 Lid up 
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experiences require that one cope psychologically with them. A method of coping for 
Penny was to blame other people. In anger and feelings of frustration she believed that 
others were wrong (intentionality). Doing this enabled her to direct the frustration 
outward and have something to feel angry about. There is another interpretation. The 
incidents Penny shared with me involved frustration and confusion. Her state of 
confusion meant that she had a loss of who she was. We find that her inability to modify 
an experience led to frustration accompanied by her feelings of not knowing who she 
was at the network. Interpreting confusion one could say she lacked direction. There 
was another incident that supports this interpretation of Penny’s experience. This 
incident we named “Asked to act up, and was angry”. Sitting across from me in the 
interview room, Penny began by explaining that a while back she was offered a 
temporary position. Somebody was needed to replace Charlie (the assistant manager); 
whilst Charlie was on short leave for medical treatment. Penny told me that she was 
excited and felt proud because she was being recognized by others for her managerial 
skills. She saw the offer as a chance for career development. However due to change 
policies put in place Charlie was told at later date that it had been cancelled. According 
to Penny there was another reason.  
 
Me: Well let’s see what comes to mind. 
 
Penny: Okay, being asked to act up, again acting up is when you stand in 
for somebody; you can then put it on your CV as a role. I was asked to act 
up into my boss’s role when she went into the hospital for an operation. 
And then a month later she came to me and said – I have decided not to 
act you up anymore because of what happened with Emma – who is 
another employee that acted up previously. So Ben is going to do the line 
management, and you’re going to do all the work. That was one situation. 
 
Me: So what did you feel when they asked you to act up and then (made a 
sympathetic expression) 
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Penny: I felt privileged, and then I felt shattered. I was not angry, but I felt 
upset, it hurt. I was asked to act up and then told no, because of what 
happened when Ellie was here. And to think that I would be like anybody 
else is an insult anyway. So I was insulted, offended, and hurt.  
Me: Ok so you were not angry? 
 
Penny: aaaaaaa, I don’t know. It just felt bad. 
 
Me: So did you commit yourself to something at that point? You know, did 
you say to yourself that you don’t appreciate this? 
 
Penny: No I never let work suffer. You say to yourself, well bugger I am 
not going to do anything. My conscience would not let me do it. I have 
never done that, as far as I can remember.  
 
According to Penny, she acted up because she was compared to Ellie (a 
colleague) who had not performed well. We see that she felt bad. She suppresses her 
feelings implied by her statement “No I never let work suffer. You say to yourself, well 
bugger I am not going to do anything.” Here, she has inability in the sense that she is 
unable to act up into a role. There is frustration. On her grid we see that Penny rates 
confusion at this moment as 1 on a rating between 1 and 8. Conclusively, it seems that 
due to change practices where a person needs to be given some responsibility, the 
network sees it as a risk.  The logic seemed to be that if the other colleague (Ellie) was 
unable to do the job than promoting Penny may be a risk best avoided during 
organizational change.  
As a consequence, we see Penny suffer and experience confusion and feels lack 
of direction. In a change context confusion can lead to lower productivity. A worker who 
feels lack of direction cannot follow change. It seems that inability to influence was a key 
idea in all of Penny’s incidents rated a 1 on a 1 to 8 scale. 
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Felt Incapable 1 1 1 1 1 Felt Empowered 
 
Inability leads to frustration. A recursive loop kept lidded by Penny brings about 
confusion and lack of direction. To cope Penny deploys intentionality and becomes 
angry. This was the reasoning in all of Penny’s incidents. Her feelings followed a course. 
This recurred in her other incidents where feelings are involved. It seems that feeling is 
always used in a manner where Penny feels frustration or inability and then she directs 
this at other colleagues before anger or fear is experienced.   
 
4.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 The section above addressed the proposed objective – To explore the presence 
of intentionality within emotional experience of workers involved in change. With 
intentionality the finding as follows: Analysis shows emotion can be understood in terms 
of intentionality. One finding is that frustration was experienced by the participants. In 
regard to intentionality Rachel’s case showed that attention that turned frustration to 
anger and lingered long after the event. Intentionality was at a general level and at a 
specific level. Next Susan’s case demonstrated non-intentionality. Frustration in her case 
was something that represented lack of ability. Not directed at anything. Here frustration 
is felt as an experience without direction. The next section explored feelings. Penny’s 
case showed that frustration is mediated towards anger by intentionality. The logic that 
relates frustration and anger shows a movement from one to the other and also shows 
that frustration as a feeling may to some degree exist as non-intentional. However the 
presence of beliefs is always a sign of intentionality in so far as beliefs were always 
directed towards things to do with organizational change. The presence of beliefs is also 
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argued by Lazarus (1992) whose study showed that they are always present within 
emotion. In a change context the theory has been suggested as a good set of ideas 
when studying emotion processes within a change context (Klarner et al, 2011).      
 
 
4.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, there is one unifying idea that comes out of the analysis of the 
incidents shared by the participants. The idea is that during organizational change 
emotion involves intentionality which occurs in feeling frustration and intentionality 
functions to mediate the move from frustration towards ones emotion. The worker 
defines his emotional experience as one of uncertainty and frustration. The anger 
or fear that ensues is experienced as about change in general but also about 
specific persons and processes. Exclusion from change through lack of information 
about how the workers job is impacted persists as a core view that maintains 
emotion. Table 4.4 comments further on how the emergent themes have been 
interpreted.  
 
Theme  Interpretation 
  
Perceptions of Change Two types of perceptions emerged. There was long term 
and short term resistance to change. The reason was lack 
of information. Senior managers saw implementers of 
change as incompetent and not fair. Administrative 
workers were afraid the impact on job tasks, which as 
unknown 
 
  
  
Uncertain about the 
Change 
 
Lack of information also meant there was uncertainty. This 
was a feeling in the background tainting the view of the 
participants towards a negative slant. This feeling also 
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Intentionality 
directed attention towards what might happen 
(anticipatory thinking) and directed attention towards job 
security (self-preservation).     
 
 
 
This theme appeared to manifest on two levels. There 
was general intentionality and then there was specific 
intentionality. We find that in both cases intentionality was 
present. The question posed here was – is it a necessary 
feature of emotional experience.  
 
 
Non-Intentionality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feelings, Intentionality,  
and Emotion  
 
 
 
A surprising finding. Non intentionality was present in so 
far as the worker experienced frustration which was due to 
a feeling of lack of control and lack of ability. The worker is 
in limbo. Coupled with the climate of uncertainty of change 
we find that the worker is unable to find words but 
experiences the emotion.  
 
 
 
We find that uncertainty and frustration were present. 
Uncertainty was about the future. Frustration was without 
intentionality. The worker experiences emotion as a 
feeling that persists recursively. Lack of information 
means that one sees thing out of control and the self as 
not able to influence. The feeling of frustration and ones 
inability are connected in a loop back and forth. The 
worker copes with frustration by pointing to something that 
can be blamed. This turns then to emotion. All the while 
the experience persists as change is resisted by workers.   
  
Table 4.4 
The ideas from this chapter will resurface in the next chapter, which looks at 
emotion and beliefs more fully. I will return to ideas covered in this chapter in order 
to build a picture of emotional experience during organizational change.   
The theoretical implications of the research findings presented in this 
chapter and the next chapter and where these fit within management research as a 
growing disciplinary sphere are discussed in chapter six. Ultimately, intentionality 
and feelings alongside the theme of belief are all components that inform the model 
of emotion presented in chapter 6, section 6.3. In particular the analysis in the 
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current chapter presented intentionality and this was a central component in its 
relations with beliefs and feelings. This was also reviewed in chapter two where 
literature proposed intentionality as a primal component of emotion. It also forms a 
central component in the model in chapter six. The component ‘feeling’ was also 
discussed in the context of change. This also forms a part of the proposed model 
and as discussed in the current the current chapter feelings can also be intentional 
– that is, individuals experience feelings as towards change.     
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CHAPTER FIVE – EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE AND 
WORKER BELIEFS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter presented perceptions of organizational change and 
explored emotion through component parts including intentionality and feelings. This 
chapter continues that exploration and examines participant ‘beliefs’. The current 
chapter addresses research objectives three and four which were established in the 
second chapter. Objective three is: to investigate relationships between intentionality, 
beliefs and feelings in workers involved in change. Objective four is: to determine the 
relationship of beliefs and feelings with the components of congruence, immediacy, and 
certainty.  
Analysis showed that both evaluative and reactive beliefs were formed by 
participants. The beliefs exhibited the features of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. 
The current chapter presents cases illustrating these features. The cases are detailed 
and they potently illustrate the features. Table 5.1 and appendix 5.2 provide instances 
from across all the cases which further support’s the presence of found features.   
In general, emotion research has focused on beliefs in two ways. Either beliefs 
are antecedents to emotion or they are consequences of emotion (Scherer, 2001.p.372, 
1988, 1984; Smith and Kirby, 2001). This has been the focus in cognitive theories and 
within organization research which has used theories from the former discipline. This 
has also been recognised in change research (Kiefer, 2005). In the context of the current 
research focus, what happens during emotion and how beliefs form in that experience 
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represents relatively unexplored territory. Within Organizational change literature this 
presents an opportunity for understanding emotion (Klarner et al, 2011). Such 
understanding would increase knowledge of how emotional workers might react based 
on beliefs formed in a change context. How the world looks to an emotional person is 
different from how it would otherwise appear to somebody who is not immersed in 
emotion. Researching beliefs in that experience represents the opportunity to propose 
how a worker may see change as perhaps worse than it might otherwise appear.    
 
5.2 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
  
The previous chapter demonstrated two themes. These were ‘perceptions of 
change’ and ‘uncertainty’. Both themes illustrate the idea that change was not supported 
by the participants. It was seen as an ill understood force that was not implemented 
properly. Change was something that was not beneficial for the individual and the 
organization. For the participants the problem was lack of knowledge about the change 
and this engendered uncertainty about how change would impact their job tasks and 
future prospects. Participants grew frustrated and by pointing blame at persons or 
processes (i.e. intentionality) they became emotional.  
Developing this further the current chapter examines how emotion forms beliefs. 
In terms of the inner workings of the mind; how emotion forms beliefs is ill understood. 
This is supported by arguments reviewed in chapter two. As noted throughout the thesis 
– the focus is on inner workings of the mind rather than on external forces that impact 
workers. Initially some understanding of what the term ‘belief’ means would help in the 
sense that an idea of what is explored is established. One argument is that a belief is a 
universal condition of the individual worker. It is a universal condition because the 
worker in an organization continuously holds beliefs. They are ways of making sense of 
experiences. Sometimes a belief is represented as a statement about what one sees. A 
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belief may also be a statement about imagined things in the mind (De Sousa, 1990). For 
instance, a worker believes that ‘organizational change is part of a grand conspiracy and 
it is harmful’. It will destroy his career. The person has not seen evidence but this makes 
it no less real for that person. It is real in their mind. A belief is nonetheless held both 
about the perceived and the imagined world. Alternatively one may believe that one 
works as a nurse and this belief may be more believable in the sense that one can 
perceive it more often in the world around them. Rather than just a statement in 
language ontologically a belief is taken as a mental state of the worker. At its most basic 
a person, the ‘I’, must always believe in his own existence in order to believe in anything 
at all (Lazarus, 1991 p.39-41). In all of the above a belief is something that we think to 
be the case. It is in these ways that belief is interpreted in the current chapter. Sections 
in the current chapter will demonstrate that beliefs were used to evaluate situations and 
to react to change. They also exhibited the features of congruence, immediacy, and 
certainty which shaped the influence of beliefs.   
In the context of the negative atmosphere at the network and perceptions tainted 
by the background, it seems logical to expect that analysis would show beliefs that do 
not support change. These beliefs form part of negative emotions of anger and fear. 
Theory suggests that negative perceptions lead to negative emotions that consist of 
negative beliefs about relations with the environment (Goldie, 2002a, 2002b, Lacewing, 
2004; Solomon, 2007; Lazarus, 1991.p.91-92.).  
 
5.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Data analysis revealed that in emotion two types of beliefs were identified as part 
of emotional experiences of anger and fear of the participants. These are 
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 Evaluative – A proposition evaluating something in terms of importance in 
change 
  
 Reactive – A proposition expressing how one will react in to others in 
change   
 
 In addressing research objective three it seems that these beliefs did exhibit 
intentionality. That is, they were evaluations and reactions that were about things to do 
with change at the network. Feelings were also involved. The most common feeling 
being one of frustration at not being able to understand the change. Again the feelings 
were in this sense also exhibitions of intentionality. Workers felt a degree of negativity 
and their beliefs immersed in such feelings displayed certain features. These were 
features that research objective four addresses.    
Evaluative and reactive beliefs involved the features of congruence, immediacy 
and certainty. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the empirical findings. The table 
identifies the features as themes. From left to right, the columns display themes, beliefs, 
the participants, and illustrative verbatim extracts with interpretation. Congruence 
involved evaluations. In their emotional moments, workers evaluated colleagues and 
processes of change as bad because they were unfair. Also the impact on job tasks was 
not known. The second theme of Immediacy involved both evaluative and reactive 
beliefs. In emotional moments people were a threat or problem that is closer or more 
likely. Participants reacted by forming beliefs to confront the person or to suppress the 
incident. The third theme was certainty. Participants in anger and fear were certain and 
very sure about what they believed. Their beliefs were strong in terms of how much they 
were convinced that such was the case. 
 
Table 5.1. Illustrates Congruence, Immediacy, 
and Certainty as key themes supported by 
emotion formed beliefs.  
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Themes Beliefs  Data – Verbatim extracts/Comments 
    
Congruence 
 
 
Belief: Change seems unfair 
and worsening for the 
participants. (Evaluation)    
   
Richard “I know what needs to be done” they 
are not doing what needs to be done  
 
Susan 
“We don’t know where this is headed 
but it does not look good.” “Yes it just 
seems all over the place.” “We in the 
lower levels well you know we are” 
(implies: replaceable.)  
Emma  “And she kept getting worse. Kept 
doing it and I really didn’t see why.” 
Sees things getting worse and worse. 
More and more unfair. 
 
Rachel  
They are just not fair sometimes. Its 
just something you think oh well this is 
not getting better  
 
 
Penny 
It got worse “a multiple number of 
times”, Makes her band three 
administrator the gatekeeper that’s 
what she is called…. She was 
targeting my time…..It’s just going to 
get worse… 
Susan Nobody says it but we all know these 
are difficult times it just does not look 
too good. 
 
Charlie 
They just didn’t do a good job and 
they could have. She was unfair and 
went behind my back. We don’t know, 
that pathway bit of the surgery that’s 
never been looked at.  
Immediacy 
 
Unfair Change. Others 
perceived as threat. 
(Evaluation).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Penny 
Others not fair.” Not listening”. “Poor 
management by others.” They said I 
would be “acted up to that role and 
then I wasn’t, they just don’t care.”  
Sense of unfairness on me or what is 
mine (i.e. job tasks).  
 
Susan  
 
“that process they talk about but we 
are just you know….Everybody is 
afraid….Anything could happen and at 
any time I might be out of a job”. In 
fear she believes it is a pending threat 
the change. Can happen any time.  
 
Daniela 
“And she was very critical of me. And I 
felt quite unfairly because I had 
actually said to her that I wanted help 
and support.” The colleague was not 
liked and perceived as a problem. 
 
Emma  
“I am an excellent manager and it is 
not always fair and it is not 
necessary.” They were seen as a 
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Confronted person or 
suppressed troubling beliefs 
about incident (reaction) 
 
threat to her development in her job 
during the change context 
 
 
Penny  
“you just can’t do it….it’s too much…I 
have nothing left” She gives up and 
decides to go about doing her job on a 
day to day basis by actively forgetting 
the unfairness from others towards 
her 
 
Daniela 
 
I have just Contained it with a lid. “Felt 
like expressing” but “contained with a 
lid” – believed there is just an 
atmosphere of uncertainty contributing 
to her belief that she can make a 
difference. Accepts unfairness.  
 
Charlie 
 
Saw little point in confronting people 
and believed processes were not 
working.” Re-grading didn’t work.” 
Immediate threat to her job. Belief to 
suppress. On another incident reacted 
by confronting believed it was too 
much. Went against “my values”.  
Certainty  
 
Seems wrong and unfair 
others seen with conviction as 
threats/problems (Evaluation)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confronted person or 
suppressed troubling beliefs 
about incident 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniela  
 
 
Was angry and believed she was “not 
fairly treated” Remained passive but 
certain that it was wrong to see that 
happen to her. Was sure that she was 
“less valued” during change. Saw it as 
bad.  
 
 
Emma  
It seemed unfair the colleague “held 
on to older structures” there was 
conviction in the wrongness of the 
other person. Their “authoritarian 
behaviour” is seen as such without 
doubt. (see appendix 5.2 personal grid 
constructs uncertain-certainty and 
anxious-certain) 
 
 
 
Rachel 
 
Believed that reconfiguration was 
unfair on everybody because it was 
not going anywhere. “annoyed at offer 
for job” saw it as not enough to reflect 
her value. “Expoitative.” It was unfair 
that she was excluded from the 
change this instilled certainty in belief 
that change was wrong. 
` 
Daniela 
“Felt victimized”. “There was not much 
I could, you know.” Sees self as 
passive and therefore not able to 
react. Suppresses.  
 
Charlie 
 
Saw the treatment of patients as 
unfairly blamed on colleagues. “felt let 
down” by change implementing others 
and confronted by using authority to 
“Expand pathways”.  
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Richard 
 
Directly used authority and confronted 
to block change implementers. Certain 
they “did not know what needs to be 
done.” Reacts with certainty of their 
wrongness and the fairness that 
needs to be protected as what he 
described as his “legacy.” Believed 
that others did not care for him or his 
teams benefit. They were just there to 
“hen their nest”.   
 
Congruence – This is a poorly researched idea in organization studies. 
Congruence means that during emotion a person’s beliefs lead to similar beliefs that are 
congruent with the emotion being experienced (Bower, 1981). For instance an angry 
worker will continue in an iterative cycle to believe and focus on the angering aspect of a 
situation. In this process the worker become angrier and angrier. The emotional 
experience goes from bad to worse. The participants in my research displayed 
congruence. Engulfed in uncertainty the participants formed the belief that change was 
digging itself into a grave. The table shows a set of quotes chosen for their potency in 
illustrating the belief that change was going to get worse. The situation looked like a 
spiral. I will return to illustrate this in latter sections. The current chapter demonstrates 
that congruence was indeed present in the experiences of workers. This made certain 
features of the environment more salient.  
Immediacy – This is a contemporary idea proposed by Elster (2009) and by 
Goldie (2002a). The idea is that in emotion one sees things as magnified, closer, and 
more likely. This assumption suggests that during emotion beliefs one holds are of a 
certain sort. Believing when one is emotional is unlike believing the same things when 
one is not emotional (Goldie, 2002a.p.18). If this is the case than it follows that during 
emotion beliefs held will be of a sort that exhibit immediacy to the worker. Things seem 
closer or more likely. The participants in my research believed that others were a threat. 
They also believed that the likelihood of negative impact of change was high/ magnified. 
Section 5.6 demonstrates that participants saw others as immediate threats to job tasks. 
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Certainty – Research focused on emotion as a series of causal events has 
described certainty as a feature of emotion. Certainty is associated with anger (Van Dijk 
and Zeelenberg, 2011; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; lerner and keltner, 2001; Frijda and 
Mesquita, 2000). However Goldie (2002a) has argued that certainty must be present in 
every emotion. One must grasp the certainty of some aspect of the world by believing it 
to be in a certain way. One focuses on the angering or fearful aspect of a situation as 
being a certain way such that emotion emerges as a reality of its own kind. The 
participants in my research were certain in an absolute degree about the threats they 
faced in the form of persons carrying out organizational change. Section 5.7 
demonstrates this in detail. 
 
5.4 INTENTIONALITY, FEELINGS AND BELIEFS 
 
Intentionality seems to be present within both the feelings and the beliefs held by 
workers involved in change. Chapter four expounded this point where participants 
expressed feelings towards the change at the network. Participants felt negatively about 
the initiative and programs of change. The most prevalent feeling was that of uncertainty 
about the change and a sense of exclusion. One example is an incident Rachel shared 
with me which we named “Seeing the change proposals concerned with fear”. The 
summary is provided in appendix 5.2. The incident involved the unveiling of change 
plans. Rachel remembers seeing some documents illustrating “some type of change 
plans”. She explained that her reaction was to initially feel surprised and then feel 
uncertainty about what was going on. In her uncertainty she formed beliefs about what 
might happen – this involved anticipating what if scenarios. She felt fear and anticipated 
negative consequences of job loss and this was despite any hint of job loss in the 
documents that had been unveiled.  
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What we see here is a relation between intentionality, feelings, and beliefs. Rachel feels 
towards change and this represents intentional behavior. Her feelings seem to generate 
similarly negative beliefs. This also represents intentionality. At the core here sits 
intentionality as present in two ways, either through feelings or through beliefs. Both 
components are capable of being experienced as part of the workers emotional 
experience.  
Another example is an incident that Emma, one of the administrators, shared with me. 
We named the incident “Frustrated with tasks”. This was about a time when Emma felt 
frustration in being incapable of doing the tasks that she had been assigned. Following 
on from the initial change proposals that had been unveiled at the network; Emma’s job 
role was changing. One of her job tasks now was to implement change in terms of 
documentation of medical supplies. However there was no clear direction or instructions 
provided to her. She felt confused and uncertain about her place in change. There was 
no training provided. With becoming uncertain and her sense of incapability; there was 
frustration. However what we see is that Emma at the most fundamental level is unable 
to pinpoint her place in change. She is also unable to attribute clearly where change is 
happening and who is to blame for the lack of direction and clarity about her role. The 
lesson to learn from her incident is that intentionality is an essential component in 
emotional experience that enables one to experience anger or fear ‘towards’. Emma’s 
frustration is just her frustration and it is not clearly about change because she cannot 
pinpoint change or her place within change. But it is towards this idea of change. Once 
Emma forms beliefs about change her perspective becomes definite and more sensible 
– it was about the specific process of change that modified her tasks.  
Without intentionality it is hard to imagine how emotional experience would exist. 
Emma’s incident shows that one can be confused, frustrated and uncertain and that 
intentionality is required to ground such experiences into being about the environment of 
change. Another example that demonstrates relations between intentionality, feelings, 
and beliefs was an incident that Daniela, another administrator shared with me. This 
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again demonstrates what Emma’s incident demonstrated; that is, intentionality grounds 
or localizes emotion through feelings and beliefs. We agreed to name the incident 
“Fear/anger colleague’s actions, made me feel victimized”. As a part of change initiatives 
the network implemented training for administrative staff. This was a relatively structured 
initiative where one could experience change in the form of training. The training 
involved certain tasks that were meant to instill skills and knowledge in workers. Daniela 
explained that even before training had started she felt afraid. Her feeling of fear 
involved thoughts of her failure to complete the training. Similar to Emma’s perspective 
presented above, Daniela also had a sense of ‘lack of ability’ to cope with change. Her 
fear was thus her belief that she might not be up to the challenge. However once training 
had started she gained confidence and her uncertainty about her ability dissipated.  
Reflecting on the training sessions Daniela saw them as badly implemented initiatives. 
She believed that there was inadequate time to learn tasks and develop skills. She felt 
anger about the lack of organization with which the change had been implemented. 
However prior to her anger Daniela much like Emma had felt frustrated in anticipating 
that she might fail in training. Her frustration turned to anger once intentionality was 
discernable within her belief that training was inadequately implemented. Thus we see 
that her evaluation about training grounded her anger. In other words, intentionality 
functions to ground through feelings and beliefs, the person’s emotional experience 
within the environment. In this case the environment of organizational change. The 
central idea here is that intentionality is a core component of emotion. In all three 
incidents presented above feelings and beliefs seem to be terms through which this core 
component manifests. This was the case with the 34 incidents summarized in appendix 
5.2. The two components feelings and beliefs are related to three further features of 
congruence, immediacy, and certainty which were overviewed in the previous section.                          
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5.4 CONGRUENCE: WHY IS PENNY’S CASE A GOOD EXAMPLE? 
  
Although congruence was present for all of the participants, it seems that 
Penny’s case was particularly illustrative (see Appendix 5.2 for case summaries). She 
was one of the administrators at the network. Penny shared incidents that were all 
negative. Her overall emotion view was negative and she experienced anger and fear 
during organizational change. Figure 5.1 shows Penny’s personal grid. Her grid shows 
two things. First what is most noticeable in the grid are the extreme ratings she provided.   
 
1 Asked 
to act 
up, 
was 
angry 
Fiddling 
with 
time 
made 
me 
angry  
Angry 
and 
decided 
to leave 
Angry at 
Gatekeeper 
Afraid of 
colleague 
8 
Trustworthy 8 8 8 8 8 Not 
Trustworthy  
Others Not 
reliable 
1 1 1 1 1 Others reliable 
Others Not 
listening 
1 3 1 1 1 Acknowledged 
Hesitant/Not 
certain 
1 1 1 1 1 Not Hesitant/  
certain 
Afraid 1 1 1 1 1 Not Afraid 
Poor 
Management 
by Others 
1 1 1 1 1 Good 
Management 
by Self 
No formal 
recognition 
1 1 1 1 1 Formal 
Recognition 
Confused 1 3 1 1 1 Clear 
Felt 
Incapable 
1 1 1 1 1 Felt 
Empowered 
 
Fig.5.1. Penny’s Grid 
The reason for these ratings was Penny’s tendency to see her situations in a 
radical way. Secondly, not only do her ratings show a radical view but they also show 
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that her constructs portrayed her situations as grim and thus congruent with her negative 
emotions. Ratings along the left hand column use words like ‘Others not reliable‘, 
‘Others not listening’ ‘Felt incapable’, all seemingly oblique and negative portrayals of 
her experiences. This is elaborated in the section below.       
 
5.5 PENNY’S CASE: PRESENCE OF CONGRUENCE 
 
Analysis of her case showed that Penny had a general mistrust of her workplace 
and her colleagues. For instance in every incident Penny’s grid shows a rating of 8 for 
‘Not Trustworthy.’ Her general belief was that others at the network were ‘Not 
trustworthy’. This was her evaluation (evaluative belief) and the danger was that it may 
have acted as a bias. As a preconception little trust may provide an undue reason to be 
suspicious of situations one had just entered. I was cautious of this idea and I had 
noticed the possibility of such bias. During the interview I took a moment to ask Penny 
whether her lack of trust was due to perhaps a misunderstanding or confusion. After all it 
did feature in all the incidents. I suggested ‘perhaps you should switch your viewpoint’. 
At that suggestion she vehemently replied ‘they just lie and I can’t do it anymore. Their 
games’. Penny’s general belief that they were not trustworthy as liars did not allow her to 
consider that perhaps there was a misunderstanding at play. This demonstrated narrow 
thinking and her unwillingness to entertain other viewpoints. Things were bad at the 
hospital and she believed that it was only going to get worse. The current section 
demonstrates that Pennys dismal view was due to congruence which was a feature of 
beliefs held during her emotional experiences. That is an iterative pattern of believing 
that things were getting from bad to worse.    
  
 
5.5.1 CONGRUENCE 
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The beliefs Penny formed featured congruence. An emotional experience that 
strongly illustrated congruence took place around a year ago. We named it ‘Angry at 
GateKeeper’. About a year back as a part of change a supervisor at the network was 
assigned to the team Penny was working in. Sitting in the interview and talking to me 
about the incident I noticed that Penny was emotional in that interview. In recalling her 
emotional incidents she had become angry herself. Talking about the angry incident 
made her angry. This is not the focus of my research but a thought I had upon reflecting 
on this was about the power of emotional memories. Penny explained that the role of the 
new supervisor – she called her the GateKeeper - was to assess the performance of the 
team on a daily basis. Penny explained that this was a move by management. It was a 
move that she was angry about. She lamented being supervised closely. Penny said it 
made it difficult for her to do her job knowing someone was watching over her shoulder. 
So far in the incident Penny has expressed an evaluative belief. A supervisor had been 
assigned and this made her angry. In anger she believed that management assigned the 
supervisor (b1). She evaluated the situation by believing that this change was against 
her (b2). She further formed the belief that her job was not easy to carry out because of 
this hindrance (b3). This meant that others could not be trusted to implemented change 
correctly. For her correct change would be no gatekeeper. A negative picture emerges 
for Penny. In her words - “The Gatekeeper constantly reminded me of what I shouldn’t be 
doing, and did not give me information to let me do my job. I asked for a bit of information and I 
was told no …..This Gatekeeper doesn’t understand what we do so how she can police things I 
don’t know.” A fourth belief is expressed in this passage. The Gatekeeper doesn’t 
understand what we do and therefore can only be a hindrance (b4). This shows that in 
anger there is a formation of beliefs that displays a grim picture of change. 
 
 
b1 – Management is to blame 
b2 – Situation is against me 
b3 – Supervisor is hindrance to job 
b4 – Supervisor does not understand    
anything.  
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In anger, the beliefs demonstrate that Penny’s evaluation gets worse. This is a 
feature of beliefs known as congruence where b1 as a negative belief leads to other 
negative beliefs b2, b3, and b4. Elaborating on the incident further Penny told me that 
everybody was against her at the network. I asked her why she believed that. She said 
that things were not fair and this made her angry. In anger she continued to believe that 
things were not fair on her and she suffered (see Table 5.1 for details). The beliefs 
above are negative in the sense that Penny positions management (change 
implementers) as a barrier to goal attainment. Her goal shared by the rest of the 
participants was to continue doing her job as if the organizational change had never 
occurred. Job tasks were perturbed and the uncertainty experienced by participants 
expounded in chapter four further added to a dismal picture. The other option is that 
perhaps Penny wanted to do her job and so participate in change. For this consider 
another viewpoint.  
The term Penny uses to refer to her supervisor is ‘the GateKeeper’. Penny uses 
the term metaphorically. In the literal sense the term Gatekeeper means a person who 
keeps guard at a gate or entrance. Curious about this I asked Penny ‘why Gatekeeper? 
Why that word?’ She explained that the supervisor was a gatekeeper because ‘she had 
the keys to everything.’ So she gave me another metaphor! This makes little sense at 
first glance. One may ask; what is being guarded and the Keys to what? In her mind 
metaphorically Penny saw the Gatekeeper guarding change and keeping Penny on the 
outside. By ‘keys to everything’ Penny means the gatekeeper knew everything about the 
180 
 
organizational change. The gatekeeper is a hindrance to her job and in this sense Penny 
has a sense of being outside and not a part of change.  
The presence of congruence was visible across the variety of incidents shared by 
the participants. Appendix 5.2 provides examples of congruence at play in incidents. The 
rationale as illustrated in Penny’s case is the following – Congruence resonated in the 
beliefs that unfairness is getting worse and other are a threat. Congruence did not 
generate reactive beliefs. This indicates a sense of lack of influence over the situation. 
The gloomier the picture gets the less we can do about things. The current thesis is a 
qualitative study that shows congruence in terms of the quality of the formed beliefs as 
negative. In anger negative beliefs led to related negative beliefs. Congruence has been 
conceptually argued from a qualitative position (Goldie, 2004) however the current thesis 
validates this with empirical data provided by respondents. Organizational change 
literature in studying emotion would expect congruence as a feature of beliefs. This 
argument is expounded in chapter six where the contribution of this finding is integrated 
into theory.    
 
 
 
5.6 IMMEDIACY: WHY IS DANIELA’S ORDEAL A GOOD EXAMPLE? 
  
Moving on from congruence, the current section looks at ‘immediacy’. The idea 
here is that emotional experience makes the world appear a certain way. This is not a 
recent idea. However the idea that during emotion beliefs are intentional and of a sort 
that makes things look closer, magnified, and more likely is a relatively contemporary 
argument (Goldie, 2009, 2002.p.8; Elster, 2009; Solomon, 2007). The theoretical 
argument is that beliefs in of an emotional sort are intentional (supported by empirical 
data from chapter four). The second related point is that such beliefs exhibit immediacy. 
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A qualitative exposition of this feature is not at present found in organization research. 
However immediacy is suggested by Lazarus (1991) whose account argues that things 
require a coping response in emotion and this implies that such things either persons or 
processes are seen as close threats/problems.  Klarner et al (2001) suggests that 
looking at immediacy using this idea provides a fresh perspective on emotion.    
In general, research participants in their emotional experiences believed that 
change was a threat to their job security. This is where immediacy appeared. 
Participants believed that people encountered were of a sort as if this was a character 
trait. That is, in emotion they saw the other person as just that x sort of person. This x 
signified an immediate threat to their job (see Table 5.1). A case that strongly illustrated 
how this belief came about was the case of Daniela. Like some of the other participants 
Daniela was an administrator who worked at the network. The incidents she discussed 
with me involved anger and fear. The beliefs she formed were both evaluative and 
reactive. Her incidents showed that in her emotion the beliefs she formed portrayed 
threats to job security as unfair and more likely than they would otherwise seem to an 
unemotional person. Emotion formed beliefs are of a sort that is indigenous to that 
experience of emotion (Goldie, 2002a. p.17-21). 
 
   
5.6.1 THE PRESENCE OF IMMEDIACY 
 
One incident that illustrated immediacy was “Anger not fairly treated’. Similar to 
Penny’s case presented in the earlier section Daniela’s incident involved the evaluation 
that change was unfair. The incident took place a few months earlier when pushing the 
agenda change forward a team of workers was gathered at the network. Daniela was a 
part of the team. It was a new role for Daniela and she explained that she was getting 
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into the routine. Research suggests that learning new tasks can be cognitively complex 
and this can involve emotions (Forgas and George, 2001). Daniela was told that the new 
role was a career enriching move and progress amidst change. Unfortunately a week 
prior to joining the new team Daniela had been taken ill.  Coming back into her new role 
Daniela was still recovering from her illness. She had approached the assigned leader of 
the team and explained how she had been ill. She explained that it was going to be a 
learning curve. The team leader had assured her that support would be provided if 
needed. Over the next few weeks Daniela tended to her tasks and learnt new things. 
During this time period the project leader had grown dissatisfied with her performance. 
Daniela told me that she had asked for support on a number of occasions but that she 
did not receive the needed support. She explained that the leader was critical of her and 
expected her to ‘learn the job fast.’ She described her anger and her beliefs about the 
situation  
 
“And I was working with a couple of my colleagues, and one of 
them was the overall leader of the project. Now, I had quite clearly 
said to her that things were fine, but I was obviously on a learning 
curve cause I had been out for three or four months, and so I 
would need plenty of support and that I would tell her when I was 
not ok about things. So she let me Motor along, and we motored 
along, and things didn’t move as fast as they could. And she was 
very critical of me. And I felt quite unfairly because I had actually 
said to her that I wanted help and support, and I knew I needed it, 
and I didn’t think I could be much more plain than that. And 
basically, she’d let me run but apparently I was not fast enough. I 
just thought that was really unfair, so I just told her. I told her, 
because I don’t believe in lidding things up. And she wasn’t overly 
impressed with that.” 
 Daniela 
 
Evaluative Beliefs – The passage illustrates that in anger the general belief 
formed was that change was fast and this was unfair. At a specific level she remarked 
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‘So she let me Motor along, and we motored along, and things didn’t move as fast as 
they could… she’d let me run but apparently I was not fast enough. I just thought that 
was really unfair. She believed that the situation was unfair because she could not keep 
up and did not receive support either. In anger Daniela explained that she believed the 
leader was ‘an unfair person.’ Analysis showed that immediacy was a feature of her 
beliefs.  
Immediacy- Recall the definition of immediacy as an emotional state that forms a 
belief portraying the world as magnified, closer and more likely. In Daniela’s case anger 
has formed beliefs of a general sort and a specific sort. This represents a leap or 
magnifying effect. In anger her general belief is that change was unfair because it was 
too fast (b5). The specific belief she forms is that change was too fast and in her job 
Daniela could not keep up because support was not provided (b6). The magnifying effect 
occurs when she goes further and forms the belief that the leader is an unfair person 
(b7). Thus a movement from b5 to b7 is a magnification in the sense that Daniela unduly 
generalizes. The team leader is believed to just be that sort of person no matter what 
situation arises. She sees things as they would not otherwise appear in a cold non-
emotional state. 
 
 
 
 
Immediacy manifests as a generalization whereby the incident specific belief 
leads to a larger belief that the team leader is just that sort of person (An unfair 
person).There is also an alternative explanation here. One argument is that Daniela has 
displayed immediacy by believing that the team leader is likely to be unfair because she 
b5 – Change is too fast and this makes it unfair 
b6 – Cannot keep up because support is not provided 
b7- Team leader is an unfair person 
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is an unfair sort of person. The key phrase here is ‘likely to be’. In anger if a person 
believes that somebody is an x type of person than they believe that that person is likely 
to behave how an x type of person would behave (i.e. unfairly). If the team leader was 
unfair in that incident than it follows that it is more likely that she will be unfair in other 
incidents because she is just that sort of person. This shows that in believing such things 
immediacy manifests as an increase in likelihood of a person as always a threatening 
sort of unfair person. This is a point suggested by Goldie (2002a) and by Elster (2009). 
The current thesis has found this contribution which will be further expounded in chapter 
six covering a discussion of contribution to knowledge.    
Reactive Beliefs – Goldie (2004) and Lazarus (1991) argue that in emotion, given 
an evaluative belief about the environment, the person will form a belief about how to 
react or cope. Adhering to this idea the research participants formed two types of 
reactive beliefs. One belief was about coping with the problem at hand (problem focused 
beliefs). In emotion the participant evaluated a problematic aspect of change. The 
aspect seemed a magnified problem. So a belief to react was formed. The second type 
of belief was about escaping out of emotional experience (emotion escape beliefs). 
Rather than a belief about coping with the problem the priority was on somehow 
escaping emotion.  
In Daniela’s example above, she formed a problem focused belief. During her 
time in the team Daniela believed that she received little support. She was angry 
because of beliefs B5 and b6 above. She also believed that the team leader was an 
angry sort of person (b7). In emotion this set of evaluations formed reactive beliefs. In 
this instance Daniela’s emotional sort of reasoning is that if the team leader was seen as 
unfair and not supportive then she was just that sort of person. Immediacy is the 
generalization to say ‘she is likely to do that because she is just that sort of person’. A 
person not experiencing emotion might not form this belief. In emotion, Daniela formed 
the belief that she has ‘to confront’. This was her reactive belief. She said: 
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so I just told her. I told her, because I don’t believe 
in lidding things up. And she wasn’t overly 
impressed with that.”    
 
Daniela’s reaction is an emotional one. The team leader does not seem 
impressed with it. However there seems some reasoning in her emotion. Before looking 
at this consider instead whether Daniela’s reaction can be seen as rational or not 
rational. Consider that a rational reaction is one that maximizes benefit and minimizes 
costs (Schick, 1997 p.32). In her anger Daniela decided to confront the team leader. 
One idea is that confrontation can develop into conflict. This can be non-beneficial 
because during organizational change conflict is a barrier (Ibarra and Pertiglieri, 2010). If 
non beneficial actions are not rational ones than Daniela’s belief to confront is not a 
rational reaction. From this viewpoint her reaction is not desirable; assuming that non-
rationality is not desirable and rationality is a desirable end.   
Alternatively one may review the emotional reasoning that Daniela seems to be 
reliant upon. She begins with the belief that change is too fast. Relative to this she 
cannot keep up and sees the team leader as responsible. Through immediacy she 
magnifies the problem by believing unduly that the team leader is just an unfair sort of 
person. Under this reasoning she forms a belief to confront the problem. From a 
rationality viewpoint this may seem wrong because conflict is a barrier to change. From 
her emotional viewpoint she is confronting as a way of coping with the problem or threat 
(i.e. the team leader). It is Daniela’s person goal of doing her job that faces this problem. 
This demonstrates a kind of reaction for survival where the worker in emotion prioritizes 
the personal goal of surviving change. 
Daniela’s case shows that anger involved evaluative and reactive beliefs. 
Change was seen as unfair by the research participants. Not being able to keep up with 
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change was frustrating and unfairness of this made participants angry. They formed two 
type’s beliefs about how to react. Daniela’s case has demonstrated that one type of 
belief is about confronting the problem inducing emotion. The other type of reactive 
belief is about escaping emotion. Alongside an analysis of certainty the section below 
will expound on this latter type of reactive belief.   
 
 
5.7 CERTAINTY – RICHARD’S CASE SHED LIGHT 
  
   A feature of beliefs explored in chapter two is ‘certainty.’ Emotion involves 
believing and grasping the world in a certain way (Goldie, 2002a p.18). The term 
certainty implies that a belief has a conviction attached to it. The fear of job loss involves 
believing that it is going to happen. The participants involved in research for the current 
thesis displayed certainty as having a specific meaning. One illustrative conversation 
took place between myself and Richard. This case was a good example because of the 
conviction attached to Richard’s emotions about change. He was not just inclined to 
believe but he believed in an absolute sense. This demonstrated the power of certainty 
attached to emotion and specifically to the beliefs held during that experience. Following 
Richard’s case I will also provide Emma’s emotional experience as another illustration. 
 
5.7.1 RICHARD AND CERTAINTY 
 
The particular incident that shed light on the presence of certainty in emotion was 
named “Anger and Intolerance at Meeting”. Moving in our conversation towards the 
second half of the interview Richard started talking about the plans of the change 
implementers. Chapter four reflected on Richards view of implementers. A meeting with 
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the implementers of change had happened and these implementers were brought from 
outside the network to fix things. He believed with some conviction that implementers did 
not know what they were doing. He explained that after the first meeting, which was 
presented in chapter four, another meeting had taken place and the implementers were 
in that meeting along with him. He was there as one of the key members and an expert 
on how the hospital network’s ran.  
Richard added he had years of experiencing under his belt when it came to 
managing the hospital environment. I asked what had occurred with the change 
implementers that had got him wound up. Richard described that “its was a bit of a joke.” 
He said that the implementers in his opinion had just come in and had little idea about 
how the network worked. They were making decisions and suggesting ideas that were 
never going to work. After listening for a while Richard explained that he had grown 
frustrated and was becoming agitated and almost angry. In his words he explained his 
understanding of what had happened. 
 
Richard: I think this was more informal everybody 
knew each other. It’s difficult. Well I think it’s trying to 
understand why they [the implementors] are 
concerned about something [the change] and 
perhaps acknowledge that they are a detailed 
person. They just get stuck in detail……people just 
going around circles in details.  
 
I asked Richard about this in more detail. And he added that he was ‘frustrated’ 
because he was sure they were wrong. They kept going around in circles. Now looking 
at his situation the conviction he had comes out to the extent that his belief in the 
wrongness of the other people was ‘too intense’. This came out more when I asked 
Richard 
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Researcher: So what about this these other people? 
You were going to say more?  
Richard: Well it’s about when somebody start going 
off at length off on a tangent. And they keep going. It 
just makes me think yeup that person has no 
clue……They would never know what to do. 
 
 
The certainty grows in this second passage. In anger his belief is intentional. It is 
about the wrong aspect of the behavior of others. As suggested by Goldie (2004) the 
individual here feeds on the object returning to its angering aspect. There is an absolute 
in his view. A certainty that ‘they have no clue’ and from here the further conviction that 
‘they would never know what to do’. This is not the likelihood or closeness of an object 
that one may find under immediacy. Richard’s conviction is an absolute evaluation. He 
entertains no other alternative or likelihoods. Ultimately Richards evaluation was that the 
move to bring implementers of change from outside the environment, who knew nothing 
about the environment, was “unfair on everybody at the network.” 
 Evaluative Beliefs – So I asked Richard “what did you do then?” He replied that in 
his conscience he had to do something. He was responsible and he could not allow 
wrong decisions to be made. In his power he could not say no to the implementers. He 
just sort of ignored or forgot about it as much as he could. In place he had generated the 
alternative belief that “But I have to learn to live with that. Because I think we all operate 
differently, don’t we”. This is suppressing beliefs that are generated in anger and can 
persist as an uncomfortable experience. Richards’s belief to look at the situation 
differently was really a reaction where the priority lies in escaping from the emotion and 
from its negativity. He just actively forgot the whole troubling and emotion inducing affair. 
His reactive belief is one that suppresses what is disturbing his mental life. In Richard’s 
perspective with a sense of certainty this is the right course to adopt. Certainty was 
potently visible in many of the cases and alongside there was a sense of unfairness (see 
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appendix 5.2 summary of incidents). Another case that illustrated certainty was Emma’s 
ordeal at the network. She shared an incident about unfairness. Having met Emma in my 
judgment she seemed like a timid person. The kind of worker who would just let others 
walk over her when push came to shove as it often might in times of organizational 
change. She seemed reserved and took time to open up. The first few minutes of the 
interview we sat there talking about the hospital and how her day had been busy. The 
incident was named “anger felt maligned over argument”. The incident had taken place 
recently and she seemed still effected by it. She explained  
 
“well there is one incident I can think of, very recently, and 
obviously it’s very fresh in my mind, where we had, we were in a 
sort of group meeting, and, there were very clearly huge 
differences of opinion around some change proposals, some 
recommendations around interpretations, around what they 
meant. ….the meeting ended up with sort of quite a heated 
argument Aaahhmmmmm, mainly between a colleague from 
another network and myself. She was one of the restructuring 
people.” 
 
The passage demonstrates a difference in interpretation about how change ought 
to be implemented. This difference was between Emma and another person who was a 
change implementer. Again the danger here is that seeing the other as a change 
implementer instills at the outset a mistrust of the other colleague. The context of change 
explained in the previous chapter is one of lack of knowledge and uncertainty about 
where this is all headed. A difference in interpretation of proposals would naturally in 
commonsense psychology lead to an emotional response and usually one of anger. A 
difference in interpretation can lead to anger (Allcorn, 1994). In this case during the 
meeting Emma explained that the argument had heated up very fast and her anger had 
come over her eyes like a red mist of negativity. I asked her to explain how it all appeared  
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Researcher: So in your anger you thought?  
Emma: The aaaaa well no, in my opinion I felt that this person had 
misinterpreted what had come out of a consultation [about 
change]. The network is going through a major review. We had 
some proposals that were consulted on and then there is a paper 
which came out with a response to the consultation. And the 
structures in the response paper had been slightly altered. As you 
would expect through the feedback received from our meeting 
[consultation]. And the structure were slightly different and this 
person didn’t agree with the fact that they should be different. And 
he was trying to hang on to the structures from the original 
document. And we Ended up having a heated discussion just like 
that. 
 
     
 Evaluative beliefs - Analysis shows there are two conflicting certainties. Both 
Emma and this other person become angry in the meeting. Their certainties about their 
preferences over structures that should be in place to facilitate change are conflicting. 
This turns into an argument. The evaluation by Emma is essentially emotional. In her 
anger she felt that this person had misinterpreted the proposals. Her feeling is intentional. 
It is directed at the incident and more specifically at the colleague’s refusal to accept the 
proposal. More than that this is what Goldie (2002.p.19) calls “thinking of with feeling”. 
Emma’s evaluation is not purely feeling. It is feeling drenched believing in the incident. 
For example she is not feeling without thinking. Her feeling about this other person’s 
wrongness involves many beliefs. These beliefs are of an absolute sort formed during 
anger. Emma believed that her opinion was the right one. She believed that the other 
person was just ‘stubborn’. Her behavior is similar to what was seen during immediacy. 
Earlier looking at immediacy we saw the tendency to generalize from an action performed 
by Daniela’s team leader to the belief that the team leader is just that sort of person. 
Similarly Emma in the current incident believes not just in her heated argument with her 
colleague as wrongness on her colleague’s part. She also forms the general belief that 
the colleague is a stubborn sort of person. Her belief is absolute. There is an emotional 
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certainty in her words. Emma’s reasoning may be understood as follows: Evaluation y is 
reached as an emotional certainty when it involves other evaluative beliefs y1, y2, 
y3,..….yn. In anger, one forms the belief (y) that she is a stubborn sort of person. This 
absolute certainty is reached using other beliefs like (y1) his preference is wrong, (y2) he 
misinterpreted the report, (y3) he is hanging on to the older structures - and so on. The 
logic here demonstrates an emotional sort of certainty that was present in all of the 
incidents.    
 Reactive Belief - In the days following the meeting, a senior manager from the 
network approached Emma. In a counseling manner the manager had a word with Emma 
advising her about her emotional reaction and suggesting that she learn to work with 
other colleagues. Emma believed that the manager was wrong and it was not her fault. 
She told me that it was unfair how she was blamed when her preference for the new 
refined report in the meeting was certainly the right choice. I asked Emma about how she 
coped with the situation. In the meeting with the manger her anger had flared up again. 
She had generated a belief to suppress. Rather than a belief that addresses the problem 
Emma had given up and mentally suppressed the whole event. This is categorized as 
one of the emotion escape beliefs generated by the participants. In suppressing 
emotional beliefs the individual prioritizes an escape from the emotional experience itself. 
The experience provides a sense of lack of control and uneasiness. Emma said she just 
actively suppressed the event.  
 Emma’s experience illustrates a few ideas. Her emotion formed both 
evaluative and reactive beliefs. Her anger was about the disagreement she had with a 
colleague. She believed with certainty that the colleague was wrong. In her anger she 
was then approached by a manager. She reacted by forming the belief to forget and 
suppress her terrible experience. Compared to Daniela’s case which illustrated 
immediacy and formed the belief to cope with the emotion inducing problem; for Daniela 
the way forward was to escape emotion by suppressing the whole event.  
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 This section looked at certainty and presented the experiences of Richard and 
Emma. There is reasoning in emotional experience whereby an absolute certainty 
emerges in believing things about one’s environment. Overall the three themes were 
features that emerged through data analysis. Their presence had been hypothesized.  
However, all three themes as a part of emotional experience have not been explored in 
organization research. This research contribution is expounded in chapter six.   
   
5.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
 
The current chapter addressed research objectives three and four. Conclusively 
the research findings show that participants went through emotional experiences 
whereby they formed beliefs about the unfairness of the change process. The people 
implementing change and the processes of change were seen as undesirable mainly 
because the impact on job tasks was either not known or seen as a threat. This was 
based on thinking that involved congruence, immediacy, and certainty. All of these 
features resonated in the experiences of the workers. Chapter six will review the findings 
and how these contribute to the body of literature that was reviewed in the first two 
chapters. It will also address objective 3 and present a model that coherently brings 
together research findings.   
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION  
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The current chapter discusses the findings of this thesis. The findings presented 
in the previous two chapters are reviewed and interpreted in terms of their theoretical 
importance in the field. From a general viewpoint, this provides an answer to the 
research question established in the first two chapters. The question is; how is emotion 
experienced by workers involved in organizational change? Research on emotion has 
posed this question in two ways. On the one hand there has been a focus on the 
external environments and how external forces of change influence emotion form the 
outside. From this viewpoint, emotional experience is largely a socially constructed 
experience shared by members of a community (Berger and Luckman, 1967). On the 
other hand, research has examined the internal workings of emotion as a mental 
process. This second option is about how the mind of the emotional person may play out 
(for instance, consider the experience of being afraid and the mental processes 
involved). Though social labeling and the interactions and recognition of emotion 
represent one research possibility, the current thesis maintains an onus on the latter 
approach. There is room to develop ideas here (Klarner et al, 2011).  
This chapter presents a few findings and discusses how they relate to theory. The first 
finding identifies the implications of emotion for change management. This demonstrates 
the importance of emotion in managing change. The second finding identifies 
intentionality as a core component of emotion. This component defines emotion as 
directed at change and the related micro processes. The third finding introduces 
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frustration-as-feeling. This extends the idea of intentionality by using it to distinguish 
emotion and feelings. The fourth finding identifies and discusses beliefs and feelings 
formed during emotion. In latter parts, a model of emotion in change is provided (figure 
6.1). It synthesizes the discussed findings into a coherrent whole and provides a fresh 
perspective for thinking about emotion. The findings were generated through qualitative 
research and rather than acting as prescriptions, they are descriptions that illustrate 
experiences of research participants. The extent to which they are applicable in other 
organizations is a question addressed in chapter eight, where issues of generalizability 
are covered. The discussed findings provide ideas that may help understand the 
reactions of emotional workers during change.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
6.1.1. THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMOTION FOR CHANGE MANAGEMENT (ADDRESSING 
OBJECTIVE ONE) 
 
Management at the top of the organisation sometimes reacts to external changes in the 
environment. This includes economic or social trends that require change practices 
within the organisation (Amiot, et al, 2006). In organisation change, a key resource that 
requires careful management is the worker. In particular, change is met with groups of 
workers with their own agendas and interests. In such situations, conflict and emotions 
can arise (Fineman, 2003 p.120-127). The environment of change is an emotional mess, 
and it is the management’s responsibility to facilitate employees in coping with changes 
(FIneman, 2003; Huy, 2002).      
Fineman (2003 p.130) writes “Change is about feelings and emotion and changing is 
itself often emotional”. That is, as a process, change impacts workplace relationships 
and interests. One widespread reaction to change is negative emotion such as fear or 
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anger (Klarner et al, 2011). Thus, emotion is one implication of change. Following on 
from this, the current thesis proposed objective one, which considers what might be the 
implication of emotion in change. It states: to explore the implications of workers’ 
emotional experiences for change management. Given the common reaction of anger, 
fear or even sadness, the worker in that experience sees change as a threat to his or her 
welfare (Ford et al, 2008; Del Val and Fuentes, 2003). This perception can be found 
throughout the hierarchy, particularly in the lower levels, where workers often do not 
understand the change programs or the reason for change (Jones et al, 2008; Lindblom, 
2004). Seeing change as a threat, the worker may deliberate in fear the possible 
adverse consequences for her job prospects. This deliberation may cascade towards 
thoughts of what all this sudden change means for personal life and family (Elving, 
2005). Often, the reason is poor communication by top management (Maitilis and 
Sonensheim, 2010). There might be fear or anger about change initiatives that are 
simply not understood. Employees may resist because they do not believe in change 
(Ford et al, 2008; Lines, 2004; Spiker, 1994; Sutton and Kahn, 1987). In putting up 
resistance, workers may ridicule and thwart change initiatives and programs (Lines, 
2005). Resistance might come from those who share a sense of personal loss when it 
comes to their former job tasks and routines (Burke Lake and Paine, 2008). Resistance 
is a cost and a source of delay in implementing change (Del Val and Fuentes, 2003).   
Overall, the literature shows that negative emotional experiences of workers 
include a sense of threat of the unknown. Change is a movement from the known 
towards the unknown (Bovey and Hede, 2001). This suggests that change will be difficult 
to manage because worker emotions are not easy to discern and manage. Worker 
emotions are covert forms of resistance to change and this makes managing them 
difficult. Emotions can reduce the willingness of workers to participate in programs 
designed to manage the transition of the organization from some former to a latter state. 
This can be a hindrance since worker participation is a key factor in successful change 
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management (Bovey and Hede, 2001; Erwin and Garman, 2010). From a critical 
viewpoint, change literature has not focused enough on the individual workers mental 
mechanisms and how components at this level can generate emotional reactions 
(Klarner et al, 2011). This remains the case despite the recognition placed by previous 
studies on mental resistance in the form of emotional reactions (Oreg, 2006; Erwin and 
Garman, 2010). To contribute to this body of literature, the current thesis drew on the 
argument by Klarner et al (2011) that providing a perspective from the inner workings of 
the individual’s emotional experience is an opportunity that has not been sufficiently 
explored. By gauging the participant’s emotional experiences, the current thesis 
proposes two implications for change management. The first implication involves the 
perceptions of change at the hospital which were formed by emotional participants. 
There were two types of perceptions to do with the long term and the short term.  
 
First, change was perceived as a long term failure. In anger, change implementers were 
seen as incompetent and participants felt marginalized. Anger meant change was not 
supported. Some of this is already documented in literature (see; Maitilis and 
Sonenshein, 2010; Elving, 2005). What the current thesis further suggests is that anger 
and the thoughts involved in emotion kept the workers at the NHS from trying to 
recourse to some other viewpoint that might facilitate change through active 
participation. Emotion blockaded them. This demonstrates that emotion is a valuable 
form of resistance to change. Successful management of change involves the 
successful recognition of emotion and the carrying out of practices aimed at addressing 
counterproductive emotions. This confirms Klarner et al’s (2011) argument that 
managing emotion during change is a priority on the research agenda. Secondly, in the 
short term, participants saw change as a constant pressure on their job tasks. There was 
frustration and fear about whether jobs would be around the next day. Change was an 
unknown variable. Overall, the perceptions were negative. This poses a hindrance to 
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change. The current thesis finds that managing change would need to address the 
hindrance cause by the formation of such emotions and related perceptions.  
 
The second implication is that emotional participants felt uncertainty. Klarner et al (2011) 
note that during change, emotions may involve uncertainty and this may influence 
sense-making by workers involved in change. The current thesis confirms this idea and 
finds that participants were afraid of change and they were uncertain about change due 
to lack of information about how their job role would be impacted. The current thesis 
found that emotion coupled with uncertainty meant that participants paid attention to the 
negative things that might happen and displayed concerns with job security. It is 
documented in the organization literature that a negative state such as fear or anger 
may lead to negative construal and a focus on harmful aspects of change. This 
demonstrates the impact of emotion on the personal sense-making of organizational 
change (Maitilis and Sonenshein, 2010; Fineman, 2003 p.91-101). The current thesis 
found that such fear and uncertainty coupled together meant that only negative 
anticipations such as job loss and failure of change were formed by participants.  
 
The above two implications for change management found by this thesis are that anger 
and fear gave rise to ‘negative perceptions of change as failure’ and ‘uncertainty about 
change’. These acted as hindrances. In other words, emotion was a barrier to successful 
change implementation. Essentially, the human element of change was not recognized 
and processed. The NHS did not manage employee emotions. Methods for this are 
proposed in chapter eight, where practical suggestions are made based on the findings 
of the current study on emotion during organizational change. 
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6.1.1. THE PRESENCE OF INTENTIONALITY (ADDRESSING OBJECTIVE TWO) 
 
The second finding proposes the concept of intentionality. The finding addresses 
research objective two, which is to explore the presence of intentionality within emotional 
experience of workers involved in change. Most organization research on emotion has 
ignored the concept of intentionality. Perhaps this is because most research has not 
explicitly defined emotion (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). Were research to define 
emotion, then not addressing intentionality would seem odd. The reason is that in 
determining whether emotion is about something or not, (i.e. intentionality) one already 
develops a definition of emotion. This basic rule has been observed by philosophical and 
cognitive theories of emotion and extends back to Aristotle (2001) and it is still a 
contemporary concern in research circles outside organizational change literature 
(Goldie, 2002b; 2004; Tye, 2008).   
In the wider scheme of things, to some extent, research on organizations has explored 
intentionality with respect to corporate identity and morals (Ashman, 2008). In the sub-
area of organizational change, Klarner et al (2011) argue that the Lazarus theory 
provides an opportunity for understanding emotion. Lazarus (1991p.89) argues that 
intentionality is a central component of emotion. His descriptions portray emotion as a 
mental state that is always about things one experiences. The current thesis confirms 
this assertion through empirical research in an organizational change context. The 
participants that took part in research for the current thesis worked at the network where 
indeed they experienced emotions about things – people and processes involved in the 
planning and implementation of change. The presence of intentionality opens a new 
concept for exploration in organizational change research on emotion. Perhaps because 
of its overtness, other studies have not considered this concept explicitly as an area for 
research.      
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Proposing intentionality means addressing two fundamental arguments. One argument 
is that intentionality is a feature of emotion (Ashman, 2008). The counter argument is 
that intentionality may not always occur as a feature of emotion (Montague, 2009; 
Solomon, 1973). This continues as an open debate; however, in organization research 
and organizational change literature, this is a new concept and thus a new debate. 
Lazarus (1991) does not question intentionality as rigorously as Goldie (2002a, 2004) 
does. Lazarus (1991) only suggests that intentionality is necessary by virtue of the idea 
that emotion is always directed at self or others. Looking at intentionality in more detail, 
Goldie (2002a.p16) aims to determine whether intentionality, in so far as it is present, 
exhibits the transient nature of emotion. Much of organization research sees emotion 
without explicating this point. Klarner et al (2011) argue that the transient nature of 
emotion as a process in change has been somewhat ignored.  
The current thesis argues in section (4.5.1) that intentionality was present and provided 
emotion with a quality that I termed ‘groundedness in change’. This term means that 
emotion unfolded for participants as ‘continuously about something that perpetuated fear 
and anger’. In this sense, emotion was similar to Goldie’s (2002a) grasp of it as ‘in 
transience’. Analysis showed that emotion feeds on the environment of organizational 
change, continuously focusing the attention of the observer on emotion inducing 
aspects. Take the example of Penny. She was a team member at the hospital and her 
emotional experiences were a continuous struggle against the management. She 
explained that even when she was not actively conjuring up an emotional incident she 
could feel the resonance of those experiences. Additionally, when she conjured up an 
incident, it was a process of shifting attention from one aspect of the angering incident to 
another. Consider Rachel’s incident “Seeing the change proposals concerned with fear”. 
This incident illustrates change as a threat and a process of fear directed at what-If 
scenarios. Facing the unknown upon hearing about the change proposals, Rachel 
thought about change and its different faces. Her attention shifted from one threatening 
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aspect to another. Her fear was about job security and this shifted to other things like 
exclusion from change and fear of what might happen if she loses her position. Fear is a 
process of unfolding possibilities to do with change. The process consists of fearing 
things about change and it is in this sense grounded in the environment as always about 
things in the environment. It is a continuous shift from one aspect to another. Emotion is 
a not static; rather, it is a process.  At a more general level, this also means that emotion 
feeds upon things that may not necessarily be a part of organizational change. The 
worker may be emotional about things encountered in every job tasks. Therefore, 
intentionality is applicable more generally as a part of emotional experience found both 
within and outside organizational change.  
The current thesis therefore portrays emotion as process. This in part addresses Klarner 
et al’s (2011.p.335) argument that literature “requires a definition of emotion as a 
process” because it is too often seen as a static thing. The current thesis argues that 
intentionality provides such a lever that grounds emotion within change; continuously 
shifting attention from one emotion inducing aspect to related ones. Emotion is change 
within an environment of change. This is a new way of thinking about emotion and 
presents scope for exploration by future studies of emotion in workplace experiences 
(i.e. emotion work). The tripartite model presented in section 6.3 places intentionality at 
the center of emotional experience. The section where the model is presented picks up 
on emotion as groundedness in change and argues that intentionality is a central 
concern that must be addressed in emotion research. This view is espoused by Lazarus 
(1991) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984), who see intentionality as a central component 
of emotion.  
The counter argument is that intentionality is not a necessary component of every 
emotion. Searle (1983) proposes that whilst emotions like fear are clearly about things in 
one’s experience, there are also other mental experiences such as anxiety or sudden 
elation that are not about things. That is, they are not intentional emotions (Searle, 1983; 
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Solomon, 1973). For instance, elation is just a sudden experience not about anything in 
particular. Contrary to this, as Goldie (2000) and Solomon (1977) have noted, emotion 
involves judgments and as such they must always be about things. This remains fertile 
territory for exploration. A study that explores the necessity of intentionality in emotion 
can only do so by including and addressing the concept of intentionality in research. In 
addressing Klarner et al’s (2011) call to research, the current thesis has found 
intentionality as a central component of the emotional experiences of workers involved in 
change.   
 
6.1.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FRUSTRATION 
  
The second concept found in relation to intentionality was ‘feeling’. Referring to 
employee ability to cope with change, Saunders and Thornhill (2002) argue that 
employees often feel uncertain and insecure during organizational change projects. In 
this sense, feeling as a component of emotion alongside intentionality does manifest 
during change. However, it is not clear how feeling is defined in relation to emotion in 
change. Within the wider organization research literature, the notion of feeling is not 
clearly defined with respect to employee emotion (Gooty et al, 2009; Ashman, 2008). 
The terms ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’ are often used interchangeably and without any care. 
However, such complacence may be avoided within organizational change literature. 
Lazarus (1991) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984) define feeling as a state with a 
subjective quality. The appraisal framework that asserts the onset and persistence of 
emotion as a result of appraising one’s environment is by this very fact dependent on 
subjective evaluations. At this level, feeling must then be involved as a part of subjective 
evaluations directed towards the appraised object in the environment. With a similar 
emphasis on the subjective sense of the world, Solomon (2007, 1973) defines feeling as 
a sense of ‘I’ situated in the world. Fineman (2005. p.100) argues that “long before there 
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was thought, there was feeling, and we are all primarily feeling beings.” The ‘I’ of feeling 
is primary compared to analytical thinking or evaluations involved in emotion.   
The participants working at the network showed this sense of ‘I’ as a central part of 
every emotional experience. The experiences revolved around the role of ‘I’ in becoming 
angry or afraid. One of the participants (Susan) made a remark that resonated with the 
way in which the other participants spoke about feelings. Referring to how she felt 
uneasy and afraid in a change context, she remarked “it’s just a feeling you know”. This 
captures the non-analytical and primary essence of feeling. Where participants spoke 
about feeling, they used the word ‘frustration’. Goldie (2002a.p.150) suggests that 
frustration is a feeling brought about as a part of anger. It is not defined as an emotion 
and instead it is a less specific experience. He explains that frustration is the individual’s 
sense of inability to influence a situation. It is an ‘emotional feeling’ that is part of the 
emotional experience (Goldie, 2002a.p56.). There are two separate points here that the 
current thesis addresses. The first point is that frustration is related to emotion. 
Demonstrating frustration, the participants felt inability during their emotional 
experiences. In a change context of uncertainty and negativity, there was frustration at 
one’s inability to stop the change – perceived as a threat.  
Feeling thus seems directed or intentional in so far as it is about change and related 
initiatives and programs. The second point is that Goldie (2002a) hypothesizes 
frustration as emotional feeling. That is, emotion has feeling flowing through it. The 
current thesis shows a link between the two and expounds this through empirical 
research. Data analysis shows that feeling and emotion are related through the concept 
of intentionality. The finding here is to take these three concepts and organize them such 
that the participants feeling of frustration turned to anger only upon attention being 
directed towards change process or some person. Goldie (2002a) as well as Klarner et 
al (2011) in change management have not made this distinction. Seemingly, this is a 
binding of the three concepts - frustration as feeling-intentionality-emotion. As Goldie 
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(2002a.p.57) suggests, feeling, when seen as part of emotion, involves apprehension 
and the current thesis argues that this means feelings enter into emotion upon attention 
being directed towards something (i.e. intentionality).  Feeling towards whether it is 
frustration or another feeling seems to bring about emotion. This partially shows that 
feelings can have some information value as suggested by Goldie (2004). This finding in 
the current thesis does not claim that feeling is reducible to emotion. As Goldie (2002b) 
argues, one does not need to take a reductionist approach because the danger is that 
analytical necessity can impoverish the emotional experience of its holistic nature. 
Overly analytical approaches can rob emotion of its lived complexity and richness.  
The above sections addressed objective two. To some extent, in addressing ‘feeling’ 
objective three was also addressed, although the latter is primarily addressed in the next 
section. Overall, it was found that emotional experiences at the network involved 
intentionality and feelings. Primarily based on theoretical conjectures by Lazarus (1991) 
and Goldie (2002a, 2002c), the current thesis found empirical evidence of intentionality. 
This appears as new knowledge in organizational change literature. The first finding 
shows that emotion involves intentionality in a change context. This defines emotion as a 
transient experience or a process. Secondly, data analysis found that frustration turns to 
anger through intentionality. That is, the feeling of frustration turned to anger upon 
attribution of blame towards some change process. For these findings, the fundamental 
assumption is that emotion involves both intentionality and feelings. An assumption that 
is reasonable in the context of reviewed literature. The tripartite model of emotion in 
section 6.3 draws on both components required for understanding emotional 
experiences of workers. The model will include intentionality and feelings as components 
of emotional experience. 
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6.2 EMOTION, BELIEFS AND FEELINGS 
 
Having established that emotion involves intentionality, the current section discusses the 
findings that address research objective three, that is – To investigate the relationships 
between intentionality, beliefs and feelings. The literature reviewed in early chapters 
demonstrated that organization research has shaped two separate research streams. In 
one stream, beliefs (i.e. rational statements or assertions) are employed to understand 
worker behavior. In the other stream, which has gained momentum since the 1990’s, 
emotion has garnered attention (Ashforth and Humphreys, 2011; Hartel et al, 2005). In 
this latter stream, feeling has gained limited attention (Gooty et al, 2009), and the notion 
of intentionality has been next to non-existent with a few exceptions (see Ashman, 
2008).   
By contrast, cognitive theories, many of which inform organizational literature, provide 
accounts that relate emotion with beliefs, and implicitly rely on intentionality. Generally, 
cognitive theories have portrayed a belief as either an antecedent to emotion or as a 
consequence of emotion (Scherer, 2001). There remains a third focus that has not 
received a lot of attention and this is where the current section places its findings in 
examining objective three. That is, to consider how emotion forms beliefs. On this front 
Goldie (2002a, 2002c, 2004) argues that our knowledge of how emotion involves 
intentionality, beliefs, and feelings remains - to speak analogically - a house still under 
construction. Several theories have ignored this issue. Goldie and Spicer (2002) critically 
argue that studies which have considered emotion formed beliefs, attempt to reduce 
emotion to a set of beliefs (Lyons, 1993; Ortony et al, 1988; Solomon, 1977; Taylor, 
1976; Scruton, 1971; Kenny, 1963). Though intentionality and beliefs are considered by 
these studies, Goldie (2002a) argues that they tend to reason away the emotion.  
In the organizational change literature, the significance of intentionality is implicitly 
proposed by Klarner et al (2011). As stated earlier, their candidate for a promising theory 
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of ‘emotion in change’ is the Lazarus theory. This theory relies on intentionality as a 
central component. Findings in section 6.1.1 showed that indeed intentionality was a 
central component of emotion. Lazarus (1991) also relates intentionality with beliefs. 
This is where findings of the current section integrate. The Lazarus theory based on 
earlier work in Smith and Lazarus (1984) provides a two part description of emotion. The 
first part involves recognizing and evaluating emotion inducing events as harmful or 
beneficial (the person forms evaluative beliefs). The second part involves forming 
reactions to cope with the events (the person forms reactive beliefs).  
The current thesis found that emotional workers in organizational change formed 
evaluative beliefs and two types of reactive beliefs (see appendix 5 for incident 
summaries). Their evaluative beliefs portrayed change processes as unfair. They 
believed they were left out of change. They were angry and afraid of the consequences. 
Adjacent to this, two types of reactive beliefs were held to cope with such unfairness. On 
the one hand, they believed in overt confrontation with the unfair situations. On the other 
hand, they believed in prioritizing escape from their emotion and from thoughts about the 
unfairness they had endured. This was either by suppressing the troubling beliefs (i.e. I 
just forced myself to forget about it) or by forming alternative evaluations that made the 
situation more acceptable (i.e. I choose to see it another way and not necessarily as 
unfair). These findings mean that the Lazarus theory, to some extent, applies to 
individuals involved in change. It can be used to understand worker reactions.  
The current thesis adds the idea that in addition to evaluative beliefs suggested by 
Lazarus, the worker also forms two types of reactive beliefs presented above. The 
reactive beliefs were about either coping by confronting and resisting change, or by 
going along with it. Prior studies show that negative emotions involve beliefs about 
resistance (Klarner et al, 2011; Ford et al, 2008; Lines, 2004). Anger may reflect the 
worker’s failure to adapt to change and give rise to beliefs of retaliation (Spiker, 1994). 
The current findings confirm such resistance; however, the difference is that current 
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findings also show that a worker can suppress or re-interpret a situation and this is an 
effort to go along with change. In other words, negative emotion can lead a worker to 
cope with change by going along with it and not just by offering resistance. For instance, 
generating a belief to re-interpret a situation and hence escape some negative emotion 
represents a positive reaction in so far as this facilitates change. Knowledge on this front 
is important because individual coping strategies of workers ultimately shape the 
outcome of change in organizations (Paterson and Hartel, 2002). 
A third component of emotion is ‘feeling’. Earlier sections presented frustration as feeling 
and data suggested that this turns to an emotion through intentionality; an idea that 
somewhat provides a distinction between feeling and emotion, which is lacking in the 
literature (Gooty et al, 2009). The current section discusses findings supporting the idea 
that ‘feeling towards’ others enables an evaluation of their importance in ‘my’ life 
situations. A feeling towards others portraying them as unfair enabled the worker to 
believe with certainty in their blameworthiness (see chapter four Penny’s case, chapter 
five Rachel and Emma’s cases).  
In organisational change literature one of the limits of the Klarner et al (2011) study - 
which supports the current thesis - is that it does not clarify what the term ‘feeling’ 
means. The term is used loosely and synonymously with emotion.  Fineman 
(2003.p.100-101) suggests that a feeling is an indication of one’s bodily state and 
Lazarus (1991) provides a very similar idea of the ‘I’. Historically, this idea also 
resonates in earlier work by James (1957). Based on Damasio (1995), Fineman (2003) 
also proposes that a feeling might tell us something about our position in our 
environment. This is closer to the study by Goldie (2004), who proposes that a feeling is 
a way of attaining general knowledge of one’s surroundings. It is a general indicator that 
a situation is favorable or harmful to interests. Findings in the current thesis suggest that 
this view is likely to be a good explanation of feelings. In so far as feeling is a general 
type of knowledge, it is certainly an instance of intentionality. Findings show that workers 
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at the NHS hospital knew about change as something that feels good or bad in relation 
to their jobs. In both cases, there is ‘feeling towards’. There was no rational clean cut 
explanation and instead it is just a feeling. For instance a participant remarked “I feel that 
it is wrong to treat us like this. You feel that you did everything and then this happens 
and you feel terrible, like an outsider.” This sentence contains feelings directed at 
change aspects where the participant places herself as a victim on the outside of 
change. The participant feels her position in relation to change. A second example is 
another illustrative remark by a participant “I am not sure, I don’t know, I don’t know, 
what you think? Do you understand, you know what I mean…it’s hard to sort of place it 
in my head”. The participant feels something but she has no clear rationale or logical 
statement. This supports the argument by Goldie (2004) that feeling is some form of 
knowledge. Traces of this argument can be found in across disciplinary spheres ranging 
from philosophy to psychology (Tye, 2008; Slovic et al, 2007; Goldie, 2004; Searle, 
1983; Solomon, 1973; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). In organizational change 
literature this finding can be positioned under the call for research by Klarner et al (2011) 
who refer to Lazarus (1991, 1994, 2006) and Smith and Lazarus (1984). The latter 
studies propose intentionality as central to emotion and adding feeling toward as a form 
of knowing opens room for thinking about the distinction between emotion and feeling in 
a change context.           
The current section addressed objective three and discussed research findings. It was 
found that emotional experiences of participants demonstrated intentionality. This in turn 
was instantiated through their beliefs and feelings. The beliefs were directed at change 
and by contrast participant feelings were less cogent. They experienced ‘feeling toward’ 
as a guide to the change environment. The discussion so far builds a picture of emotion 
as a continuous experience (i.e. process) with intentionality at the core, which is 
instantiated through beliefs and feelings about change. Emotion is change within a 
change context. From the viewpoint of organizational change literature, this introduces 
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ideas that answer the call to research by Klarner et al (2011) aimed at arguments by 
Lazarus (1991). Further data analysis indicated additional components, which arose 
during emotional experiences of the participants. The following section explores their 
relevance to research objective four and related arguments.  
 
 
6.2.1 CONGRUENCE, IMMEDIACY AND CERTAINTY 
 
Following the discussion of intentionality, beliefs, and feelings, findings also indicate the 
presence of three other components, namely, congruence, immediacy, and certainty. 
Exploring this further, the current section addresses objective four, that is; to determine 
the relationship of beliefs and feelings with components of congruence, immediacy, and 
certainty. The components have received some attention in emotion research. In the 
context of organizational change, they provide a fresh understanding of how emotional 
experiences of workers develop. This further adds to our picture of the mental working of 
emotion in a context of change.      
 
6.2.2 THE PRESENCE OF CONGRUENCE 
  
Research findings of the current thesis suggested the presence of congruence. The idea 
of congruence is rooted in cognitive research. It was in the early 1980’s that theories 
proposed that emotional states of individuals form beliefs that agree with each other. In 
other words, an angry person forms beliefs that validate his anger and make him angrier. 
Several studies have represented congruence (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Scherer, 
1987; Ortony et al, 1988; Bower and Forgas, 2001; Fiedler, 2001; Ekman, 2004; Clore 
and Huntsinger, 2007). Such theories provide a causation based explanation. One belief 
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is associated with others in a cause-effect schema. Secondly, the theories portray 
automatic activations of beliefs whereby emotion is largely an involuntary response 
(Smith and Kirby, 2001). These accounts leave out the qualitative experience of the 
worker. They leave out the way in which workers see change during emotion. Goldie 
(2002a, 2002b) notes that this robs emotion of what essentially makes it what it is – i.e. 
the quality of having lived the experience. In organization research, there has been 
some focus on the qualitative approach. Emotional labor studies examine how emotion 
involves an effort to manage evaluations (Martin et al, 2000; Ashforth and Tomiuk, 2000; 
Msiska et al, 2014). However, emotional labor studies have not explored congruence. 
Generally, in this research stream, the role of emotion in forming beliefs has not received 
attention.  
In organizational change literature if one employs the Lazarus (1991) theory, then it 
seems that emotion formed beliefs network together to build the view of the observer. 
For instance, beliefs that make the worker angry network close together to propagate the 
negative aspects of his experience. This etches close to work by Goldie (2002a) whose 
descriptions of emotion also illustrate congruence. Unfortunately, empirical evidence of 
congruence in a change context is lacking. Based on reviewed literature, there appears 
no qualitative study researching emotion and the emergence of congruence. The current 
study specifically found that congruence was present in emotional experiences shared 
by participants. 
Consider the example of Susan discussed in previous chapters. Her incident illustrates a 
progressively dismal view of her prospects at the hospital. The incident was named 
”Afraid of new role.” Susan had joined the network and change was taking place. During 
her first week, there was a meeting she attended. In the meeting she felt fear whilst the 
following sort of thoughts crawled in her mind - I felt afraid. What if I can’t do the job 
properly? There are so many things. And we are in the middle of change. What if I can’t 
make it through the probationary period? This might not work. And I can’t be out of a job. 
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The incident illustrates that connected thoughts or beliefs appear congruent and aimed 
towards the conclusion that is failure in her job and job loss. Lazarus (1991) proposes 
that such thoughts are involved in fear. Goldie (2004) also proposes that the 
development of thinking in a skewed manner towards fearful conclusions is symptomatic 
of fear. The current thesis found that in a change context, the participants experienced 
this process of thinking or believing in a skewed manner congruent with their emotions. 
The findings add the idea that coping with workers during organisational change requires 
awareness of congruence as a component of emotion.      
A worker with congruence in her thinking may come to a disabling point where one can 
imagine that she just freezes in fear. In organizational change, the worker may continue 
to focus on the negative side of things. The drive to participate or contribute to change 
may be crushed under paralyzing emotions and intense feelings. Studies looking at 
change and conflict may benefit from a consideration of congruence and how this is a 
part of emotional experiences and worker reactions. Klarner et al (2011) suggest that 
beliefs drive the emotional worker to participate or resist change. Congruence seems to 
be a component of emotion that may explain such behavior. One of the related 
arguments is that emotion forms reactive beliefs that can lead to lack of participation 
(Kiefer, 2002). It appears that congruent beliefs network together to illustrate a negative 
encounter that is associated with worker resentment. It was found that all of the 
participants in the current study resented change. Their beliefs were congruent towards 
anger or fear of change projects and reactive beliefs further isolated them from active 
involvement in change. Participant beliefs about unfair treatment presented in chapters 
four and five reflect the findings in several change studies (Saunder and Thornhill, 2002; 
Smollan, 2012). Congruence may lead to resistance or acceptance of change. If one 
accepts the binary view of emotion as negative or positive, and presumes that one is 
undesirable whilst the other is desirable, than it follows that congruence would involve 
inference to the best explanation that is either desirable or undesirable in a situation. 
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That is, in negative states like anger, the worker will increasingly see the situation as 
worsening. In a positive state, one would conversely see the situation as perhaps unduly 
optimistic (Clore and Huntsinger, 2007). This presents an area for further inquiry in 
relation to the role congruence plays as a factor underlying emotion and change coping 
efforts.   
 
6.2.3 THE PRESENCE OF IMMEDIACY 
 
Further data analysis revealed a second component of emotion termed ‘immediacy’. 
Literature reviewed in chapter two defined immediacy as a process whereby the object 
of the observer’s emotion seems closer or more likely than it otherwise would for non-
emotional observers (Elster, 2012; Sartre, 2006; Goldie, 2002a, Frijda and Mesquita, 
2000). Immediacy has been defined by Tappolet (2010 p.333) as a state of emotion (he 
refers to fear) underlined by the evaluation of a problem as a threat that is immediate. 
The philosopher Wild (2008 p.135) proposes that this involves an observer coming 
across what appears more noticeable and thus closer. Lazarus (1991 p.122) also 
hypothesizes that emotional observers view things as closer than they would appear to 
other observers. This sort of reaction has been hinted by Klarner et al (2011) in their 
assertion that emotional workers harbor beliefs of a sort not found in other workers. The 
implication is that in a change context, the worker in fear might perceive job loss as a 
close threat or possibility. Fineman et al (2005 p.19) associate this notion with what they 
call a sort of feeling knowledge. In other words, emotion formed beliefs are of a kind that 
portray things as closer and this comes with a feeling of imminence. Similar to 
congruence, the idea of immediacy is that it represents the process by which emotional 
workers develop beliefs alongside feelings. In general, from a research viewpoint, there 
is a lack of empirical evidence to explicitly indicate the presence of immediacy in 
management and in organisational change research on emotion.     
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Findings in the current thesis indicate that immediacy was indeed present in the 
emotional experiences of research participants (see chapter section 5.6 and 5.6.1). 
Looking at anger and fear, the findings show that participants formed beliefs that made 
change feel like an immediate and a big problem (see summaries in appendix 5.2). 
Consider the case of Susan. She explained how she anxiously experienced change as 
an immediate threat around the corner: “that process they talk about but we are just you 
know…. everybody is afraid……anything could happen and at any time I might be out of 
a job”. For all the participants, there was this feeling of anxiety. Analysis shows that the 
threat of change seemed ever more imminent for those who recalled being afraid or 
angry toward change initiatives and programs. Similarly, another example is the incident 
Daniela shared. She saw change people implementing change as an immediate threat 
to the healthy functioning of the network. She believed it was unfair. The implementers 
were a threat because Daniela saw them as just unfair sort of people. This 
generalization meant that dealing with such people day in and day out meant threat was 
closer than it otherwise might have been.   
Conclusively, based on data analysis, the current research found immediacy as a 
feature that belongs to beliefs formed during emotion. The impact on a worker involved 
in organizational change could mean that he or she over reacts because in their 
interpretation the threat or news of change is represented disproportionately or closer. In 
this regard, one might assert that emotional workers are more sensitive to change. In 
latter parts of this chapter, section 6.3 presents immediacy, where it forms a part of the 
tripartite model of emotion. Generally, past research has not focused on immediacy as a 
feature of emotion formed beliefs. In particular, reviewed literature on change has not 
addressed this issue. Perhaps this is evidence of Klarner et al (2011) assertion that 
mental components of emotion in change have been relatively ill researched. 
Conclusively, arguments by Lazarus (1991) and others like Goldie (2002a, 2004) and 
213 
 
Elster (2012) call for exploration of immediacy in emotion and this presents an 
opportunity for further research.  
 
6.2.4 THE PRESENCE OF CERTAINTY 
 
The third component of emotion to emerge through data analysis is termed ‘certainty’. 
Anyone who has experienced an emotion has experienced this sense of absolute 
conviction in what they perceive or imagine about something. An angry manager, 
contrary to evidence that suggests otherwise, may perceive a worker as incompetent. In 
anger, his certainty is unshakeable (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000).  
In emotion, this certainty is a strong conviction in the belief held by the worker. Research 
shows that an emotional person in the face of clear evidence which does not support his 
or her belief will often continue to blindly cling on to that belief. It is a blinding certainty 
found in the angry person’s sense of the world (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). This 
conviction is endemic of those who blindly followed what in hindsight seem like the 
ludicrous ideas of history. A study found that angry people are more likely to blame other 
people, rather than blame circumstances or blame themselves (Lerner and Tiedens, 
2006). A similar suggestion is made by Solomon (2007, p. 20) who argues that beliefs 
drenched with, for instance, feelings of anger or fear, are of a special sort. This is 
particularly the case in so far as the angry person believes strongly and certainly that he 
has been wronged by another person, and it is this feeling of certainty that can drive 
responses rather than some calculated rational plan to react.  The study by Lazarus 
(1991.p.91) suggests that in emotion, certainty is attached to our beliefs about how to 
react to our environment and other people. Specifically, he suggests that emotion may 
move us towards some goals. In the context of the current thesis, this implies that 
certainty may contribute to how one reacts in thinking about what one wants (goal 
achievement). Lazarus (1991) is not clear on the role of emotion formed beliefs 
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particularly with regard to whether certainty as a feature of beliefs moves a person to 
react to the environment whilst that person is emotional. Cummins (2006) suggests that 
anger moves one to construct a personal interpretation of a situation and this can 
provide beliefs about how to react given the personal interpretation that varies from 
person to person. However, certainty as a quality that resonates with beliefs formed 
during emotion is not clearly articulated in change literature.     
The current thesis discusses the findings that demonstrate how certainty was present in 
emotional experiences of participants (see table 5.1 and appendix 5.1). The findings 
from chapter five demonstrate that indeed research participants in emotion displayed a 
degree of certainty. They believed with conviction in the truthfulness of their accounts. 
For instance, the team manager Richard expressed his belief “They just don’t know what 
they are doing [about the people implementing change].” His ideas about change 
expressed an absolute conviction in his beliefs that he held in a state of anger. He also 
stated that “one feels the need to do something because of all the hard work that might 
go to waste”. Similarly, one of the administrators Emma spoke about her belief in the 
colleague assigned to lead a project she was working on and she said “They just do 
things and I am not sure why, I asked and she didn’t listen. It just is like that. [silence] 
Getting worse.”  
Data analysis showed that the emotional participants attached a strong sense of 
certainty to their view of things. They expressed an unflinching allegiance in their beliefs. 
The findings demonstrate this idea which has also been suggested in the literature by 
Fineman (2003.p.91). He has argued that emotionally charged beliefs can often take 
priority over any organizational notions of rationality. In other words, the participants in 
the current research might attach certainty to personal beliefs over and above any 
organizational rationality aimed at the smooth implementation of change.       
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The overall emotional sort of belief held by the research participants that they were 
treated unfairly by others who were to blame was not unclenching. This showed the 
presence of certainty as a feature of beliefs formed during emotion. The second related 
point is a suggestion rather than a contribution. Based on what is suggested by Lazarus, 
(1991 p.98-99) that in emotion, one believes in harm or benefit for what one cares about 
and thus moves towards achieving goals, the current thesis identifies a role ‘certainty’ 
might play. Consider that in emotion, the participants of my research believed with 
strong conviction in the unfair treatment they suffered. The beliefs held by participants, 
had they not been imbued with such conviction, would not call for the formation of beliefs 
to react with any sort of urgency. That is, if emotion forms beliefs that are high in 
certainty, then one may reason that this drives the person to react or cope with a 
problem more readily than if certainty was lacking. This is a mere suggestion for 
researchers wishing to further explore the Lazarus theory and utilize related ideas by 
Goldie (2004, 2002a, 2002b) that stand in line with call for research by Klarner et al 
(2011).     
 
 
6.3 THE TRIPARTITE MODEL OF EMOTION 
 
The above sections discussed several components of emotion in a change context. 
These include intentionality, beliefs, feelings, congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The 
discussion addressed the research objectives, elaborated several components in 
relation to theory, and to some extent, commented on their inter-relations. Building the 
picture further, the current section proposes a model of emotion to illustrate and 
expound how its components inter-relate and provide a way of thinking about emotion as 
mental process encompassed by the larger process of change. In the past, research has 
represented emotion through models (see Klarner et al, 2011; Kiefer, 2002; Huy, 2002). 
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The Cambridge dictionary defines a model as “something that represents another thing”. 
In other words, a model is an environment that is used to represent another 
environment. This provides the opportunity to represent emotion in two ways. On the 
one hand, emotion can be thought about through the different components involved in 
emotion. On the other hand, a model provides a holistic picture, which illuminates how 
components relate with each other as a dynamic system.  
The core assertion of the proposed model is that it involves intentionality. This sits at the 
heart of the model and it resonates in all of the components (see model in figure 6.1). 
Intentionality means that the person who is emotional is involved in the act of 
apprehending something as the basis of his or her emotion (Goldie, 2004; Lazarus, 
1994.1991; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). This may involve other components such as 
“believing in”, or “feeling towards”, which in turn, as argued in latter sections, can 
develop through components like “congruence”, situated in the outermost layer of the 
model. In this way, intentionality resonates through the components sectioned into 
layers. The main assertion of intentionality that underpins the model is influenced by 
Lazarus (1994, 1991) and Goldie (2004, 2002a), both of whom adopt the idea as a 
fundamental concern. Observing from a bird’s eye view, the proposed model illustrates 
intentionalit, and the components at three levels:  the core, the middle, and the 
peripheral level. In organizational change, models have implicitly built in the notion of 
intentionality (see Huy, 2002 model of emotional balancing). However, it is not explicitly 
recognized or addressed as a fundamental component in its own right. Addressed here, 
this represents a shortcoming of emotion research in organisation change literature.  
   
6.3.1 THE CHANGE CONTEXT: A PROCESS VIEW   
 
In the larger scheme of things, the model represents components as processes across 
its three concentric levels in figure 6.1. These are encompassed by the wider 
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organizational change process. From this viewpoint, intentionality represents the worker 
‘apprehending’ change aspects as angering, perhaps by ‘believing’ or ‘feeling’ something 
about them. The point here is that verbs like ‘apprehending’ depict emotion in the model 
as an ongoing process, or mental development of workers involved in change. In this 
instance, emotion involves the components intentionality, beliefs, and feelings – as 
processes. According to Klarner et al (2011), studies of emotion often tend to ignore this 
way of thinking. And most of the time, emotion is often viewed as a static frozen picture. 
The same criticism is levied by Goldie (2002a), who argues that emotion is always 
changing and descriptions should concede this idea.    
In earlier sections, findings suggested that the wider process of change at the hospital 
harbored the emotional experiences of participants, which were largely negative 
reactions. The way in which change was managed, or mismanaged, partly accounts for 
the negative reactions of anger and fear expressed by the participants. Their anger or 
fear was largely due to poor management of change. This included the perception that 
diminutive efforts were made by management to involve workers in change. There was 
also the perception that dissemination of information was badly handled. At an 
organizational change level, the emotions represent resistance towards such processes 
poorly designed to manage people through change. The workers shared a sense of 
being left behind. In this way, one can think about emotion, and in particular, about its 
components in the model, as micro processes resisting the macro process of change. 
From a management viewpoint, the tripartite model represents components that need to 
be recognized and engaged by workers and the management, so that change is 
administered effectively. Practical implications of this are further explored in the 
conclusion chapter.    
Finally, before moving on to explain how the model works, I want to visit some thoughts 
about the limits of the model. This will provide the opportunity to appreciate it from 
another viewpoint. Generally, according to Simon (1986) a model can be normative or 
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descriptive (Lopes et al, 2006; Smith and Kirby, 2001; Patterson and Hartel, 2002; 
Forgas, 1995; Simon, 1955). A normative model often involves quantitative analysis, and 
it acts as a prescription of how things should be. By contrast, a descriptive model is 
largely an illustration of what was found and how it appeared to work as a whole. The 
proposed model is an attempt to provide a descriptive explanation.   
Critical about the use of a model, Goldie and Spicer (2002) offer the argument that 
emotion is like the weather system, which is unpredictable because it never repeats 
itself. It is too complex and most analytical models are too simple. Therefore, models do 
not provide justice to such occurrences. Contrary to this, the proposed model is a guide 
to thinking about how emotion unfolds in a change context. Therefore, normative 
concerns levied by Goldie (2002), whilst valuable, do not impose a great limit. In favor of 
a model, Klarner et al (2011) have proposed that, whilst there are models of emotion 
(Kiefer, 2002; Huy, 2002); these do not illustrate emotion as a process. The proposed 
model with its components, specifically addresses this criticism.      
 
 
6.3.2 THE MODEL AND ITS COMPONENTS 
  
The tripartite model is illustrated in figure 6.1. It was inductively derived from analysis 
and interpretation of qualitative data collected through interviews. The innermost layer is 
the core and represents intentionality. The second middle layer consists of beliefs and 
feelings, as components that instantiate intentionality (that is, beliefs and feelings are 
directed at things). The third layer stands on the periphery and consists of congruence, 
immediacy, and certainty.  
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Figure 6.1 The Tripartite Model of Emotion 
 
Given its components, the model possesses a particular directionality. The oxford 
dictionary defines directionality as “having a particular direction of motion, progression, 
or orientation.” The model has an outward directionality and a circular directionality 
around the circumference. This means that the model is interpreted as initiating from the 
core layer towards the outer layers. At the outer layer, the three components are related.  
The workings of the model unfold whilst the individual is in the grip of emotion. The 
outward directionality relies on relations that exist between the components. The central 
assertion of the model, as mentioned earlier, is the existence of intentionality. Data 
analysis showed that in the 34 incidents, emotion was about something to do with 
change. The worker is not just angry, but he or she is angry about something, or at 
something to do with change. For example, in one of the emotional incidents that Emma, 
220 
 
one of the participants, shared with me, she had grown angry at unfair training 
programs. Her ‘anger at the programs’ was a process of shifting attention directed at 
different aspects of the program. This involved the formation of beliefs and feelings 
directed at, for instance, program administration, or the lack of involvement in designing 
the program. In anger, Emma’s shifting attention involves beliefs and feelings, and this 
represents a concentric move from the innermost core layer to the middle layer. This is a 
move from intentionality to the middle layer, where intentionality resonates through 
Emma’s beliefs and feelings about the change program and its aspects (see arrows in 
figure 6.1). Whilst Emma and others demonstrated intentionality, it was also found that 
this concept is a fundamental concern, not just for its presence, but for its possible 
absence as well. In other words, non-intentionality was also an idea that was entertained 
in chapter four. It was briefly found that some participants struggled to articulate what 
they felt frustration or fear towards. This throws into consideration the fundamentality of 
intentionality as a central part of emotion.      
In the middle layer, out of the two components, beliefs are more structured than feelings. 
A belief adopts the following form ‘x is acting in a manner that is of a y sort’. Here x is the 
person or the subject, and y is the unfair action performed (in Emma’s example the 
program development) also known as the predicate. So a belief has a subject and a 
predicate (see chapter five for examples). By contrast, feelings were raw and less 
structured. For instance, one participant remarked “It just feels wrong. It’s a feeling I 
have about what’s happening.” In her feeling, there is no clear subject or predicate. In 
this sense, it is unlike a belief. Conclusively, the middle layer contains two components, 
and both involve intentionality. The two reflect varying degrees of discernibility. That is, 
beliefs are more structured compared to feelings, which, as argued earlier in the chapter, 
provides a sort of general knowledge in a situation rather than specific detailed 
assertions. In the model, the two components in the middle layer develop and generate. 
So for instance, an angry individual’s belief is linked with other beliefs, as well as related 
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feelings. Such development is represented by the components in the third layer. These 
are congruence, immediacy, and certainty. To the extent that these are developments, 
one can think of them as processes.    
One of these is congruence. This is a mental process that forms beliefs consonant with 
the felt emotion and its theme (Lazarus, 1991; Fitness, 2000; Forgas and George, 2001). 
Findings show that angry participants tended to form beliefs that further validated the 
theme of ‘unfair treatment’ and enraged the person further. For example, Penny, one of 
the administrators at the hospital, grew angry in one of her incidents. Her anger 
subsisted alongside thoughts about unfairness. She had noticed colleagues cheating on 
a task, and was helpless to do anything about it. She remarked “They just aren’t trying, 
and they just do not understand why it’s important. It just is not right and why should they 
get away with that, when we work. It is about honesty really.”  In this way, congruent 
beliefs represent a process of thinking, often indigenous to angry experiences. This 
shows a consonant process of thinking in emotion.  
In the outermost layer, the second process is immediacy. For the emotional individual, 
this mental process involves the development of beliefs through which objects in the 
environment seem closer than they might otherwise appear (Elster, 2012; Goldie, 2009, 
2004; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). Findings provide the example of Susan, the personal 
assistant in the team. In a telling incident, Susan had become aware of change and 
engulfed by fear of job loss. The incident involved abrupt news of change. Susan 
explained that “It’s quite emotional because everybody in the team is feeling a bit 
anxious, or worried, you know. We are not sure what might happen, it could, any day. It 
all just seems so sudden, it’s everywhere, and everybody is a little worried.” Susan went 
on to talk about change as a process and this further illustrated immediacy, she 
remarked about change as that “…process they talk about but we are just you know…. 
everybody is afraid……Anything could happen and at any time I might be out of a job”. 
Her fear provides a sense of closeness to change and characterizes it as a threat. This 
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process also involves a feeling of imminent danger. Feelings, as findings suggested in 
earlier passages, act as a general indicator, hinting towards that which requires 
attention.   
In the proposed model in figure 6.1, the third process in the outermost layer is certainty. 
Presented in the data chapters and earlier in the current chapter, this is defined as the 
emotional workers unflinching conviction in a belief (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000; Averill, 
2001; Cummins, 2006; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Small and Lerner, 2008). There is 
some certainty involved in the experience of anger. This generates beliefs, as well as a 
feeling of assurance. Findings support the idea that angry and afraid participants 
leveraged their view of the situation with such assurance, which, when questioned, 
would water down to a response based on feeling. A participant would respond with a 
feeling based certainty – as one participant remarked “It feels wrong. We do not even 
know what is happening”. Overall, the participants in anger or fear were certain of the 
badness of change. It is proposed that perhaps in line with the negative emotion, the 
participant, under its influence, perceived things negatively. The evaluation about 
badness of change is an angry or fearful reaction, and under this reaction, there appears 
rigidity. An example is the case of Penny, one of the team administrators. A few months 
back, she had found herself in a situation where change had meant that her current job 
tasks worked in the position they were already occupying. That is, her job would require 
little or no change. Penny perceived this with anger as unfair treatment towards her. She 
explained that beyond doubt they (the implementers) were at fault “You just can’t deal 
with this, it is just unfair. Trust me, I have tried and nothing happens the way you think. I 
was promised and now there is no acting up for me.” In her anger, what Penny is certain 
about is her accusation that she had not been promoted [acted up] during change, and 
this was in the context of colleagues who had been recognized and promoted.  
Penny’s certainty is a process that locks her beliefs at the forefront and she is unable to 
entertain alternative explanations that might justify how she was treated. That is, an 
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emotional person often clings on to beliefs such that adoption of alternative explanations 
or viewpoints becomes difficult or unlikely. Table 6.1 summarizes layer specific 
components, with descriptions of how they develop.   
 
    
Model Components Table 6.1. 
 
On the circumference of the model in figure 6.2 there are arrows. These indicate 
relationships between the processes of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. More 
precisely, the findings implicitly suggest how one can emerge in parallel with others.  
 
6.3.3 CONGRUENCE AND IMMEDIACY  
 
Congruence is a concept that has mostly been researched by cognitive theories and in 
most cases it represents a quantitative interpretation (Bower, 1981; Forgas and Bower, 
Layer Component Description 
Core 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 The idea is that emotion at its core involves attention 
directed at things. 
Second 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠  Evaluative and Reactive beliefs generated during 
emotional experience located in the second layer. These 
expound intentionality.  
Second 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 During emotional experience relatively raw and 
generally informative moments directed at what the 
emotion is about. 
Periphery 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 On the periphery of the model congruence is the 
tendency to infer beliefs to validate the emotion being 
experienced 
Periphery 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑐𝑦 On the periphery of the model congruence leads to 
immediacy. This latter occurs when during emotion 
things appear closer or magnified. 
Periphery 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 On the periphery of the model immediacy leads to 
certainty whereby certainty is the strength with which 
a belief is held as valid.  
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1987; Forgas, 1989; Forgas and George, 2001). At the same time, there are qualitative 
studies that reflect emotion based congruent thinking (Flam, 1993; Lazarus, 1994; 
Fitness, 2000). In qualitative terms, congruence is the angry employee’s appraisal of 
something as offensive. With regard to congruence, one concern arises over its relation 
with immediacy. Can the object of anger appear both congruent (worsening) and closer 
or more offensive (immediacy)? According to one interpretation of the research findings, 
in the proposed model, there appears a link between congruence and immediacy. The 
idea is that the workers emotion involves congruence, and possibly the same 
experience, may also include immediacy (indicated as the arrow linking the two in figure 
6.1).  Again an example is the case of Penny. Her case includes an incident named 
“Afraid of colleague”. A while back she had encountered a colleague in a meeting and a 
quarrel had ensued. This was about perceived unfair practices. The colleague had yelled 
at Penny and mocked her experience as a low ranking worker at the hospital. During the 
exchange, and since after that, Penny had become afraid of her colleague. She 
explained that the colleague “was out to get her”. The fear had become intense, such 
that, if the colleague was walking towards her in a corridor, Penny would avoid eye 
contact and generally avoid the colleague. She perceived her as a threat, and she 
perceived her as someone out to get her (i.e. a threat). In Penny’s mind, this caricature 
of her colleague was a result of congruent beliefs underpinning her fear. In Penny’s mind 
what constructed this caricature were her anger based beliefs and feeling towards the 
colleague, who was perceived as someone with a personal dislike of Penny. In her fear, 
the colleague also appeared as a close and impending threat lurking around the corner. 
The implicit suggestion is (indicated by the arrow in the model in figure 6.1): the more 
congruent beliefs a fearful worker forms, the higher the chances of a situation being 
characterized as imminent, largely by virtue of the possession of more negative 
information about the situation. The data suggests this type of link. The implication is 
that in a change context, an emotional person, let’s say an employee who is afraid of 
change, will perceive change aspects as increasingly worsening (congruence) and this 
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might include overestimation of how close the threat appears (immediacy). In other 
words, an employee who experiences fear may see change as grim, and as more 
threatening than it might otherwise seem. This may account for the disruptive and 
uncooperative worker found in change.                   
 
 
6.3.4 IMMEDIACY AND CERTAINTY 
 
In the model, the next link on the circumference appears between immediacy and 
certainty in the outermost periphery layer. Data subtly suggests that an emotional worker 
in the experience of immediacy may also possess some certainty about that experience. 
Emotion based immediacy remains very scarcely researched (Elster, 2012; Wild, 2008; 
Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). The tripartite model proposes that it may lead to or co-exist 
alongside a sense of certainty. In the data, there was no clear demarcation between 
immediacy and certainty, so that one may claim where the bridge lies between the two. 
However, one can reason that if an angry worker sees some aspect of change as 
impending or looming overhead, then at the same time, she must be certain about the 
presence and effect of that aspect. This certainty is built to unshakable levels of 
conviction in emotion. The threat of change is close and it is certainly a threat and 
nothing else.  
Consider the case of Rachel, one of the team administrators. She shared an incident 
that involved a lack of resources to carry out some tasks. She had been assigned as the 
change program initiative manger, and in her new role, she had asked for more 
personnel. It had been a while and nothing had happened. Rachel had grown angry with 
the management. There was no response from them. In anger she believed that costs 
would be very high in the longer run. In her anger she felt that the management had 
asked for help, and now her talent was being exploited, mainly because they expected 
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her to do all the work, and this felt unfair. She perceived the costs in terms of failure as 
very high. In her anger, she thought that management was incompetent, and change 
would collapse at any moment. In her anger, this feeling of urgency seemed at a peak. 
She remarked it was “chaotic” and “not sensible”.  Thus, in anger she experiences this 
immediacy. Alongside this, Rachel also stated her version of the incident with extreme 
conviction. When asked about whether she was sure about how the incident had 
happened, there seemed little or no doubt in her mind. “They know what they are doing. 
I mean com’on usman. It really is not like that. There just seems no will to help us, and 
hhhhmmmmm we are expected to work.” Thus, it is implicitly suggested that on the 
periphery on the tripartite model of emotion, the process of immediacy may also involve 
certainty. The link between the two has been suggested. This opens room for further 
inquiry.  
 
 
6.3.5 CERTAINTY AND CONGRUENCE 
  
Thirdly, looking at the model in figure 6.1, one can interpret a link between certainty and 
congruence. This is indicated in the model by an arrow. The process of certainty is often 
attributed to a feeling attached to a belief (Goldie, 2004; Lazarus, 1994; Lazarus and 
Folkman, 1984 p.78). It is also associated with the gut feeling one has of immediate 
certainty and rightness about their conviction of something to be the case (Averill, 2001; 
Saddler-Smith, 2008 p.75). In some cases, this response might be a feeling and nothing 
more.  It may not be the mathematically rational belief in terms of how efficiently it gets 
the worker to achieve, say the goal of securing a promotion during change; however, it 
does feel like the right thing to believe (Lowenstein et al, 2001).  
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In this way, emotion-based certainty seems to fly in the face of conventional rationale. In 
the half time at a football game, try explaining the poor skills of a football player to a 
Manchester United fan, and that certainty in the fault of the other team will instantly stare 
back at you. Similarly, try explaining to an angry worker that his conviction in wrongdoing 
on the part of the management is not right. He will quickly rationalize his anger with the 
generation of more congruent beliefs. In other words, when congruence is challenged, 
the worker might respond with the generation of more consonant beliefs to validate his 
or her anger. This idea is supported by the argument of emotional processing in 
cognitive studies (Forgas, 2006; Bower and Forgas, 2001; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984 
p.78; Bower, 1981). The argument states that in a worker’s memory, emotion is 
organized at the center of a structure. The structure is used to generate beliefs 
associated with the emotion. So when an emotional person’s belief is challenged, he can 
use the structure to generate more congruent beliefs in support of the emotion that he or 
she is experiencing. In the proposed model, this means that certainty underlying an 
emotion, when challenged, may lead to congruence (i.e. generation of more congruent 
beliefs in defense of the emotion).   
At a general level, the experiences of the participants may be explained with reference 
to the above argument. Consider the case of Daniela, another administrator in the team 
at the hospital. Like the other participants working at the hospital, her view of the change 
was a negative one. She did not understand change and did not favor it. She shared an 
incident named “Fear of alternatives.” The incident involved news of the change, 
primarily through rumors and gossip. “There was word around the office and everybody 
thought it was not good, not good news I mean.” She elaborated that for her, there was a 
feeling of fear, and she was more certain in that fear, about the badness of change. In 
fear, she explained that all kinds of thoughts had come to mind, she was unsure of her 
work on a daily basis. For her, generating more beliefs about the certainty of bad news 
made it all the more a threat, which loomed overhead. One can, albeit using a somewhat 
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relaxed interpretation, make sense of her behavior by referring to the above theory on 
emotional processing.  
In fear there she expressed little or no doubt about her assertions, and there seemed a 
reliance on the held set of beliefs (i.e. in cognitive terms the memory structure 
surrounding her fear). Were her certainty to be challenged, it might be likely that 
congruent beliefs would back up her certainty and fear of change as something that 
amounted to bad news.         
However, it should be noted that the data does not explicitly provide support for this kind 
of argument. Generally, this is because congruence and certainty were components 
involved in emotion and a part of the model, but their relation was not the key focus of 
this research. In reference theory however, participant emotional experiences somewhat 
implicitly suggest and support that certainty might link with congruence (indicated by the 
arrow in figure 6.1). At a broader level of detail, the proposed model works to integrate 
the findings of the current chapter. The current section used qualitative accounts to 
expound the model. The model is an illustration of how emotion and its mental 
components can be thought about in an organizational change context.  
 
 
6.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
The current chapter has discussed a range of ideas. These address both the research 
objectives in relation to findings and the relevant theory. Overall, the current thesis is a 
qualitative study, and in line with this, the findings have provided a deeper understanding 
of individual experiences. This would not be an approach that one could afford, if one 
were to conduct a quantitative study aimed at correlations and probability based trends. 
At the same time, the findings demonstrate a relatively relaxed interpretation compared 
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with probability based analysis. At the outset of this chapter, the findings included the 
exploration of why emotion is important in a change context, followed by the finding that 
intentionality is a key component, alongside other components including beliefs, feelings, 
congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The findings were integrated towards the latter 
section of the chapter and a model of emotion was used for this.  
The model directly addresses the proposed research question. To the extent that it 
integrates findings addressing the various research objectives, the model provides a 
holistic view of how emotion is experienced by workers involved in organizational 
change. The dynamics of the model are two-fold. Relating the core level to the middle 
and outermost layer, the model has an outward directionality. Secondly, the model has a 
circular movement on the outermost level, suggesting links between the components 
that represent processes on this level. Overall, based on a qualitative study of emotion, 
the model provides an inductively derived illustration of the mental dynamics of emotion. 
It brings together components that form a new way of thinking about emotion in change. 
The next chapter will provide reflexive ideas about the research conducted for this 
thesis. This is a look at my research journey. Following that, the final chapter reflects on 
some important thoughts, including the rationale for the current thesis, the practical 
implications for the NHS involved in change management, the theoretical difference 
made by this research, the methodological aspect of this research, and related 
prospects for research.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: REFLEXIVITY  
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In thinking about his place in the research process, the researcher has two options 
available to him. The first is to act like the traditional sciences observer who sees himself 
independent of the problem he studies. The researcher does not influence, nor is influenced by 
what is studied. The researcher is a neutral observer who represents reality as it is. The second 
option is to think about how ‘I’ – the researcher - shapes and is shaped by the forces involved in 
the research process. The researcher brings to the situation his thoughts, emotions, 
assumptions – these interplay with what is brought by the research participants and their views. 
The researcher can recognize this interplay and think about it in the context of changing power-
relationships, social norms, time-frames, academic debate, and practice (Steier, 1991). The 
current chapter is about this second option: Reflexivity.  
I reflect on my personal journey through the world of research. The current thesis does not 
adopt the first option above, where the researcher is a neutral uninfluenced observer. It is 
impossible for the researcher to not shape and not be shaped by the research process 
(Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; Glaser and Straus, 1976.p.3). More to the point, the research 
process is not so much an unfolding sequence of physical actions (i.e. causal process) but 
rather it is an experience that is lived by the conscious researcher. Rather than turn a blind eye 
to what this research experience has to offer, the researcher should embrace it by recognizing it 
as a learning experience. This is the purpose of the current chapter. That is, to share what has 
been learnt from the research process as an experience “I” have lived. This chapter is organized 
in the following way – first I draw on the passive-active dimension of the researcher. This is an 
argument about the role of the researcher as either the passive receiver of content like a mirror 
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that reflects reality or as an active agent that carves out and shapes reality. This is followed by 
reflection on the various relationships formed during research with people and with theory.  
Then, I provide an illustration of the research stages that I went through. The stages are 
problem formulation, access to research data, Interpretations and confusion, fitting your 
contribution to research, and reflecting on reflexivity.  
 
7.1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF REFLEXIVE RESEARCH 
 
Reflecting on my research experience would be a futile undertaking if in doing research I was 
merely a receptacle of what is around me. That is, if I were a passive thing then I would merely 
receive data and through a series of physical steps ideas that inform a body of knowledge would 
emerge and form research output. If research was in this way determined as a series of steps 
with no free will, then it would be futile to reflect on research experiences because all in the past 
and future would be pre-programmed. Looking at emotion as a causal series of steps is 
nonetheless one approach adopted in research. Sartre (2006) argues that the researcher is 
unlike the pen used to write up a thesis. A pen is determined in so far as it will not bounce up 
and write a thesis of its own accord. It is also not free to see itself or others in whichever way it 
wants. The researcher is not at all like the pen. To some extent he is free to pick up a book or 
select a journal paper. He reasons or feels out the methods appropriate for data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation and write. This means, for instance, that conversations in a research 
interview are not data packets transferred from one person to another. The researcher must as 
much as possible reflect on whether what he has read or been exposed impart an enabling or 
some disabling influence on his interpretation of a conversation (Gergen and Gergen, 1991). To 
recognize where a sentence may have been interpreted as such and such implies something 
more important about reflexive research. It implies that interpretation is involved in every step of 
the research process therefore reflecting may have something to teach the researcher travelling 
along doing research. The latter sections will, to a large extent, reflect on a notion called 
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emotional reflexivity. This seems appropriate given the topic of the current thesis namely 
emotion.        
 
7.1.2 ENROLLING TO DO RESEARCH AT A UNIVERSITY 
 
Upon enrolling as a student, a person enters into a contract. The person becomes part of an 
institution. The person adopts a role. Every role in society is guided by rules and norms 
(Goffman, 1990). Some of these roles are more explicit than others. A researcher for instance 
can look to a set of rules that describe the tasks he does as a researcher, issued by the 
institution where he does research and by general wider norms observable in groups and 
communities of disciplinary specific researchers (Kuhn, 1996).  
Joining the university in the first year of the doctoral program along with other researchers, I 
participated in training. This exposed us to a range of tools. Reflecting back on the experience, 
we learnt to use qualitative and quantitative tools. There was a sense of membership. It meant 
that I was part of a larger community of academics. Kuhn (1996) argues that academic 
communities have their own rules and languages used to regulate the development of research. 
Members of communities are both liberated and constrained by rules and languages. This 
includes concepts and norms of practice. I felt liberated because doctoral training provided me 
with different ways of looking at research. This was an expansion in my worldview. At the same 
time, I felt somewhat constrained by within-discipline thinking. The training enabled us to think 
and the tools structured our thinking of research problems.     
 
7.2 EMOTIONAL REFLEXIVITY  
 
The main idea is that a person conducts research as part of a community and this includes the 
development of relationships with stakeholders in the research area. Such relationships 
generate and are often regulated through emotion: both positive and negative. Emotional 
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reflexivity is about reflecting on the influence of such emotions in the research process (Procter, 
2013). I found this to be the case when forming relationships with my supervisors, peers, and 
with others in my area of research I could come across in conferences.  
Learning from my Supervisors - In research meetings where conversations are held 
with a supervisor, the atmosphere can become emotional. For instance, upon hearing that your 
supervisor has some positive feedback about your ideas, you might feel happy and proud. In my 
case, when this happened it built my confidence in my ability as a researcher. The relationship 
between the supervisor and student was nurtured. The hardest thing for a researcher in the 
beginning of his journey is to learn to take feedback in a constructive manner and to not shut 
down. Research shows that an individual will tend to resist ideas that do not fit with his 
worldview (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000).   
I found that it was a skill to interpret and integrate feedback into my thinking. The assumptions 
formed through rigorous examination of theory enclosed in library environments for hours can 
leave a person with a dense view of a research problem. Theory structures the way in which the 
researcher apprehends the research problem. The important skill when interpreting new ideas 
(i.e. feedback) is to loosen this structured view and integrate other ideas to build alternative 
explanations and reflect on their usefulness. In retrospect, this skill seems like a very important 
tool for doing research. The lesson is that one must develop the skill to step back from a 
theoretical viewpoint and to integrate ideas that modify that viewpoint providing a rich manifold 
of explanations. One must actively recognize his emotion and its influence on thinkin 
 Relationship with research peers – The doctoral experience was very much like a community 
particularly when I was around other research students. This meant that there were informal 
meetings in the doctoral student’s area on campus as well as discussions around research 
problems and understanding. Through such communal experiences, one finds that emotion is 
contagious. This was very much the case during interactions amongst the doctoral students. As 
a community, we shared stories of success and failure and this drove positive emotions of hope. 
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The motivation sometimes came from comparing your research with others. In doing this along 
with a sense of camaraderie emerged a sense of competition. One may think - if he has 
completed his literature review then where am I and why have I not reached the same 
milestone.  
Relationship with Theory – For a reflexive viewpoint theory has a particular meaning 
and importance. As a researcher, I found that theory is not just an explanation of something in a 
book or journal paper. One thing may be explained in different ways dependent on whether you 
are a chemist or an anthropologist (Kuhn, 2012.p.51). I found that as a researcher, theory 
meant an explanation of emotion in terms of the research debates I had read and thought about; 
and in terms of what they meant for my research focus.     
A related idea comes from hermeneutics a movement that argues about context. The idea is 
that if you take a text and pick a single word in that text you will find that it is situated within a 
context. The word is to be interpreted in relation to the sentence, the passage, the book, the 
writer of the book, the reader, the readers historical conditioning and at a wider level the society 
they live in (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009). But one will fall into an infinite regress if one 
considers that even a single reader has multiple viewpoints passing from one day to the next. 
This compromises coherence and focus. The point is to refer to words in context by being 
selective as a researcher. In my role as a researcher, I found myself at a point where I could 
see many theories. I had to learn to develop the discipline to be selective. This involved 
directing attention at relevant literature. The tendency to look at every theory that seems 
somewhat relevant is too great to curb in a single day. In elation or in the instant joy of coming 
across a theory the danger is that one compromises the epistemic focus they are building for 
research. 
One becomes passionate about a theory they read in a book. They do not recognize its degree 
of relevance for their research. This is a grave threat that a researcher needs to manage. After 
data collection and analysis, one finds that the answer generated is not what was initially 
235 
 
expected. One revisits the literature and so needs to be selective again about what is relevant 
and not. The problem occurred when reviewing theory where one became too passionate and 
could not judge theory relevance.    
But this is the general research process. One may think he is informed when in fact one may be 
entangled in theoretical structures. On the other hand, good knowledge of a variety of 
theoretical ideas can be useful in interpreting data in a multiple number of ways (Alvesson, 
2009; Martin, 1992). A related issue that I came across in doing research was the problem of 
too much theory. Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009 p.154) point out that 
  
“A lack of consensus is healthy as it provides the 
possibility of perceiving and relating to the world in 
different ways and of avoiding blockages.” 
 
They refer to blockages in interpreting collected data. I found that a blockage was what is 
explained above as becoming too emotional about ideas that do not necessarily fit within your 
research. I found on a few occasions that too much attachment with an idea tainted my vision. It 
is what I wanted to find. The solution here was to actively forget what is read and then interpret 
the data (Jung, 1964).  Alternative ideas that stand in conflict with the researcher’s expectation 
are not therapeutic (Greenberg, 2004). They may be resisted and bring about negative 
reactions such as anger or fear. The overall lesson is that as a researcher I must continue to 
manage the balance between theory and interpretation of fresh data based on management of 
pre-conceptions, at the same time using the array of theories available to me in interpreting data 
in relation to research focus is a developing skill.       
Interaction with Research Participants - If you are not doing an entirely theoretical 
piece of work, then research participants become very important. The data is the lifeblood of 
research and knowledge production. In my research I used repertory grids to organize 
interviews for data collection. The ideas of Kelly (1963, 2003) were a guiding source. He argues 
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that one has to relate to the research participant as more than just a respondent to questions. 
The researcher and participants are co-authors of a perspective they share until each one takes 
their own perspective with them having left the conversation. The interaction with research 
participants is fraught with complications. The first complication can arise from too much time 
spent with theory. As a researcher, I came to the interviews having reviewed and digested many 
theories of emotion. I developed emotional ties with ideas. The interview meant that I had to 
actively forget and make an effort to listen to the participant rather than think in terms of theory 
x. The psychoanalyst Jung (1964) once remarked that in collecting and analyzing data, one 
should deliberately forget what has been learnt from books and theories. One should make a 
conscious attempt to make sense of the data afresh leaving aside preconceptions. The story of 
the participant should be facilitated in its emergence through guiding dialogue.  
The other idea is that theory can help recognize voices that may otherwise be unspoken and not 
made explicit by the participant who is perhaps blind to her own position. I found research 
participants somewhat oblivious to the impact of emotion on their experience. Not one 
participant confessed something of the sort where, in their moment of emotion, perhaps they 
found things to be the case of their own fault or myopic vision of things. From the inside, one 
may be educated to be invisible to what those on the outside can interpret.      
An emotion that one may see as essential for understanding the story of a research participant 
is empathy (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009 p.54). For a while, I believed that if I could put 
myself in the participants shoes then I would have a grasp on what each word, sentence, and 
conversation meant. Each research actor has their unique history and they are aware of this at 
some level (Heidegger, 1978). One may think that each actor’s history is the personal causal 
pathway that leads to meaning making. Then, each research actor has their own cause not 
shared with any other. In this spirit Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000.p.152) ask “Can the 
researcher say anything about ‘reality’ which will be qualitatively superior to other people’s 
statements about it? What about claims to ‘truth’?” In thinking about the truth of my research 
participant’s experience, a thought I had was to ask the question that if my research seeks to 
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determine emotion and its workings than an understanding of emotional experiences of 
participants would be of what sort? In this question, the implicit assumption is that emotional 
experience is amenable to reason. That is, it is a reasoned truth rather than a felt truth that is 
sought after.  
7.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
The current chapter is a set of reflections on lessons learnt in doing research. My research 
journey has instilled a sense of knowledge of self as a researcher facing challenges and a steep 
learning curve. This includes knowledge of one’s skills as a researcher and the experience of 
interacting with others involved in the research process. My journey as a researcher will 
continue. The single most important lesson is to reflect that emotion does not take place in 
isolation. There is the topic of interest and then there are actors in the process. Both are a 
valuable parts of doing research. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION OF THE THESIS  
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION    
 Central to the current thesis is a concern with how individuals involved in organisational 
change experience emotion. Often, organizational change is a result of the desire for growth 
and a means for increasing organisational competitiveness in a global arena. A key source for 
success is the involvement of workers of the organisation’s change efforts. In earlier chapters, a 
review of theory established that change in organizations is often met with emotional reactions 
by workers. Whilst change is planned by top management, it demands coping efforts from 
workers throughout the organization (Klarner et al, 2011; Amiot et al, 2006; Armenakis and 
Bedeian, 1999). Scholars have argued that emotion presents territory for further exploration. 
The process of change is not value-free and usually it involves micro-processes whereby 
emotion is formed in the workers mind (Burns and Jackson, 2011). As a result, change is often 
met with negative responses such as fear or anger, and these can jeopardize the achievement 
of organisational goals (Ford et al, 2008; Lines, 2004). The current thesis has held the position 
that managing employee emotion is a key goal that underpins the achievement of other broader 
commercial goals of the organisation.      
It seems that a change context gives rise to emotion, and in turn, this consists of mental 
components that work together in a dynamic environment. To study this, the current thesis 
adopted an approach focused on the mental components of emotion and their inter-relations. 
The methodology adopted was based on a qualitative approach. In asking how emotion is 
experienced by workers involved in organizational change, the aim was to obtain the opinions of 
individuals in the midst of the storm. Chapter three presented the philosophical assumption of 
constructive alternativism.  Ontologically, what is real may exist inside the persons mind, and in 
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tandem, there may also be an external reality. Epistemologically, a person is able to construct 
alternative versions of any given situation. In other words, he may construe a situation in many 
ways. Hence, knowledge is based on opinion and consensus (Kelly, 2003). Using the case 
study approach research for the current thesis engaged with workers at a hospital undergoing 
restructuring in Nottingham, United Kingdom. Each person presented a case, and shared 
incidents of emotional encounters at work. Analysis enabled deep probing of each incident and 
the identification of components of emotion, presented in chapters four and five.  
Initially, the current chapter will present practical contributions of research findings. The concern 
is about why the findings matter for the hospital in Nottingham. This is followed by a discussion 
about the contribution to theory, methodological contribution, and avenues for further research.   
 
8.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH    
The key practical contribution of this thesis highlights the need for programs that help ‘emotional 
adjustment to change’. For a worker, adjusting to change means coping with how his job and 
personal life are influenced as a result of changes that are sometimes unexpected. Often 
enough, such coping involves emotion, and this occurs at multiple levels in the hierarchy 
(Klarner et al, 2011). Failure of the worker to cope with change, to some extent, signals bad 
management practices (Ford et al, 2008). At the NHS hospital in Nottingham the findings 
suggest that management did not sufficiently support workers in their efforts to cope with 
change. This is reflected in commentary that addressed research objective one in previous 
chapters. The objective states: to explore the implications of workers emotional experiences for 
change management.  
It was found that communication of change was poor. This included lack of staff involvement in 
change processes at the hospital, and the poor provision of regular information that increased 
uncertainty. Participants shared a sense of job insecurity and this resonated throughout the 
hospital cancer wing. From a practical viewpoint, the workers who took part in this research did 
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not support the change. They did not understand the change and resented the management. 
The implication is that organisational change will fail if an information sharing ethos is not 
sufficiently practiced. This is the main problem that was faced by the workers participating in this 
study; there was not sufficient information sharing, and as a result, organisational change 
brought about anger and fear amidst workers. During change a healthy dose of information is 
essential, otherwise uncertainty and fear can become endemic hindrances to change initiatives 
(Sutton and Kahn, 1987). Information serves to enable workers to establish confidence in the 
purpose of change with respect to their jobs (Klarner et al, 2011).  
To prevent such failure, worker involvement and information sharing can be practiced. The right 
policy needs to be established. It is suggested that a policy which is about worker involvement 
during change and the education of management regarding the role of emotion in change 
should be developed and adopted. This can be funneled through the hierarchy with programs 
designed to engage workers at places in the hierarchy, particularly those who are angry or 
afraid of change. Both the management and worker have to partner and work together. 
Researching the impact of emotion Avey et al (2008 p.3) propose change is about internal 
cohesion and that “This organization change is both critical for managers in terms of effective 
implementation and for employees in terms of acceptance and engagement”.     
In the NHS the Institute for Innovation and Improvement published case studies available online 
to the public, titled, ‘Productive Case studies: Staff improvements and leadership’ (link in 
appendix 3.0). The purpose of the studies was to show programs used to empower staff, and 
enable positive change. At the outset, it is somewhat telling that the whole document does not 
mention the word ‘emotion’ even once. In the document one of the cases was based on 
services in Essex and Luton. It is claimed in the case description that programs are about 
“empowering” workers so that they “own the changes they make.” Unfortunately, this quickly 
fades out of focus. The majority of the case highlights improvements in patient care, and there is 
little focus on worker care.  
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Compared to this example, the current study found that successful change requires both patient 
care and worker care. As a part of efforts in this direction, a policy is needed to encourage 
information sharing and gauging of workers who are expected to practice change in their daily 
interactions with patients. An environment where it is considered normal and acceptable for staff 
to remain unaware, and uncertain about change, will most likely breed negative emotions. In 
addition to programs focused on patient care, there should be programs focused on worker 
care. A central part of such programs might be about gauging worker anger, fears, or doubts, 
about change processes. The impact of such developments is expected to be gradual and 
requires support from top management. Looking to the future, earning employee support is 
important during change, and this means gauging their emotions in the workplace, perhaps 
through one to one meetings, or small group meetings. A good example of this is provided by 
Huy (2002). He described a study of a company in the Information technology sector 
undergoing restructuring. Power was devolved to middle managers who dealt with workers. One 
manager failed because she failed to recognize the value of worker participation; instead, her 
onus was on economic variables. Another manager took it upon himself and engaged with 
workers in small groups. “I realized that one could not deal effectively with emotions when one 
was with a crowd. So I began to set up smaller meetings in groups of seven or eight, and I told 
them I would be available for private meetings after the group discussion.” (Huy, 2002 p.21). 
Successful and lasting change at the NHS required a soft approach. This should be based on a 
policy, implemented through programs designed to weed out negative emotion at micro levels of 
interaction and task co-ordination. This is the recommendation based on findings addressing 
objective one. Given the recommendations presented in this chapter, a concern that arises is 
about research generalizability. The term is used to signify the extent to which research findings 
from a sample apply to the population from which it is drawn (Ali and Yusof, 2011). That is, one 
may think about the extent to which ‘my research findings’ apply beyond the participating 
organisation, to other similar organisations. Qualitative studies often suffer the criticism that they 
are not designed for generalizations. Traditionally, the latter is seen as a positivist concern. 
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Applied to the current thesis, what comes to the fore is the research methodology; to be able to 
generalize, one requires a large sample of data, such that a larger portion of the population is 
evenly covered (see stratified sampling Bryman, 2004). The larger the sample, the more of the 
population it covers, and so, presumably, the safer the inferences of research. Generalizability 
is a basic core concern with studies that look for correlation type associations between 
variables. This focus misses out what is the central concern of the current thesis. In other 
words, focusing on correlations for the purpose of prediction, or to better understand such 
associations, misses out the meanings that organizational actors attach to their environments. 
Correlation is the search for trends, and it provides relatively superficial knowledge. The things 
forgone are the meanings that actors attached to the experiences that underpin the trends and 
variables used to exonerate the quantitative approach. The current thesis, with its interpretivist 
focus, subscribes to the qualitative approach. The findings provide detailed and deep accounts 
of the participant’s emotional world in a change context. According to Stake (2000) such 
findings can have practical uses, and they reflect what is actually happening on the ground.     
         
8.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
In the current thesis, the central implication for theory is the contribution of the tripartite model of 
emotion. The model illustrates emotion in change. In both organizational change, and the wider 
encompassing terrain of organizational research, the notion of emotion sits vaguely in the 
background. Even, the study by Klarner et al (2011), which underpins the argument for 
researching emotion and its mental components in the current thesis, does not define emotion 
explicitly. Gooty et al (2009) and Ashman (2008) have cautioned against this growing ignorance 
in emotion research. Clarity on emotion and its structure in terms of mental components is one 
way to define emotion. By addressing the research objectives, the current section will expound 
the contribution to theory. This builds up to the proposed model as the holistic conception of 
emotion in change, presented in this thesis (see figure 6.1).         
243 
 
Theory covered in earlier parts of the thesis argued that change is often met with negative 
emotion (Klarner et al, 2011; Maitlis and Sonensheim, 2010). Failure by management to gauge 
emotion can lead to the ineffective implementation of change (Avey et al, 2008). A chief reason 
why emotion is present during change is the thesis that emotion is an example of adaptive 
behavior, and since change requires adaptation, one would expect the presence of such 
behavior (Scherer, 2005; Zeelenberg, et al, 2008). This makes it all the more important to 
develop an understanding of what emotion ‘is’. Only after this preamble can studies seek to 
relate more in depth the notion with other organization-wide problems.   
Objective two of the current thesis states: to explore the presence of intentionality within 
emotional experience of workers involved in change. The contribution made in addressing this 
objective is the introduction of intentionality as a fundamental concept that sits at the heart of 
emotion. Klarner et al (2011) refer to Lazarus (1991) as a prominent theory for developing an 
understanding of emotion in change. The Lazarus (1991, 1994) theory relies on intentionality, 
and based on research findings, this has been adopted in the model. The difference this makes 
is that it brings to the forefront a concept that has not been explicitly recognized in both 
organizational change literature, and within the wider terrain of organisation research on 
emotion. In introducing intentionality, the current thesis brings to organizational change literature 
the idea that emotion is a process. In his philosophical exploration, this argument is proposed by 
Goldie (2002a p.13) that emotion is not unchanging; it is a continuous stream of beliefs and 
feelings towards that which one is experiencing as emotional. Robinson (2004) comments that 
for Goldie (2002a) emotion is a continuous process that unfolds like a narrative. The current 
thesis, by introducing intentionality in organisation research, provides a concept that portrays 
emotion as a continuous process of changing attention, directed at various aspects of change. 
Goldie (2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004, 2009) represents the tip of the iceberg, and philosophy 
provides other studies that change literature can draw on, such as Richard Wollheim who 
influenced Goldie’s thinking (see: Goldie, 2006).     
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The third research objective states: to investigate relationships between intentionality, beliefs, 
and feelings in workers involved in change. Findings that addressed this objective make a 
specific contribution to a trend that has dominated research and can be rooted in cognitive 
theories. For the most part, ideas of emotion have been borrowed from cognitive accounts (see 
Klarner at el, 2011 review) and (Forgas, 2003; Bower and Forgas, 2001; Scherer, 2001; 
Scherer, 1999; Lazarus 1991; Ortony et al, 1988; Bower, 1981; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; 
Scherer, 1988). In this area, studies have related emotion and beliefs; a belief has either been 
an antecedent or a consequence of emotion (Scherer, 2001). The formation of beliefs during 
emotion has not received sufficient attention. Addressing objective three, the current thesis 
contributes to this gap.   
The contribution is the idea that both beliefs and feelings are instances of intentionality. As 
such, both components in the middle layer of the tripartite model, represent ways of knowing 
change through emotion. This addresses Klarner et al (2011) call for research of appraisals 
through emotion, found in the current thesis as “believing in” and “feeling towards”. Both 
represent an unfolding process of appraising change. As argued by Goldie (2004), emotion 
through such a conception is not just brute feeling sitting in between beliefs. During change, it 
represents a way of adapting to the environment (Scherer, 2005; Zeelenberg et al, 2008). This 
adaptation may be a hindrance or facilitation. From a practical viewpoint, Fineman (2003 p.131) 
has highlighted that success is likely “where managers facilitate change rather than command 
it.” The management can gauge employees and facilitate emotional adaptation to change. The 
difference this makes to theory is the status provided to beliefs and feelings as two appraisal 
components of emotion, which represent intentionality. Specifically, this contribution is based on 
a review of Lazarus (1991, 1994), in line with call to research by Klarner at el (2011).  
The fourth research objective is: to determine the relationship of beliefs and feelings with 
components of congruence, immediacy, and certainty. The three latter components were found 
in philosophical and cognitive studies (Ekman, 2004; Forgas, 2003, 2001; Smith and Kirby, 
2001; Scherer, 2001; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al, 1988; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). The 
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relationship between beliefs and feelings on the one hand, and congruence, immediacy, and 
certainty on the other, appears to be that the latter three components are processes illustrating 
the development of the former two components. This was the finding of the current thesis. The 
three processes are novel concepts in change literature. Writing about coping with change, 
emotion studies have been concerned with employee interpretations (Bovey and Hede, 2001; 
Maitilis and Sonensheim, 2010). Addressing this concern, two findings provide new ground for 
further reflection. On the one hand, findings showed the presence of congruent beliefs, 
immediacy based beliefs and feelings, and certainty. Additionally, interpretations made by, for 
instance, an angry employee, are likely to involve the processes to structure his or her view of 
change.   
Conclusively, as stated at the beginning of this section, the main theoretical contribution is an 
assembly of the above findings in the form of the tripartite model of emotion, applicable to 
change, and perhaps to wider organizational developments. This addressed objective five, 
which states: Based on empirical data analysis, to develop a model that depicts the components 
and dynamics of worker emotional experiences in a change context.  
According to Klarner et al (2011) most models of emotion tend to interpret it as a static non-
processual part of the larger process of change. There are models about triggers for emotion, 
coping with change, and change outcomes (Huy, 2002; Liu and Perrewe, 2005b). There is little 
information on how appraisals are formed during emotional experience. Klarner et al (2011) 
argue that Lazarus (1991) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984), provide a good set of ideas for 
deriving a model (see Liu and Perrewe). One of the drawbacks is that a richer picture of emotion 
has not been built. Klarner et al (2011) suggest that this would include components like 
intentionality, feelings, and beliefs, that portray emotion as a process, and consider distinctions 
between its components (Gooty et al, 2009), whilst expounding on the dynamics.  
To a large extent, the proposed model provides a picture towards building this sort of 
understanding. The model provides components across three levels, with intentionality 
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resonating throughout. Intentionality, at the center means that other components, (as 
instantiations) are processes, whereby emotion is continuously about what is experienced 
(aspects of change). The dynamics of the model are twofold. There is a concentric outward 
directionality, and a circular relation between processes in the outermost layer. Thus, 
qualitatively, the model contributes a picture of emotion as an intentional experience, involving 
‘believing in’ and ‘feeling towards’, which dynamically develop through processes of 
congruence, immediacy, and certainty. This assembly of components provides a novel picture 
that contributes to the theme of organizational change, nested within the wider domain of 
organisation research. Looking forward, gauging emotion as an adaptive reaction (Klarner et al, 
2011; Zeelenberg, 2008; Scherer, 2005; Frijda, 1986), there is potential to explore concepts for 
change management.   
 
8.4 METHODOLOGY 
Chapter three presented the methodology of this thesis. A methodology that works refers to how 
research is done from the ground up. This includes concerns about, how the researcher adopts 
a philosophy of what is researched, what are the right tools be used for doing the research, and 
why are they the right tools (Easterby-smith et al, 2008; Schwandt, 2000). The current thesis 
established a focus on interpretations of emotional workers involved in change. For this, the 
ideas of Kelly (1963, 2003) were adopted, including his ontology of a world that comes from the 
mind, and may exist outside the observer’s perception of it. This world can be known through 
interpretations that actors have some power over (Chiari and Nuzzo, 2003). The current thesis 
in particular, contributes a method for data analysis. Admittedly, some mental analysis takes 
place during conversations one might conduct as part of one to one interviews. Following on 
from this, once the raw data is in place, (Miles and Huberman, 1994) highlight the importance of 
analysis and synthesis procedures. This procedure of organising and re-organising the data can 
provide different perspectives on the same set of data. One is also moving back and forth 
between perspectives formed and the theory. Discovering this relationship in the context of the 
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research purpose presents a key part of successful data analysis. The current thesis contributed 
the analysis procedure in section 3.6. This interweaved data from transcripts, with grid data, and 
a template structure, designed to further funnel down data in the direction of the research goals. 
This provides a procedure that may act as a blueprint for further research of emotion, and 
perhaps for other types of organizational behaviours. One of the advantages of using the 
repertory grid is that researchers have been able to develop derived methods that display the 
use of grid elements and constructs with modifications to best suit what is researched 
(Jankowicz, 2004; Bell, 2003; Stewart and Stewart, 1981). The application of the grid along with 
the larger encompassing philosophy of constructive alternativism, has induced creative 
developments in both social and organizational research. The current thesis has applied its 
ideas to researching emotion in a change context. Future research may explore the prospects of 
such methodology to emotion research, particularly in terms of its suitability in capturing the 
process aspect of emotion in organisations.               
   
8.5 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The proposed contributions open avenues for further research. In so far as emotion is an 
adaptive micro-process in the larger process of change, studies have several themes available 
for research. One theme is the further development of intentionalty as a core concept. Outside 
the field, this concept has been delineated into types of intentionality relating to emotion (see 
Tye, 2008). In organisation research the concept has scarcely been touched by emotion studies 
(Ashman, 2008). Further research on types of beliefs and deeper inquiry into the distinct nature 
of feelings, will follow as a result of this focus. The notions of congruence, immediacy, and 
certainty, are next to non-existent in change management literature. Further inquiry on their 
influence in terms of employee coping behavior in a change context, provides some promise. It 
has been commented that emotion is a form of adaptation (Klarner et al, 2011; Zeelenberg et al, 
2008; Scherer, 2005, Frijda, 1986). A deeper understanding along the above lines of inquiry can 
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enabled understanding of adaptive responses, and it can facilitate better employee experiences, 
alongside smoother change implementation. From a practical viewpoint, to avoid the trouble that 
the NHS hospital in Nottingham ran into, with respect to emotional disengagement of workers, 
one suggestion is to develop a sustainable change strategy. According to Fineman (2003 p.131) 
this requires further empirical research into nurturing “emotionally sensitive managers”, that 
facilitate change at the personal coaching level (Huy, 2002). Managers need to be 
approachable and establish trust with workers during change, so that uncertainty and fears 
about what might happen are curtailed. If such attempts mean a top down strategy, where 
change is funneled down through the organisation, than the topic of leadership presents an area 
where the proposed conception of emotion can be applied and researched. Leadership is 
defined as a set of processes implemented in order to moderate aspects of the organisation and 
move it towards a direction (Dinh et al, 2014). A micro-process involved in this appears to be 
emotion (Dasborough  and Ashkanasy, 2002; Day and Sin, 2011; Dinh et al, 2014).    
In this regard, emotion as a topic of interest has started to pick up momentum in journals like the 
leadership quarterly (Dinh et al, 2014). Successful change requires addressing resistance to 
change, which manifest as the emotional volatilities of workers. At times the top down message 
from the leadership can clarify the mist. Therefore, leadership studies aimed at successful 
change (Levay, 2010) seem in this way linked with emotion and its significance for leading 
successful change through policy aimed at managing employee anxieties, uncertainties, and 
fears. One must be careful in relating the findings of the current thesis to a concept like 
leadership because leadership research has also recognized emotion management as “popular 
ideas and fads” (Zaccaro and Hom, 2003).  
Looking forward towards the effective management of emotion as a mental process, a few 
questions come to the surface; how is emotion as a mental experience managed on a day to 
day basis during change? How is change implemented by winning employee emotions through 
emotionally sensitive leadership and management practices? What is the mental picture of 
emotion that ‘leader-follower’ or ‘management-employee’ relations should draw on?  
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Such questions do not advocate that we necessarily send managers to do courses in 
psychology or therapy, which are forms of education in their own right (Greenberg, 2004; Kelly, 
2003). The point is aptly articulated by Fineman (2003 .p.197) “To be sensitive to emotions does 
not mean transforming the manger into a psychoanalyst. Basically, and pragmatically, it is 
increasing the manger’s awareness of the role and legitimacy of emotions in organizational 
transactions, and about the organizational benefits that this can bring.” In the current thesis, this 
means increasing clarity and knowledge around how change may mentally impact workers. 
Pragmatically, for workers this is about employing methods of coping with emotion during 
change, both for the self and others.     
Overall, the current thesis has illustrated emotion as a variable that requires a clearer 
conception in organizational change literature. This is a quest that can also benefit academic 
understanding in other areas of organizational development. Addressing ‘what emotion is’, has 
been the onus of the current thesis. How should it be conceived or pictured as a mental 
process? Ultimately, the transient nature of emotion continues to present challenges for 
achieving this goal in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
 
3.0 EXTERNAL SOURCE 
 
Online publication by the NHS link from the Institute for Innovation and Improvement: 
http://www.institute.nhs.uk/quality_and_value/productivity_series/the_productive_series.html    
 
 
3.1 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE COPY    
 
This section is a set of guidelines that were used to conduct the interviews.  
 
 
Opening 
 
I. Opening Section (Establish some Rapport) – Meet and Greet. Introduce myself and 
gently explain the purpose of my visit and how it is entirely optional. “We can stop at any 
time you like for a break or if you feel like discontinuing.” Explain it’s not anything like an 
appraisal.  
II. Purpose of visit – Explain research aim and output and rationale.  
III. Outcome and benefits – Explain the motivation behind the research and the kind of 
benefits it can have in looking at employees during change.  
IV. Ethical Dimension of the Interview should be clarified including confidentiality and 
anonymity.  
 
Main Body 
 
I. Give example of an emotional incident.  
II. Give them time to think up of an incident and while they think make sure the recording 
equipment and the tools for note taking are all in reach. Keep a neutral face with a 
friendly demeanor.  
III.  Listen to the incident and guide any places where they might need to go into more depth. 
Think ‘Beliefs’. Feelings, evaluations, reactions.  
IV. To get to deeper thinking ask “Why they thought that or felt that?” 
V. Move between emotion and feeling.  
VI. Once grid elements down on paper with constructs give them a break for 10 minutes.  
VII. Come back ask them to go over grid with you. Get them to provide ratings. 
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Closing 
 
I. Summarize that it was a good experience. You plan to look at the experiences closer.  
II. Show appreciation for their participation. Provide option to contact you for feedback. 
Explain that the data might require coming back for more. Ask how they felt and if the 
interviews were fine. 
 
 
5.1 PARTICIPANTS PERSONAL GRIDS   
This section contains the personal grids constructed during interviews with the research 
participants at the network. Each grid consists of elements (i.e. incidents across the top) and 
constructs in each row. Ratings are provided. The ratings range from 1-5 to 1-8. This has no 
deliberate significance. The participants in interviews were merely asked whether they were 
comfortable with a range and to select one. The ratings were filled in by the research 
participants. 
 
Rachel’s Personal Grid 
  
1 Seeing the 
reconfiguration 
plan, concerned 
with fear 
Felt 
annoyed 
at offer 
that was 
not 
enough 
Information 
gathering 
feel 
frustrated 
and angry  
They not 
listening 
felt anger 
/ignored 
No Personal 
assistant, 
which is 
needed, feel 
anger 
5 
Response No response 5 5 5 5 Less 
Response 
Concerned Both 1 1 5 5 Not 
concerned 
Committed 
Others 
1 5 5 5 Not 
Concerned 
Ignorant 
Others 
Inclusion 5 5 5 5 5 Exclusion 
Fair 5 5 No 
Response 
 
5 5 Contain 
with a lid 
Feel 
Valued 
5 5 5 5 5 Exploitative 
Beneficial 1 5 1 5 5 Costly 
Controlled 1 5 5 5 5 Chaotic 
Capacity 5  1 5  Boredom 
Sensible 5 5 5 5 5 Not 
sensible 
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Notes: The grid shows that Rachel felt Excluded with a rating of 5 in favour of this pole as oppose to the 
opposing pole of Inclusion. The situation seemed to be “Not sensible” with a high rating of 5 across the 
incidents. Rachel believed that the restructuring was costly. The cost to her appeared to be a threat, a 
threat made of the thought that she might loose her job tasks. 
 
  
 
 
Emma’s Personal Grid – Administrator in the team. 
 
1 Stakeholder 
Event felt 
satisfied, 
sense of worth 
Oppressed 
by Manager, 
fear and 
anger 
Anger Felt 
maligned 
over 
argument  
Frustrated 
didn’t know 
what or why 
Frustrated 
with tasks 
4 
Control 1 4 1 4 2 Less control 
Self 
concerned 
1 1 1 1 4 Altruistic 
Authoritarian 
Behaviour 
4 1 1 4 4 Everyone 
has a voice 
Dominant 1 1 1 1 3 Sharing 
Uncertain 4 1 1 1 3 Certainty 
Rigid 4 1 1 1 4 Flexible 
Intimidating 4 1 1 1 4 Empowering 
Anxious 4 1 1 1 4 Certain 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniela’s Personal Grid – Administrator in the team 
 
1 Satisfied at 
gaining 
position 
Fear of 
Alternatives 
Anger 
not fairly 
treated 
Fear/anger 
colleagues 
actions, made 
me feel 
victimized 
Anger at 
meeting 
colleague 
5 
Feel 
Inadequate 
5 1 1 1 1 More things to 
do 
Stressed 5 1 1 1 1 Relaxed 
Low Moral 5 1 1 1 1 Motivated 
Felt 
appreciated 
1 5 5 5 5 Felt pressured 
Felt like 
Expressing 
Self 
1 1 1 1 1 Contain with a lid 
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Feel Valued 1 3 5 5 5 Less Valued 
Intense 
Feeling 
1 1 1 1 1 Passive 
Feel Isolated 5 1 3 5 5 Feel connected 
with 
Surroundings 
 
 
  
Charlie’s Personal Grid  - Assistant Manager in the team 
 
 
1 Angry at 
colleague for 
going behind 
back and 
contacted 
Richard 
Anger and 
frustration 
at re-
grading 
Felt 
angry 
left job 
tasks 
Confrontation 
with colleague, 
felt angry, 
contacted 
Richard 
Felt 
frustrated 
and angry, 
decided to 
expand 
pathways 
8 
Felt let down 2 1 1 4 1 Supported 
Let down 7 7 7 3 1 Anger 
Trust 7 7 8 7 7 Lack of 
trust 
Angry with 
Others 
1 8 1 1 8 Angry at 
nobody 
More aware 2 2 2 3 4 Less aware 
Frustration 2 1 1 2 2 Being 
heard 
Others 
Unjust 
behavior 
2 4 2 2 4 My Unjust 
behavior 
Felt ignored 4 1 4 4 4 Included 
Not 
appreciated 
1 2 2 2 4 Valued 
Achieved 
personal 
goals 
4 4 2 4 4 Not 
achieved 
personal 
Goals 
Self aware 2 2 2 1 2 Little insight 
into self 
 
 
 
 
Penny’s Personal Grid -  Administrator in the team. 
 
1 Asked 
to act 
Fiddling 
with time 
Angry 
and 
Angry at 
Gatekeeper 
Angry and 
Frustrated 
Afraid of 
colleague 
8 
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up, 
was 
angry 
made 
me 
angry  
decided 
to leave 
at situation 
Trustworthy 8 8 8 8 8 8 Not 
Trustworthy  
Not reliable 1 1 1 1 1 1 Others reliable 
Others Not 
listening 
1 3 1 1 1 1 Acknowledged 
Hesitant 1 1 1 1 1 1 Not Hesitant 
Afraid 1 1 1 1 1 1 Not Afraid 
Poor 
Management 
by Others 
1 1 1 1 1 1 Good 
Management 
by Self 
No formal 
recognition 
1 1 1 1 1 1 Formal 
Recognition 
Confused 1 3 1 1  1 Clear 
Felt 
Incapable 
1 1 1 1  1 Felt 
Empowered 
 
 
 
Richard’s Personal Grid – Team Manager 
 
1 Felt Frustrated and Angry at 
meeting proposals 
Anger and Intolerance at 
Meeting 
7 
Others Know 6 7 Others do not 
know 
Control 1 1 Anarchy 
Influence 6 1 Lack of Influence 
Order 1 7 Dis-order 
Not being heard 1 1 Being 
understood 
Others 
undermining 
1 3 Others 
supporting 
Right 7 3 Wrong 
 
 
 
 
 
Susan’s Personal Grid – Team Personal Assistant 
 
1 Fear of 
restructuring 
process 
Anger at 
lack of 
information 
Afraid 
of new 
role  
Felt bad 
for 
colleague 
Afraid of 
other 
person 
taking my 
role away  
Feeling 
Fear 
about my 
future   
8 
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Knowing 8 8 8 2 4 7 Not knowing 
Uncertain 1 1 2 2 4 2 Certain 
Insecure 1 2 2 7 4 2 Security 
Job Hope 5 8 7 2 2 7 Pessimistic 
Self-aware 1 1 2 2 2 2 Complacent 
Control 8 7 7 7 7 7 Out of 
control 
Afraid 1  2 4 1 1 Not afraid 
Adequate 
support 
8 1 2 7 4 8 Inadequate 
Support 
Frustration 1 1 1 2 2 1 Less 
pressure 
  
 
 
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENTS SHARED BY THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
This section provides a summary of the research incidents shared by participants and it highlights the 
components of covered throughout the thesis namely, intentionality, feelings, beliefs, congruence, 
immediacy and certainty.  
 
 
Rachel  
Incident  Summary of Incident  
 
“Seeing the change proposals concerned with 
fear” 
 
This was when Rachel saw 
change proposals. She was 
uncertain about change and felt 
fear because it was unknown. The 
impact on her job was not known 
and she spiraled into what-If 
scenarios (congruence). Change 
seemed a bad thing. It was a 
continuous erosion of her current 
position at work. Slowly chipping 
away. She believed its impact 
while not known, could be 
adverse. She evaluated change as 
exploitative because it was not 
communicated. If there was 
nothing to hide than why not 
communicate the change clearly. 
In fear she formed more beliefs 
characterizing change as a threat, 
albeit one that is to be feared 
because she understood that her 
job could be replaced. It all 
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seemed unfair due to asymmetry 
in what they knew and what the 
change implementers knew. 
Uncertainty added to fear because 
it signaled that all types of 
possibilities could emerge. It was 
all chaotic. Did not feel like she 
was part of change. She was 
frustrated at being left out and not 
being included. This turned to fear 
once Rachel thought about what 
was fearful such as job loss or 
implications for her life goals 
(intentionality). Although the 
impact of the change on job tasks 
was not clear the fear she 
experienced made the change 
look like a threat that was closer 
than it would otherwise seem 
outside of an emotional experience 
(immediacy). As a process it grew 
closer everyday she thought about 
it. In fear she reacted by 
Suppressing the incident. This was 
her fear driven formation of her 
reactive belief.    
 
 
“Felt annoyed at offer that was not enough” 
 
As part of change there was the 
creation of a new role. Rachel was 
offered a job. She was annoyed 
and frustrated. She felt the offer 
was not enough. Believed it was 
exploitative. Believed the impact 
was immediate costs (congruence 
and immediacy). Frustrated that 
the offer did not make sense and 
could not pinpoint where it was 
coming from. From frustration 
unable to reach an emotion due to 
lack of intentionality (non-
intentionality). Reacted by 
believing that forgetting the offer is 
best (suppressing). 
 
 
 
 
“Information Gathering feel frustrated and 
angry” 
 
This was a time of frustration and 
anger. Rachel experience 
frustration because she was 
unable to carry out her job amidst 
change reforms. The person who 
was going to provide information 
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was not doing that. Believed it was 
ignorant others (Evaluative 
beliefs). Frustration turned to 
anger once the person was 
blamed as incompetent. Felt 
excluded from things. Frustration 
involved aimless chaos and this 
turned to anger once there was 
aim towards the person who was 
responsible (i.e. intentionality). 
Formed belief to react by forgetting 
the whole affair (reactive belief). 
Section 4.5.3 in chapter four 
shows that intentionality was 
potently present in this incident as 
a general and a detailed focus. It 
turned frustration to anger.     
 
 
 
“They not listening felt anger/ignored 
 
During change there was 
uncertainty. The change was 
perceived as a bad thing. Rachel 
felt excluded. She believed that 
her input was not included. She 
saw herself as an outsider. 
Ignored. (Congruence and 
certainty of exclusion). Was angry 
and formed the belief that it was 
not fair and her anger was directed 
at them, the change implementers 
(Intentionality). Formed the belief 
to confront after having 
suppressed her thoughts was a 
while (confront).      
 
 
 
 
“No personal assistant which is needed, feel 
anger” 
 
This was a time when in the 
backdrop of perception of change 
as poorly managed and not 
communicated Rachel was not 
getting the support she needed. 
She was frustrated and believed 
she was being exploited because 
she did not have the personal 
assistant that was needed for 
helping with her job. The 
implication was that the lack of 
resource was seen as an imminent 
threat. It was pending 
(immediacy). Frustration turned to 
anger once she was able to pin 
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point and direct blame on to 
persons (Intentionality).       
 
Emma 
Incident  Summary of Incident  
 
“Stakeholder event felt satisfied, sense of 
worth” 
 
This was an event that Emma 
attended. It was for her 
development. There was a feeling 
of satisfaction and being involved 
in change. The event was thrust 
upon her as a prescription. At the 
same time she believed it was 
empowering. She also felt 
frustrated at not knowing where 
the event fit into the whole change 
process at the network. Against 
the backdrop of uncertainty it was 
confusing. She was uncertain. A 
not very informative incident 
relative to other data.       
 
 
“Oppressed by Manager, fear and anger” 
 
This is when Emma was under 
attack. The manager was 
oppressive and not supportive. 
Uncertainty was high. She was self 
concerned. There was fear and 
anger. She was afraid with the 
belief that she had no control and 
could lose her job (congruence). 
She was angry with the belief that 
the manager was rigid and not 
flexible (Evaluative beliefs). She 
was certain of this (certainty). At 
some level she was also frustrated 
(non-intentionality) and this 
translated to emotion every time 
she blamed the manager 
(intentionality). Reacted by forming 
the belief that she should forget 
the incidents (suppression).      
 
 
“Anger Felt maligned over argument” 
 
There was a meeting to discuss 
change proposals. A 
misunderstanding with a colleague 
unfolded. One of the 
organizational change people had 
a different opinion. Before she 
knew it she was angry. Emma 
believed outright that the colleague 
was mistaken and would not let go 
of legacy systems (Certainty). 
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After the meeting her boss blamed 
her cautioned her. This further 
fuelled the anger. In anger she 
believed that she was being 
maligned. It was not fair on her. 
She forms the belief to suppress 
the conflict. (see chapter 5. 
Section 5.7.1)      
 
 
“Frustrated didn’t know what or why” 
 
The incident was about Emma 
feeling frustrated over a period of 
time during change. She was 
frustrated felt intimidated with talk 
of change. The rumors. Everyone 
had a voice and yet there was not 
clear direction. It was not clear and 
there was uneasiness. Frustration 
thus involved a loss of direction. 
Things seemed closer than 
otherwise. They seem to be 
getting worse (immediacy and 
congruence).     
 
 
“Frustrated with tasks” 
 
The incident involved frustration at 
inability to do tasks. Amidst 
change she was asked to do some 
tasks and without proper training 
she struggled. Everyone told her 
something different about what to 
do. Believes it’s unfair on her. She 
believed strongly that there was 
her inability but that it was related 
to lack of clear direction or 
instruction (non-intentionality). Her 
frustration is not yet an emotion 
because there is nothing to 
pinpoint the blame on. Its just a 
cloud of confusion where in her 
altruistic reaction she considers 
everyone’s instruction and ends 
with no clear direction, no 
aboutness. That her frustration is 
about nothing in particular. It’s 
inability and lack of direction. 
Forms belief to do nothing and just 
forget the tasks (suppressing). 
 
     
 
Daniela 
Incident  Summary of Incident  
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“Satisfied at gaining position” The incident was a time when 
Daniela had been chasing after a 
position that had opened up as 
part of change at the network. With 
uncertainty about change this 
position would provide satisfaction. 
She believed that she might 
otherwise suffer and there would 
be all sorts of negative 
consequences (congruence). She 
secured the position. Elated and 
satisfied. This incident was 
somewhat different from the others 
because it really showed a relaxed 
but intense positive feeling. Unlike 
in other incidents change was 
accepted. Feeling elated was like 
being satisfied and feeling valued 
as part of change. This had little 
value in the context of other 
incidents. However it showed that 
change was in this single instance, 
just momentarily, appreciated due 
to positive impact for the self.        
 
 
“Fear of Alternatives” 
 
The incident was when Daniela 
was afraid of what might happen. 
She heard about the change 
proposals while sitting in her office. 
There was a rumor circulating 
around the office, that change 
might mean new jobs would be 
created and old ones abolished. 
There was frustration at not 
knowing more. She felt unable to 
react with the belief that the impact 
on her job tasks was not known. In 
fear she formed negative beliefs 
about what might happen, job loss, 
mortgage burden, career 
deterioration (congruence and 
immediacy). She felt inadequate 
during change. She was under 
duress and felt pressure. The 
feeling was intense yet one of 
isolation. She believed she was 
not a part of the change 
(Evaluative beliefs). Her reaction in 
fear was initially to form the belief 
that she should seek out 
information. As an administrator at 
lower levels in the hierarchy she 
believed that she should stay quiet 
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(suppress). This was her reactive 
belief based on the belief that 
confronting the situation would 
only make things worse for her 
and her job security.         
 
 
 
“Anger not fairly treated” 
 
The incident was about a time 
when Daniela believed she was 
treated unfairly. She had come 
back off sick leave. She joined a 
group of workers. She explained to 
the team leader that she might 
take time to learn. She was angry 
because the team leader would 
not help her and criticized her 
performance. The leader was seen 
as the object of the anger 
(intentionality). Her actions were 
unfair. In anger believes that the 
leader is just that sort of unfair 
person. Likely to be unfair given 
any event (immediacy). The threat 
here is exaggerated. There was 
certainty in her belief that the 
leader was just that sort of unfair 
person. Perhaps a certainty 
unattainable outside of anger. 
Formed belief to confront the 
problem, a reactive belief.  
(see chapter 5 section 5.6.1.         
 
 
“Fear/Anger colleagues actions, made me feel 
victimized” 
 
The incident involved Daniela 
becoming fearful of the change 
training sessions. These sessions 
had been introduced in order to 
provide some skills and awareness 
to participants who were extremely 
uncertain about the change. Moral 
was low and Daniela initially felt 
afraid holding the belief that she 
might not being able to do the 
tasks. She moved on from this fear 
when the training made her feel a 
part of the change. But there was 
pressure. She grew angry at the 
pressure. Not being able to fully 
perform her tasks she felt 
inadequate. There was frustration 
and this turned to anger once she 
pointed her finger at the training 
sessions as methods used by the 
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hospital to blanket the change. 
The training was confusing and 
frustration turned to anger with the 
belief that it was not correct and 
made her feel inadequate 
(Evaluative beliefs). The anger 
generated the belief that she 
should just swallow the situation 
and not react. Perhaps this may 
have been the result of returning to 
fear of what might happen had she 
reacted overtly by confronting the 
training session (reactive belief).     
 
“Anger at meeting colleague”  
The incident was a time when 
Daniela had grown vary of a 
colleague. During change this 
colleague was believed to 
deliberately hinder her job tasks. 
There seemed some ill will that 
Daniela had not revealed. 
However the two did not get along. 
One day the colleague refused to 
help out on a task that Daniela 
was struggling with. Specifically 
there was some information 
required and this was not being 
shared. Daniela grew angry and 
believed in anger that the 
colleague was wrong and just did 
not like her. She was frustrated at 
not being able to complete her job 
tasks and this turned to anger 
once she could blame this 
colleague (evaluative belief). It 
was unfair from her perspective. 
There was certainty of an extreme 
sort here (certainty). Daniela 
believed with conviction that 
seemed unshakable that, yes, this 
colleague was someone who did 
not like her very much. She 
reacted by confronting the 
colleague trying to talk to her 
(reactive belief). The colleague 
replied that it was just not in her 
ability to provide information. This 
Daniela believed was a lie. In 
anger this reinforced the belief that 
the colleague was a bad person. 
She formed similar beliefs that 
characterized the colleague as a 
bad and manipulative person 
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(congruence).          
 
Charlie 
Incident  Summary of Incident  
“Angry at colleague for going behind back and 
contacted Richard” 
 
The incident involved Charlie in an 
argument with a colleague about 
how to handle holiday application 
procedures. These had been 
modified during the change at the 
network and there was resistance 
from the other colleague. Charlie 
was anger. She formed the belief 
that the colleague was unfair 
towards others. The colleague 
falsely believed that some tasks 
were her responsibility (evaluative 
beliefs). Charlie tried to reason 
with the colleague but this further 
frustrated her when the colleague 
refused to acknowledge her 
attempts as anything but the 
factual. Charlie characterized the 
colleague as just that sort of unfair 
self-centered person. She saw her 
as a close threat. Closer and a 
bigger danger than she would 
otherwise appear outside anger 
(Immediacy and congruence). 
Again the certainty she attached to 
her belief in anger was strong to 
the extent that she formed the 
belief to go see the team leader 
(Richard). Her reactive belief was 
to confront Richard to intervene.    
      
 
 
“Anger and frustration at re-grading”  
The incident involved a process 
known as re-grading. As a part of 
organization wide change this 
process was introduced. It 
involved assessing the positions of 
workers, administrative and 
clinical, and assigning grades 
according to that. The process 
angered Charlie because she 
believed that it was not fair on her. 
She believed the assessments 
were not detailed enough and not 
broad enough to cover the full 
spectrum of what people like her 
did at the hospital. She believed 
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that people who were implanting 
the change were not competent 
and this came through in the 
insufficient workings of the re-
grading process (Evaluative 
beliefs). She felt let down. Unable 
to do anything to modify the re-
grading process she was 
frustrated and whenever she 
formed the belief that the process 
was bias towards clinicians, it 
fuelled her anger (congruence). 
Frustration turned to anger by 
attending to the process as flawed 
and bias against her. She held her 
beliefs with an absolute sort of 
conviction (certainty). The re-
grading took on a meaning 
whereby it was a large and 
imminent threat to her job and to 
related things outside the job such 
as her mortgage, her lifestyle, her 
relationships (Immediacy). Unable 
to do anything she formed the 
belief that she was helpless and 
just went with things. She reacted 
by suppressing the whole incident 
(reactive beliefs).          
 
 
“Felt Angry left job tasks” 
 
This incident involved frustration 
with job tasks in the context of 
change at the network. Charlie had 
experienced difficulty in carrying 
out her job because there was 
what she believed lack of 
information and support. She was 
angry with this belief in mind. 
Alongside she felt that things were 
wrong. A general indication. Both 
demonstrate knowing of by 
believing and at a more general 
level knowing of something by 
feeling (intentionality). In anger 
Charlie believed it was unfair to 
expect that she would facilitate 
change provided she was not 
given the support she asked for. 
Change processes were unfair on 
her (Evaluative beliefs). Frustration 
at inability to complete job tasks 
turned to anger once processes 
that hindered support were 
blamed. She reacted by leaving 
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the job tasks to one side and 
confronting the change 
implementers. She explained what 
was and was not possible given 
the resources. Thus her anger 
died out once conflict had 
extinguished.      
 
 
“Confrontation with colleague, felt angry, 
contacted Richard” 
 
The change processes had put in 
place some guidelines. Thereby 
Charlie’s relationships with a 
colleague had changed in the 
sense that both were working 
closer together. The colleague one 
day ran to Charlie and told on 
another colleague. She complaint 
that there was dishonesty and 
people were not with the change. 
Charlie grew angry because she 
believed that this colleague who 
worked closely with her had some 
hidden agenda. In anger she 
formed beliefs about the sort of 
person her colleague had become. 
Looking out for her own back and 
telling on other people so that she 
would look regal in comparison. 
Charlie did not trust her. Formed 
the belief that she could not be 
relied on. Formed congruent 
beliefs that there close working 
relationship headed for doom 
(congruence). The colleague 
appeared a closer danger than she 
perhaps would were Charlie’s 
gaze not shrouded with anger. The 
reactive belief formed by Charlie 
led her to contact the team leader 
to re-organize the working 
procedures and distance Charlie 
from her colleague. A reactive 
belief that enabled anger to 
diffuse.        
 
 
“Felt Frustrated and angry, decided to expand 
pathways” 
 
The incident involved frustration 
and anger at pathways. The 
pathways are journeys for 
terminally ill patients and form end 
of life care. Charlie was frustrated 
because she believed that 
pathways were insufficient. 
Change had formed certain 
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modifications and these were not 
enough for delivering good end of 
life care. She believed patients 
suffered while costs were 
minimized. (Congruence). She 
was frustrated because she was 
unable to make the pathways 
better. Her frustration turned to 
anger when she believed that 
change implementers were to 
blame (Intentionality). In anger 
these evaluative beliefs were held 
with certainty. She also believed 
that others could not be trusted. 
So she formed the belief that she 
needs to take matters into her own 
hands. The situation seemed 
impending and closer than ever 
before (a sense of Immediacy). 
She formed the belief to confront 
implementers of change who were 
expanding pathways. In her anger 
she was convinced that this was 
the one way that would work and 
pathways would become better. 
Her frustration and anger would 
thus be extinguished.  
 
  
Penny  
Incident  Summary of Incident  
 
“Asked to act up was angry” 
 
The incident was about gaining a 
promotion. At one point during 
Change Penny had found the 
opportunity for career 
advancement. She had been 
promised a promotion and then 
subsequently that did not 
materialize. She was angry and 
felt that she had been wronged. 
She also believed in anger that 
others were not to be trusted and 
were not competent. What she felt 
and believed was directed towards 
others who were seen as 
incompetent (intentionality). The 
anger formed further negative 
beliefs including – others are not 
reliable, they do not listen, they are 
poor managers, I am a victim and 
confused, I am incapable – such 
beliefs propagated the negativity of 
anger (congruence). Penny was 
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also very certain and this was 
demonstrated by her extreme 
ratings and her belief that she was 
a victim at the hands of others who 
were unfair towards her 
(Evaluative beliefs and certainty). 
The belief formed was to cope with 
the situation by forgetting it 
(suppressing). In cases explored 
this tendency to suppress is one 
option that stands in contrast with 
the alternative belief to react by 
confronting others.           
 
 
“Fiddling with the time made me angry” 
 
The incident was a time when 
Penny was angry and believed 
that colleagues were being 
dishonest and fiddling with time. 
She believed they were covering it 
up. They were dishonest people 
and needed to be exposed. This 
was not good for the network and 
for change implementation. These 
workers were not reliable 
(evaluative beliefs). She informed 
her manager. The manager she 
believed took no action. This 
manager was poor at her job.     
 
(see chapter 4 section 4.7.1 and 
chapter 5 section 5.4) 
 
“Angry and decided to leave”  
The incident involved Penny 
becoming angry at the way the 
network was being run amidst 
change. In anger she had formed 
the belief that the whole change 
management project was flawed. 
In particular she believed that 
colleagues were not able. One day 
she had to carry out a job task. It 
made her angry that she was not 
able to do the work due to 
disagreement with colleagues 
about the methods involved for 
completing a spreadsheet. She 
was angry because she felt 
undermined. She believed that 
others were no reliable. Others 
were not trustworthy when it came 
to completing the spreadsheet and 
tasks of that sort. They were a 
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threat (Immediacy). The specific 
spreadsheet she was working on 
in collaboration with others was 
interpreted by Penny with a 
certainty not shared by others. She 
held steadfast to her beliefs. Anger 
brought about this strong 
conviction in her way as the right 
way to get the task done 
(certainty). In anger Penny formed 
more related evaluative beliefs 
including the belief that she 
received no recognition from 
others and that it was her against 
them. Things were getting from 
bad to worse. Anger maintained a 
grim outlook (congruence). She 
formed the belief to react by 
suppressing the whole affair and 
actively forgetting everything 
(reactive belief). Thus her anger 
dissipated.      
 
 
“Angry at Gatekeeper” 
 
The incident was about a time that 
Penny was angry because she felt 
and believed she was being 
policed. A person had been brought 
in and she was somebody that 
Penny had despised for being 
unfair towards her. Penny did not 
believe that this person had the 
ability to police her. The term police 
indicated that Penny believed she 
was being stalked or watched 
without due justification. She 
believed that the gatekeeper was 
targeting her time and had little right 
to do so. Things were getting 
worse. The gatekeeper was a 
hindrance to her ability to do her job 
(congruence). See chapter 5 Table 
5.1 and section 5.5.1. In anger the 
gatekeeper is seen as a threat and 
an imminent one. A threat to the 
increasing involvement in change 
programs that Penny desired. 
Penny reacted by suppressing her 
anger because she believed she as 
incapable. Her frustration that had 
turned to anger towards the 
gatekeeper (intentionality); was in 
the end actively suppressed. This 
was the reactive belief she formed 
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in anger.  
 
    
“Angry and Frustrated at situation”  
The incident was about a time when 
Penny was frustrated with her 
treatment on a team project. As a 
change initiative the project was 
about reducing lead times. These 
were times taken to measure the 
delivery of certain treatments to 
patients. Penny believed that her 
opinion was not considered and 
she was sidelined. She was 
frustrated at her inability to 
influence the project and to 
influence others. This turned to 
anger when she realized that she 
was not being involved to the extent 
that she wanted to be involved 
(intentionality). Her anger painted a 
gloomy picture and the others 
seemed conspiring and actively 
sidelining her (congruence). The 
situation was something that Penny 
found difficult to cope with. In anger 
she formed the belief that she could 
not trust others. Those others were 
unfair in not providing her with the 
attention that she believed she 
deserved. There was a bitter 
certainty in her beliefs. Anger 
further confirmed her beliefs. An 
unshakable certainty was inherent 
in anger formed beliefs (Certainty). 
Given her marginal involvement 
and increasing feeling of anger 
towards others Penny formed the 
belief to just forget about the project 
and go back to her daily basic 
tasks. She suppressed her anger 
and related beliefs (reactive belief).      
   
“Afraid of colleague”  
The incident involved intimidation 
felt by Penny. She was afraid of a 
colleague who she believed had 
intimidated her by shouting at her. 
On one occasion Penny explained 
that she had gotten involved in an 
argument with her colleague. The 
colleague was higher up the 
hierarchy at the network. The 
argument was about a work 
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procedure. Penny believed that the 
colleague shouted and her with the 
intent to stare her down, and 
influence her to withdraw her 
contrasting opinion. Penny was 
afraid of the colleague. Her fear 
presented the colleague as a threat 
that was progressively getting 
worse (Congruence). In her fear 
she saw the colleague as a pending 
threat to her job tasks. She believed 
the colleague was out to get her. 
This attributed a villainous 
character to the colleague who may 
not have seemed so dangerous 
had Penny not been shrouded in 
fear. The threat looks closer than it 
otherwise would seem (immediacy). 
The competence of the colleague is 
attacked in so far as Penny forms 
the belief that she is incompetent 
and contriving. Her incompetence is 
a threat as well in so far as she may 
inadvertently also harm Penny’s 
career. In fear Penny reacts by 
initially confronting the fearful 
colleague by gently explaining her 
concerns. The colleague countered 
this with more intimidation. Penny 
retracted and formed the belief to 
just get on with her job. A reactive 
belief to suppress the troubles she 
faced.     
    
  
Richard  
 
“Felt Frustrated and Angry at Meeting 
proposals” 
 
The incident took place not too long 
ago. There was a meeting about 
change initiatives and about the 
plans that had to be developed and 
implemented at the network. The 
incident showed anger about the 
change.  He believed with a strong 
conviction that the change 
implementers were not doing the 
right things. Richard was against 
the change. His frustration was that 
change implementers did not 
consider the expertise he had built 
over time and through experience. 
His view of the implementers was 
that they were there to hen their 
own nest. That is, look out for their 
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careers. There was a meeting and 
the plans shared in the meeting 
angered Richard. In his anger he 
saw these implementers of change 
as not possessing the right 
experience and the sort of people 
who thought like amateurs 
(congruence). Such evaluative 
beliefs painted a negative picture of 
change. Richard believed that his 
opinion was not being heard and he 
had lack of influence. He saw this 
as unfair because he was the 
expert with relevant experience and 
these outsiders, the change 
implementers, were the ones who 
were calling the shots. He felt he 
was undermined. He felt they were 
wrong. Both beliefs and feelings are 
directed towards them 
(intentionality). The reaction if to 
form the belief that ‘I cannot work 
with these people’. They are here to 
destroy what ‘I have worked hard to 
build.’   
 
(See chapter 4 section 4.2 and 
chapter 5 section 5.7.1.) 
 
 
Anger and Intolerance at Meeting 
 
This incident was about a second 
meeting. The meeting was met with 
the same animosity and anger by 
Richard. The meeting still in the 
shadow of the previous meeting 
fared no better in Richards’s eyes. 
He saw the situation getting worse 
(congruence – see chapter 5. 
Section 5.7.1). There was a strong 
conviction in Richards beliefs that 
the change was doomed. The 
meeting unveiled more arguments 
about how to proceed forward. 
Richard in anger believed that what 
he had left behind, his legacy, the 
procedures, the formalized rules, 
things that had worked well – were 
being sidelined. He believed it 
would be unfair on everybody at the 
network. The knowledge had to 
come from the inside and not from 
external actors who acted 
unilaterally. The frustration turns to 
anger by pointing fingers at the 
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incompetent change implementers. 
In anger what seems certain is that 
‘my way’ is right and by comparison 
alternatives seem less viable. In 
Richards case he did have more 
experience. In anger he formed the 
belief to simply forget the troubling 
affairs. If he could not change them 
than no point in mulling. He 
suppressed.  
 
   
Susan  
Incident  Summary of Incident  
 
 
“Fear at restructuring process” 
 
 
The incident involved her 
recognition of the idea that the 
process of change at the network 
is threatening. She was afraid and 
believed that restructuring (i.e. 
change) was a threat to her job 
tasks. Ever since she had heard 
rumors her concerns had grown. 
She believed the change was not 
very well managed. This was 
because it was not well 
communicated. One day she 
received an email sent out across 
the network. This email explained 
the change as an exercise in 
efficient delivery of patient care 
and better cost management. It 
was the latter aspect of cost 
management that hit Susan. In 
fear she saw the cost 
management exercise as the 
slashing of jobs. Immediately she 
felt in danger. Things spiraled from 
bad to worse. She believed that 
perhaps she would lose her job 
any moment. An exaggerated 
reality gripped her (congruence 
and Immediacy).         
 
 
 
 
“Anger at lack of information” 
 
 
This was when Susan had found 
out about the restructuring 
(Change). There was extreme 
uncertainty in her mind. The 
change had not been 
communicated to her particularly in 
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terms of what it meant for her job 
tasks. There were concerns about 
whether she would lose her job 
and what might happen next. In 
fear the anticipation was to think 
about more negative outcomes 
rather than any positive ones (i.e. 
congruence). She saw a spiral of 
negative beliefs.    
 
 
 
 
“Afraid of new role” 
 
 
The incident took place when 
Susan was a new arrival. She had 
joined the cancer care network 
and was settling into her role. She 
remembers feeling afraid and 
frustrated. She was frustrated at 
her inability to learn tasks quicker. 
Her first meeting involved fear and 
the belief that she might not be 
able to carry out the tasks. She 
might get confused or not step up 
to expectations (Evaluative 
beliefs). There were several 
negative beliefs inferred one 
leading to another (congruence). 
Her reaction was to form the belief 
that she must take a proactive 
approach and keep going. This 
enabled escape from emotion 
(reactive belief).  
 
    
 
 
 
 
“Felt bad for colleague and confused/angry” 
 
 
 
Thinking about a colleague she 
believed that he was not treated 
appropriately by change 
implementers (Evaluative belief). 
There was a lack of resources for 
carrying out job tasks. She Grew 
angry saw others as threatening to 
the carrying out of job tasks during 
change (Evaluative beliefs). 
Suppressed beliefs. In this incident 
there is some apparent lack of 
clarity in terms of what the emotion 
is about. This is one incident that 
was rare and demonstrated 
possible non-intentionality 
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(discussed in chapter 4).  
 
 
 
 
“Afraid of other person taking my role away” 
 
 
This was an incident when Susan 
had found out about people joining 
the team. She was afraid that she 
might lose her job. She believed 
that job loss was likely (Evaluative 
belief). This was coupled with the 
beliefs that another person may be 
more capable and that another 
person wanted ‘my job.’ Spiraled 
into inferred beliefs sch as 
implications of job loss 
(congruence). The more she 
thought this way the more likely 
the possibilities seemed and the 
more her fear grew (certainty). In 
fear she formed the belief to react 
by suppressing these thoughts and 
actively forgetting about them 
(reactive belief).      
 
 
 
 
“Feeling fear about my future” 
 
 
This was a time when Susan had 
found out about the restructuring 
(Change). There was extreme 
uncertainty in her mind. The 
change had not been 
communicated to her particularly in 
terms of what it meant for her job 
tasks. There were concerns about 
whether she would lose her job 
and what might happen next. In 
fear the anticipation was to think 
about more negative outcomes 
rather than any positive ones (i.e. 
congruence). She saw a spiral of 
negative beliefs. Rumors further 
engendered negativity.     
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